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Tuesday, December 9, 2014

India's affordable housing challenge - a graphical summary

I have written earlier about the near impossibility of achieving the government's affordable housing mandate. The following graphics reinforce the point.

The country has one of the highest price-to-rent ratio among all its emerging Asian peers, thereby constraining demand. This points to over-valued property prices, a fact reflected here.
This is complemented by low rental yields, the gross annual rental income expressed as a share of property purchase price. Rental yields, a measure of the landlord's return on investment, have been stagnant at 2.5-3% for a long time.
The combination of these two factors severely distorts the country's property markets. The former prices a large share of the population out of the market. The low rental yields, over and above acute land scarcity and high building costs, come as a disincentive to creation of housing stock other than for living in, and encourages land owners to hoard land rather than build on it. The combined effect of both is to severely constrain demand and supply respectively.

This effect is even more pernicious given the nature of demand and supply in India. The country's affordable urban housing demand stood at 25 million in 2010, of which 16.6 m was in slums. Nearly 90% of the demand comes from households with incomes below Rs 5,00,000.
The real estate consultancy Jones Lang LaSalle estimates that 60% of the demand would come from households with annual incomes below Rs 5,00,000, whereas units for them constitute just 10% of the total supply. Interestingly, those with incomes greater than Rs 7,00,000 form just 20% of the demand, whereas a whopping 70% of the units in the market caters to them. In other words, 90% of the housing units in the market cater to the demands of just 40% of the population, those with incomes above Rs 5,00,000.
A 2010 MGI report highlighted the housing unaffordability problem for those below the Rs 5,00,000 income barrier. The graphic below shows the affordability gap for Tier 2 cities in 2010. The affordability gap is massive among those at the bottom two categories...
... who make up the majority of the population. In 2005, they formed nearly 95% of the total population. Even in 2015, the share of population with household income below Rs 2,00,000 is estimated to be 78%.  
In the circumstances, meeting the affordable housing challenge appears a distant dream. 

Update 1 (27.02.2020)

A good graphical piece on India's real estate market here. This captures the unaffordability challenge. 
While Mumbai has among the lowest parking charges, its vehicles take up a disproportionate share of the space available.
A parked vehicle consumes the space of 8 people in Mumbai, while in New York Mid town, it occupies the space of .42 people.

Monday, December 8, 2014

The Great Depression - Greek Edition

The Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent Great Recession visited untold economic suffering on both sides of the Atlantic. But, as the graphic from Barry Rithotz below shows, nowhere was this as comparable to the Great Depression as in Greece.
The Greek economy contracted by more than a quarter and is even today at just three-fourths its 2008 baseline! The other PIIGS also have a fair bit to recover even to get back to the baseline levels of output. 

Saturday, December 6, 2014

India drugs regulation capability fact of the day

The spate of punitive actions by the US FDA on drugs manufacturing facilities in India in recent months on grounds of impurities in samples and falsification of test results draws attention to the role of the Indian regulator, the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI). In particular, this from a Business Standard report stands out,
While the Indian regulator has a total staff of 650, the USFDA has 20 times more at 13,000. 
For a sector with exports worth $14.6 bn in 2012-13, of which 26% went to the US, and with over 370 US FDA approved pharmaceuticals manufacturing facilities, the largest number outside the US, the level of regulatory over-sight leaves much to be desired. Apart from being a reflection of the doubtful corporate governance standards, the punitive actions are a reminder of the glaring deficiencies in India's state capability. If the "Make in India" campaign, and sustainable economic growth itself, is to stand any chance of success, the country needs to fix its sorely deficient state capability.

The grossly inadequate regulatory personnel is a first order deficiency and is representative of governance and regulatory failures across sectors. Early this year, the US FAA had downgraded the country's aviation safety ranking to Category II citing 31 inadequacies, including deficient technical expertise, lack of trained personnel (more than 500 vacancies), record-keeping, and inspection procedures being followed by the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). 

Postscript : The Times carries an article on the government's efforts to ease environmental regulatory burdens by scrapping a layer of pollution inspections with voluntary disclosure and compliance by business owners. While streamlining the processes is welcome, it is unlikely to yield much benefits in the absence of its effective implementation.

It is here that India's state capability problems surface. Across states, the Pollution Control Boards (PCBs) are perceived as extremely corrupt and sorely lacking the professional competence and bandwidth to effectively discharge their implementation responsibilities. This is instructive of the capability deficit,
The newly appointed National Board for Wildlife, which must approve projects in and around protected areas, plowed through 140 pending projects during a two-day gathering in mid-August. One member said they worked at a rate of 15 to 30 minutes per file.
The point being made is that the weak state capability is as much a bandwidth problem as a professional competency problem. 

Friday, December 5, 2014

What to expect from mega construction projects

The Times carries an excellent story of yet another grandiose trophy project - the nearly $4 bn World Trade Center Transportation Hub - which is facing massive cost over-run and execution delay.

The Hub, with its winged "Oculus" pavilion, designed by the famed architect Santiago Calatrava, is being developed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. It is estimated to cost about $3.7 bn when it is likely to open in 2015, many years delayed and at more than twice the original estimate when the project was unveiled in 2004. After all this spending, it turns out that instead of being a predominantly transportation hub, the project would in all likelihood end up being a "high-priced mall, attracting more shoppers than commuters".

The experience from this and numerous other similar projects points to a few important lessons that appear universal for such projects

1. Cost over-runs and time delays are unavoidable, unless you are doing it in China. It is therefore appropriate to factor in this at the beginning using some form of "optimism bias" to accommodate the inevitability of delays and cost over-runs. This would help all parties - government agencies, developers, financiers, and citizens - appreciate the real challenge, instead of being misled by the highly deceptive initial estimations.

2. Star planners, designers, and architects are more likely than not to disappoint. However, this cannot be a reason for not considering them. They are essential to meet the client's (a political leader or a wealthy promoter) aspirational hubris, atleast when the project is initiated. It is just that the hype surrounding any sales pitch has a dynamic of its own which camouflages reality and most often fuels excessive expectations. Even other wise, plans submitted by them are likely to run into technical (it is rarely possible to literally translate the design into physical structure - any change to the design, which is mostly inevitable, to get it to suit field conditions is most likely to disrupt/compromise the original promised effect) and financial (it is too expensive to translate the design literally) challenges. Either ways, when the promised effect does not materialize and disappointment sets in, the architect/planner would blame it on the developer/government failing to keep its side of the contractual bargain.

A rigorous enough analysis of the design/plan (so as to test its aforementioned technical and financial dimensions) that can anticipate all possible technical/financial contingencies is almost impossible at the initial stages of a project. The emergent dynamics of these large projects are difficult to anticipate. So being disappointed with the work of star architects/designers is par for the course.

3. Much the same fate is likely with other important external service providers like project managers, owner's engineers, master planners, and construction contractors. This assumes significance since almost $655 million of the $3.7 bn for this project will be spent on such administrative costs. Disputes, like with the Hub's construction contractor Phoenix, are commonplace. It is difficult to write complete contracts that define the scope to last detail and capture all contingencies. The scope of work undergoes continuous changes at the different stages of execution for a variety of unforeseeable reasons. The best that can be done to mitigate this is too have in place enough flexibility within the contract to deal with such contingencies and attendance disputes, given the inevitability of it surfacing.

4. The emergent dynamics of such projects necessitate several decisions which are not easily justified on terms of objectivity. For example, from hindsight one gets the (mistaken) impression that in the Hub project, given the exorbitant increases in cost, there were occasions when the design could have been junked for a more prudent and financially viable one. But the reality is that the option value of shifting to a new design is most often zero, even negative, given the different types of sunk-costs associated with the original design. Or the decisions to agree for expensive sub-contracts to expedite the work, or the

This raises the question of how do public managers, especially in countries where post-construction audits are done with the apparent wisdom of hindsight, take decisions that do not fall foul with such auditors. This assumes great significance for India where audits-induced decision paralysis has become an important problem in recent years. In fact, a business as usual audit of this project in India could have incrimated all the concerned, including Mayor Bloomberg, of causing loss to public exchequer and even left many in jail. 

Tuesday, December 2, 2014

The Chinese and Japanese investment rush

In the past two months, the Chinese President Mr Xi Jinping and the Japanese PM Mr Shinzo Abe have promised investments worth $20 bn and $35 bn respectively over the next five years. In the aftermath, Chinese and Japanese investors have been swarming across the country, scouting investment opportunities. States like Andhra Pradesh have been aggressively courting these investors. A few observations.

1. The Chinese investment push is led by provincial governments, who have secured lending commitments aimed at India from the China Development Bank. In typical Chinese style, they are ready to deploy funds immediately and get started with investments. The Japanese investment push is led by its large trading houses, zaibatsus, who too have secured commitments from the country's overseas assistance and lending agencies JICA and JBIC respectively.

2. Investments come either in the form of government-to-government loans to help build infrastructure assets - high-speed rail is at the top of list for both countries - or by businesses to establish manufacturing and other facilities. Both countries, especially the Chinese, prefer loans. In fact, the Chinese provincial delegations have been expressing their intent to lend at the "most concessional rates" to governments, though there is considerable opacity about the terms of such lending.

Further, in both cases, loans are conditional on procuring their respective national firms, mostly through nomination. This means a go by to the conventional global competitive bidding that is the norm for awarding large public projects in India. In any case, only a small proportion of the massive investments that have been committed by the leadership of both countries can be realized through nominated public procurement.

3. The traditional and sustainable route of private capital investing in manufacturing and other facilities is a distant secondary prong for both countries. However, investors from both countries express willingness to invest in large development/economic zones if the state governments allot land to them. The JBIC financed Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) is a case in point. But there are limits to such investments and may not be desirable, especially if these investment zones come with large and prolonged fiscal concessions.

4. All the hype around these investment commitments should have opened up several large private-to-private investment partnership opportunities for Indian firms with those from China and Japan. However, such partnership announcements have been conspicuously missing in action. What is holding back Indian businesses from reaching out and establishing partnerships? For example, since Japanese investors have announced investment commitments in power generation, where are the JVs in local manufacturing of power generation equipments (BTG)?

5. Given their massive foreign exchange surpluses, currently invested in low yielding US Treasuries, both countries naturally view India as a large destination to invest their swelling surpluses at far more attractive returns. In turn, India has massive infrastructure and industrial investment demand which can be whetted only through large foreign capital inflows. There appears a great potential for mutually beneficial partnerships, though the fiscal space available with central and, especially, state governments for absorbing large volumes of loans may be limited.

All this raises several questions. Are central and state governments willing to preferentially nominate Chinese or Japanese firms for large public projects? Is it desirable to compromise on quality just to access the less demanding capital that accompanies Chinese and Japanese firms? Do state governments have the fiscal space to take loans to finance such large projects? Assuming a relatively stronger renminbi in the years ahead, do state governments have the ability to bear the forex risks associated with large exposures in projects (like HSR) where revenues are in rupees? Given the likely upward trajectory of interest rates globally and in both countries in the years ahead, how affordable are such loans? What is the likely cumulative cost of capital, when accounting for these risks?

What can be done to make it attractive for both investors to assume risks and invest in manufacturing and other industrial facilities in India? What can be done to promote private-to-private investment partnerships between business entities in both countries? What can be done to encourage investors from both countries to establish manufacturing facilities where Indian governments procure directly from Chinese and Japanese firms? What can be done to leverage Chinese and Japanese investment loans towards their JVs with Indian firms?  More ideally, can Indian firms, in some partnership with their firms, access this capital to establish industrial facilities here? Are the Chinese investors willing to set aside their propensity to in-source their labor for their projects? What is Indian state's economic diplomacy doing to facilitate partnerships and address concerns?

Answers to some or all of these questions, and its mutual appreciation, will give a more sustainable push to such investment partnerships. In its absence, such hype is likely to remain just that. 

Monday, December 1, 2014

The case for immigration, and social protections

Noah Smith makes the case for liberalized immigration which is as simple as anything I've read on the issue,
Tech companies want cheap labor. Tech workers -- or prospective tech workers -- want expensive labor. So they fight over whether to let in more skilled immigrants. Letting in more skilled immigrants will expand the industry (and the overall economy) a bit faster, but more of the revenue will flow to the owners and top-level managers of the companies. Letting in fewer immigrants will slow growth a bit for the industry and the economy, but will give a bigger piece of the pie to native-born skilled workers.  
Ignored in this argument are the rest of the people in the economy, the grocery clerks, cab drivers and landscapers who don’t have tech skills... The skilled immigrants will shop at the grocery stores, take cab rides and get their lawns landscaped, thus putting money into the pockets of the low-skilled American workers. 
Meanwhile, some native-born tech workers will be put out of a job, but since the number of jobs in the world isn’t fixed, they will find new jobs at new companies -- possibly for a bit less money than they earned before, but they will be OK. And with the creation of those new companies, the economy will grow... Some Americans might lose out, but more will gain, and the people who gain will be working-class laborers, not highly trained engineer types.
I agree with him completely. But the argument is incomplete without invoking the second welfare theorem and compensating the losers, atleast those badly affected, with lump-sum redistributions. In other words, liberalization of immigration rules (and similarly of trade itself) has to be complemented with social protections that cushion those worst affected and most vulnerable against the adverse consequences of the liberalization policy.

It is for this reason that the next round of reforms in India, essential for moving up a sustainable high growth trajectory, and invariably involving further liberalization of trade, has to be preceded by steps that lead to the creation of a basic social safety net that at the least cushions those worst affected by the reforms.  

Sunday, November 30, 2014

Is skills gap a binding constraint on Indian economy?

Aashish Mehta makes an interesting intervention on skills gap in India. He questions the conventional wisdom that the country is facing a massive skills deficit. He points to two narratives, with the difference being that in one firms "cannot find skilled workers", whereas in the other firms "cannot find skilled workers at wages it can afford". From his joint work with others, he finds compelling evidence against the former and in favor of the latter.

He points to signatures that question the conventional wisdom on "skills gap" - stagnant or falling return on educational investment (or skill price), workers in labor-intensive manufacturing require barely secondary education and pick up skills in 4-6 weeks, textile firms with more than 10 workers pay 30% higher wages than those with less than 6 workers.
Further, the Employment and Unemployment Survey 2011-12 reports that workers in firms with less than 20 workers earned Rs 1581 a week, a third higher than the modest Tendulkar poverty line, whereas workers in firms which employ more than 20 earned more than twice the poverty line. The differential in wages between the two types of firms points to an affordability problem for smaller firms (the larger firms poach from the smaller firms) and a possible unwillingness problem for the larger firms (why should we pay 30% more for the same worker).

In simple terms, as long as the benefits (to workers and employers) from skilling exceed costs, the market (through "skill price" mechanism) and/or government (through skill development programs) can address the skills gap. But evidence, as aforementioned, appears contrary to this inference. However, if the wages are unaffordable for the majority of firms, neither markets nor governments can do much to alleviate the problem.

In India's case (even elsewhere), it is commonplace to hear firms, even in labor intensive sectors, complain of skills deficit. India's overwhelmingly small sized firm eco-system is a likely major contributor to this problem. Consider the scale - firms with less than 20 workers, constituting 73% of all manufacturing workers, produced 12% of manufacturing output in 2010-11. This is even more skewed in labor intensive sectors like textiles.

Small sized firms, being more likely informal, pay far less than larger firms, especially at the starting levels. In fact, the vast majority of these firms would, given the scale and nature of their operations, find it unviable to pay any more. These firms would struggle to retain their employees in the face of competition from medium and larger firms, and are therefore likely to complain of "skills deficit". The sheer numbers would add greater salience to their voices. Further, even among the larger firms, the exorbitant cost of labor related taxes, upto 45% of wages being deducted, limits their ability to pay high enough wages to attract and retain good workers.

A chorus of "skills deficit" is therefore not surprising, though it may be less a "deficit" problem and more an "affordability" one. If, as it appears, it is a matter of "affordability" than "shortage", then it points to other binding constraints facing those firms which need to be relaxed so as to enable them to pay higher salaries to attract workers.

Update 1 (3/12/2014)

A Times article that highlights shrinking educational wage premium in Chile. A combination of massive increase in skill acquisition and its decreasing quality appears to be responsible for this trend. Further, this has to be seen against the backdrop of Dutch disease - Chinese demand for copper boosting exports, causing currency appreciation, and reducing the demand for skilled workers.