Substack

Saturday, August 22, 2026

Weekend reading links

1. Germany used to be the unquestioned global leader in chemicals, machinery, and automobiles. Now, thanks to the onslaught from China, it has fallen on bad times. Sample this on automobiles.
When German companies expand or build factories, it is often in places like Hungary, China or Mexico. The number of cars produced in Germany has fallen 28 percent since 2016, according to the VDA, the German automakers’ association, putting the country well behind China, the United States, Japan and India. Germany could soon also be overtaken by South Korea and Mexico... The German carmakers face an assault on two fronts. In China — the world’s largest car market — sales of foreign car brands are plummeting. And Chinese automakers are making big strides in Europe. In June, Chinese carmakers outsold Japanese carmakers in Western Europe for the first time, according to figures compiled by Schmidt Automotive Research.

China was once a lucrative market for the Germans, accounting for 37 percent of Volkswagen sales in 2019. But after Chinese automakers learned how to manufacture cars through joint ventures with foreign carmakers, the tables turned. BAIC Group, an automaker owned by the Chinese government, has become Mercedes’s largest shareholder, with a stake of almost 10 percent. Chinese companies like BYD and Geely Auto were quicker to develop electric vehicles that were heavily promoted by the Chinese government and are selling briskly in Europe. The Germans took too long to offer appealing electric vehicles. Volkswagen sold 26 percent fewer cars in China in the first six months of the year compared with a year earlier, while Mercedes reported a 28 percent decline and BMW a 20 percent slump.

2. The latest on AI's limitations on vertical use cases, explained with three illustrative use cases.

While A.I. can excel regularly at complex tasks, it can be unreliable when put in charge of an entire job. It can certainly add value to certain areas of the work force, but for now, A.I. still needs a human boss... In our experiment, we deployed A.I. “agents” to act as office workers and found that they were capable of performing some of the tasks we assigned, but not all of them. The agents, which can act autonomously and make decisions based on detailed instructions, excelled at problems they could solve by writing computer programs. But they struggled with understanding the nuances of human language and at navigating user interfaces like the Chrome web browser.

3. Important point about how wealth inequality has come to dominate income inequality as the reason for social discontent.

While wealth inequality has not changed much, the relative importance of wealth compared to income has. The median household’s disposable net worth (net property and financial wealth excluding pensions) in the UK, US, Germany and France has roughly doubled in real terms since the mid-1990s; incomes have grown by only around 30 per cent. The result is that where a generation ago it would have taken about 20 years of savings from the average salary to earn your way from the bottom quarter of the UK’s wealth distribution to the top quarter, it now takes 40. There are similar or even larger upward extensions to society’s economic ladder elsewhere.
This is all the more pernicious since the growing role of passive wealth gains (whether gifted by an asset price boom or one’s parents) relative to income in determining someone’s economic status is mirrored by their growing importance for wellbeing. In the 1990s income rank mattered more than wealth rank for life satisfaction or avoiding distress. Since then wealth has become steadily more influential and is now the larger driver. 

4. Ukraine has run out of Patriot air defence systems to shoot down incoming Russian ballistic missiles. 

5. Chrystia Freedland on Baumol's disease and public services.
Baumol’s assignment was to determine why in-person classical music performances seemed harder to fund. He found that the snag wasn’t that the musicians were getting worse — it was that the rest of the economy was getting better. It took four musicians one hour of work to perform a Schubert string quartet, exactly the same as it always had done. But four hours of human labour would produce roughly a hundred times as much wheat as it did in the pre-industrial era. For manufactured goods, the multiple is even greater. The same insight applies to taking a two-year-old on a walk in the park, or supporting a mother as she gives birth. As such, Baumol’s disease poses a knotty challenge for the state in liberal democracies because so much of what governments do is more like playing the violin than manufacturing a car.

6. Two points from John Burn-Murdoch's latest on the crisis of social isolation among youth. First, the share of those without any in-person contact during a typical day rose sharply during the pandemic and has not returned back to normalcy.

The least socially connected are increasing their disconnectedness. 

7. Rent controls are back as housing prices rise.
Rent controls, where a government sets price limits on rents or annual rent increases for certain types of housing, tend to be effective in their primary objective. A 2024 review of dozens of studies on the policy published globally between 1967 and 2023 found controls were effective in capping rents. The quid pro quo, say their critics, is that they increase rents on unregulated properties and reduce the overall supply and quality of housing in the long term... Of the 38 members of the OECD club of mostly richer nations, 23 already have some form of rent control. Ireland and Austria widened the scope of existing rules this year... In practice, rent regulation can encompass a wide range of measures. Outright freezes, such as in New York, tend to be temporary. More enduring limits can apply to existing or new tenancies, or both, and may apply nationwide or be focused on areas of high rental demand. There are often exemptions, such as for newly built properties, and a variety of yardsticks are used to determine the size of permitted increases... 
New Yorkers are the most burdened tenants in the US. Despite decades of regulation, new renters in the city spend an average of 40 per cent of their income on rent. Rent stabilisation — where annual increases are set by a city board based on its assessment of the market, inflation and other variables — is the main mechanism, applying to almost a million units. Households living in rent-stabilised apartments tend to have median incomes lower than overall renter households... In Berlin about 700,000 households, or a third of the total, spend more than 45 per cent of their income on rent, according to the Berlin Tenants’ Association. Like several hundred other high-demand areas in Germany, Berlin is subject to the Mietpreisbremse, or rental brake, a 2015 law that applies to new leases, and the Kappungsgrenze, introduced two years earlier, which limits rises on certain types of existing tenancies. Despite these guardrails, rents have risen almost 70 per cent over the past decade. 

Scotland has come up with new rent controls which have evoked interest globally.

The new controls are more precisely calibrated than before; they will apply only to specific areas, last for a maximum term of five years, and limit rent increases for both new and existing tenancies to consumer price inflation plus 1 per cent, up to a 6 per cent maximum. There are some exemptions, for instance properties that are coming to the rental market for the first time.

8. China's investment slump deepens in July.

Industrial output expanded 4.5 per cent in July on a year earlier, official statistics showed on Monday, short of the 4.8 per cent forecast by a Reuters analyst survey and growth of 5.3 per cent in June. Retail sales rose just 0.6 per cent last month, compared with analyst forecasts of 1.5 per cent growth and 1 per cent in June, as the waning effects of consumer goods trade-in subsidies weighed on household spending. Fixed asset investment declined 6.7 per cent for the first seven months of the year on the same period in 2025, deepening from a 5.7 per cent drop in the year to June. 
Over the last 10 years, across spot and forward markets, the RBI’s net annual currency intervention has averaged about $60 billion, or 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). During FY21 and FY22, when India’s balance of payments generated surpluses, the RBI net purchased $157 billion. That effectively put a floor on the exchange rate. In contrast, the RBI sold a significant $118 billion in FY25, helping restrict the rise in USD/INR from 83.50 to 85.50. Between April 2025 and February 2026, the RBI sold another $37 billion, even as USD/INR moved up to 91. Following the outbreak of the Iran war, the RBI sold a further $37 billion in March 2026 alone, with USD/INR eventually ending the month around 93.50... Such interventions were not necessarily incorrect. But when sustained at this scale and over such timeframes, it inevitably influences currency levels, not just volatility...
The RBI also intervenes in bond markets and modulates banking liquidity to facilitate monetary-policy transmission. During FY26, India’s net government debt across central and state government bonds and Treasury bills grew by ₹17.8 trillion. About ₹10.6 trillion was net purchased by banks, insurers, and pension and provident funds, which have regulatory obligations to buy such bonds. The RBI’s own holdings net increased by the remaining ₹7.2 trillion, thus accounting for a substantial 40 per cent of the incremental government debt... The RBI’s large bond purchases and liquidity operations helped keep rupee-denominated interest rates below levels that might otherwise have been required to attract discretionary savings.

10. Israeli national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, a hardline settler previously convicted of incitement to racism, advocates killing Gazans each night. 

“I think we should be doing 30 to 40 targeted assassinations per night,” Ben-Gvir said. “Not just those who pose an immediate threat. There are people there who don’t deserve to live . . . They are not even people.” Ben-Gvir also called for the re-establishment of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territory, saying he envisaged “all Gaza” belonging to Israel and reiterating his previous calls for Palestinians to “emigrate”. “I imagine settlements not just in Gush Katif but throughout Gaza, and encouraging emigration, the more the better,” he said, referring to settlements that were dismantled by Israel in 2005. “And for the terrorists, there should be no emigration. We should just kill them one by one.”

11. Fear of AI is uniting American politics.

Almost three quarters of Americans do not trust businesses to use AI responsibly, according to Gallup. More than 70 per cent oppose having data centres built in their area because of fears about water and electricity inflation. Eighty per cent or more distrust AI for driving, medical advice and corporate hiring decisions. As The New York Times recently put it, fear of AI is the “most bipartisan issue since beer”. That feeling is as strong in the centre as it is on the Maga right and the democratic socialist left. That such fears are often conspiratorial should be no surprise. Paranoia is a natural response to the unknown. Maga’s Steve Bannon calls data centres “weapons labs”. Marjorie Taylor Greene, the former pro-Trump lawmaker, refers to Big Tech as “Skynet” after the self-aware computer system that triggers nuclear holocaust in the Terminator movies. Progressives talk of AI killing US democracy and ushering in a Blade Runner-style dystopia.

12. The big economics story of the recent months is the return of interest rates.

13. For long the World Bank and IFC have tried to get African countries to capture value by investing in the processing of their natural resources. Nigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote is doing exactly that by constructing the world's second-largest petroleum refinery, which has allowed Nigeria to export refined oil to Europe and elsewhere, while also ensuring that Africa's largest crude producer does not need to import refined oil. 
His new $20 billion oil refinery in Lagos, which has seen a spike in demand for petroleum products — both in Africa and elsewhere — since the war began in February. Despite having abundant crude oil, Africa still relies heavily on imported fuel... Jet fuel shipments from the Dangote Refinery reached the U.S. market for the first time ever this year, according to the company. The Dangote Refinery was “the world’s single largest exporter of jet fuel” in April and May, said Daniel Evans, a vice president of S&P Global Energy, a market-research firm. Last month, the refinery was Europe’s largest supplier of jet fuel and diesel, according to Devakumar Edwin, a vice president of Dangote Industries. On Tuesday, Dangote Refinery said it had secured $1 billion in financial backing from a Dubai-based investment group to go public on the Nigerian stock exchange. If the listing goes through, it will be Africa’s largest-ever public offering.

14. The rise and rise of America's public debt.

The US’s national debt has hit a record $40tn as borrowing rises at a historic pace... It has grown by $3tn over the past year, its fastest ever pace outside the pandemic era... America’s national debt has surged over the past two decades, rising from less than $6tn (about $12tn in 2026 dollar terms) at the turn of the century as vast public spending during the financial crisis and Covid pandemic exacerbated yawning budget deficits. In the past 10 years alone, the overall debt burden has doubled. Debt held by the public — a key metric monitored by markets that excludes intragovernmental holdings — now exceeds $32tn, roughly equal to the size of the US economy. The Congressional Budget Office, a non-partisan watchdog, expects the debt held by the public to exceed the high of 106 per cent of GDP reached in the aftermath of the Second World War by the end of the decade and hit 120 per cent by 2036.

15. The moderation of Meloni...

As prime minister, Meloni’s cautious pragmatism has dismayed hardline Maga purists such as Bannon, who told Italian media she was “a total globalist” who had betrayed her “fundamental beliefs”. Meloni has paired tough measures to curb irregular migration with higher quotas for legal migrants, helping Italian businesses cope with labour shortages. She has also softened her anti-EU rhetoric and forged effective working relations in Brussels.

... and fall out with Trump.

After Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, Meloni — the only EU leader to attend his inauguration — sought to cast herself as Europe’s bridge to Washington, hoping it would strengthen her hand in Brussels and at home. Instead, Meloni has been tarnished in the eyes of many Italian voters by her close association with an unpopular US president. Trump has imposed high tariffs on EU imports, pressed Nato allies to sharply increase defence spending and attacked Iran — policies deeply damaging to Italian interests. “Her proximity to Trump has failed to give her any appreciable results,” said Riccardo Alcaro, research director at Rome’s Institute of International Affairs, calling her erstwhile friendship an “electoral albatross” as Meloni gears up for a bruising re-election campaign... analysts say Meloni’s difficulties with the White House reflect not only Trump’s personality but a Maga world view that appears to expect near-total subservience from its allies... Maga’s deep-rooted antagonism towards the EU as a political project also made it hard for any leader with a pan-European outlook “to cosy up” to the administration for long.

16. One of the biggest innovations of the 20th century, container shipping.

Seventy years ago it would take at least 10 days for a ship at London Docklands to be emptied and reloaded by around 50 dockers. Pilfering was rife, accidents were commonplace and port business was vulnerable to labour strikes. Then came the shipping container, an 8ft x 20ft steel box that needed increasingly vast vessels to carry an ever-expanding volume of goods... it takes cranes roughly 40 hours to empty and reload a large container ship — around 20,000 steel boxes lifted by 146-metre-high computerised cranes that move two containers every three to four minutes. That efficiency and scale is testament to the unglamorous steel container, an invention that has driven down shipping costs to such a low fraction of total manufacturing value that it has enabled the rapid expansion of global trade over the past 70 years... The box’s dimensions were standardised from 1968 — a step that is “frequently overlooked”, says Brian Slack, a professor in geography and planning at Concordia University, Montreal. Without it, “containerisation would not have been as revolutionary as it turned out to be”...
More than 280mn journeys were made by containers between world markets last year. They bear around two-thirds of global seaborne cargo — about 60 per cent of total world trade, according to UN Trade and Development. More than 7,000 container ships are currently operating. The largest can carry cargo equivalent to a 44-mile-long freight train with, for example, around 120,000 bananas or 10,000 pairs of jeans per box. The average size of the ships has more than doubled since 2000, according to the WSC... To service the demand for goods, shipping lines have ordered larger and larger ships. The current record size for a container ship is the so-called ultra-large container vessel MSC Irina, which has a carrying capacity of 24,346 twenty-foot equivalent containers, or TEUs. The number of new container ships on order is equivalent to around 40 per cent of the current sailing fleet — a record high.

17. Circular trading in China's humanoid robots industry.

China’s humanoid robot makers are generating much of their revenue from selling machines to government-backed training centres — which then collect and sell training data back to the robot makers, raising concerns about actual demand in an industry Beijing is keen to promote.

18. Data centre job creation facts.

At the peak of construction, according to a November 2025 study by the University of Southern California, a data centre in the US needs between 0.7 and 2 workers per megawatt. To build India’s targeted capacity of 10 GW by 2030, that works out to a peak construction workforce of 26,000... In direct employment, a 100 MW data centre supports 120–150 jobs. Take the generous end of that range and India’s 10 GW target yields 15,000 full-time, sustainable jobs. And these aren’t, for the most part, gold-collar jobs. A handful of C-suite roles rake in Rs 1 crore a year. Design and engineering workers make Rs 30–40 lakh. The staff who actually keep the lights on—on-site security and hands-on hardware engineers—earn around Rs 10 lakh. A recent study from the US—the world leader in data centres with an installed capacity of 55 GW—examined the employment records of 770 server farms going back two decades and concluded that the industry overstated their job impact by a factor of three at least. Apply the cut to India’s job-creation estimate and the promise wilts before a single server is switched on.

And who will use it.

Of the 10 GW capacity India intends to build by 2030, only a sliver is meant for the country. The industry estimates that 90–95% will be leased by foreign firms such as AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle, and Meta. Even now, of the roughly 2 GW already installed, barely 30% is used by Indian players.

Wednesday, August 19, 2026

Leveraging the interdependence to combat China's industrial policy

There is an interesting asymmetry in the way China is covered by the Western media and commentators. 

China’s trillion-dollar and rising export surplus and its rapidly growing outward foreign direct investment (FDI) are seen as signs of deepening global dependency. This framing ignores the context of a weakening domestic economy and increasing dependence on exports to sustain jobs and growth (and the social contract between the Party and citizens). It also glosses over the risks to both exports and FDI posed by the rising backlash against China’s mercantilist policies. The Chinese vulnerabilities created by this dependence (on exports) and exposure (of FDI) are rarely discussed. 

This perspective stands in stark contrast to the view that bemoans the vulnerability of Western multinationals operating in China and completely ignores the buyer’s leverage on China with its importers. The same fact of deep interdependence is narrated as “strength” when it’s China exporting to the West, and as “vulnerability” to be endured when it’s the West transacting with China. For China’s trade partners, its $3.77 trillion export volume is as much a powerful bargaining chip as it is a dangerous dependence. 

In this backdrop, this post provides a framework to think about combating China’s manufacturing dominance. 

As I blogged here, experts and commentators ought to explore ways in which the leverage from China’s export dependence and FDI exposure can be used by its trade partners as bargaining chips to protect their interests. 

In this backdrop, I used Claude to develop an analytical framework to address this asymmetry. The matrix covers six domains where every lever Beijing pulls has a symmetric counterpart. 

The single most underused lever is market access. China’s $ 1tn-plus surplus exists precisely because Western markets absorb the overcapacity its own weak consumers can’t. This is what keeps the factories running and the post-1980 social bargain afloat. That makes access to EU/US demand a bargaining chip of the first order, not a favour to be lamented. 

Local production inverts China’s own auto playbook by making the likes of BYD and CATL now dependent on European permits, subsidies and goodwill, and leaving them vulnerable to imposition of the same local-content and tech-transfer conditions China once imposed on Volkswagen and GM. 

Brands and ownership are a bargaining chip that are almost entirely ignored. Volvo, MG, Pirelli, Smithfield and GE Appliances derive their value from Western consumer trust and shelf space, which divestiture orders, golden shares and procurement bans can all reach. Data and security concerns confer enough leverage to restrict Chinese hardware out of the Western markets. Capital access through US and HK listings and dollar funding is a vulnerability that delisting and Entity-List tools can throttle. And core technology is the rare-earth lever in reverse, as outlined here

These are chips to be priced into a bargain. Each carries a cost to the user, and the mirror pairs show symmetry, not exact equivalence in magnitude or legality. The central point is that the dependence is bilateral.

In their use of the bargaining chip, the alliance could emulate China’s rare earth playbook. An FT long read on China’s management of critical minerals trade is instructive. 

Cheaply produced Chinese metals are now embedded in the just-in-time supply chains that global industries rely on, but which buckle dramatically when interrupted — as the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz trade waterway have shown. That has given China leverage, which it has increasingly been willing to use: since 2023, it has imposed a series of export restrictions on a wide range of niche metals… Despite the export controls, metals flows have not ground to a halt. Instead, China has created a licensing scheme under which it decides who gets which minerals. The lengthy application process gives authorities detailed information about which metals overseas companies and their contractors are using, and why. Applicants must show that the material is going into civilian, rather than military, supply chains.

Companies, traders and analysts say material has been flowing but at unpredictable paces, with licence approval often slow. “The export control system has evolved from a crisis into a managed system”, though buyers still face “compliance and commercial” challenges, says Kyle Sullivan, vice-president of business advisory services at the US-China Business Council. This embeds new uncertainty into corporate supply chains and risks customers switching to Chinese component suppliers whose metals purchases are not being monitored and squeezed. One executive at a large Japanese user of rare earths says China wants to keep companies in a “neither alive nor dead” state, by supplying them with the minimum needed to avoid a supply chain collapse — which would hit Chinese companies that still rely on materials and components from Japan.

The big difference is China’s intentwillingness, and ability to use these chips in its strategic calculus. I’m not sure whether any of its counterparts in the West currently possess the same three at anything close to the degree present with China. The US can mobilise them if it puts its mind to the task. But it is most unlikely in the current dispensation. 

Another challenge is that no one country, including the US, has anywhere like the leverage China has across industries. This means that any meaningful application of a bargaining chip would require effective coordination among a group of countries. This is precisely the point that Rush Doshi and Kurt Campbell made when they argued in favour of America mobilising an alliance of like-minded countries to respond to China’s weaponisation of trade. 

Unfortunately, President Trump’s disruption of the Western alliance makes even a collaborative effort very difficult. The only option may be to wait out the regime before serious efforts in this direction.

Monday, August 17, 2026

A graphical summary of India's labour market challenge

I have blogged earlier (see here and here), highlighting the importance of broad-based economic growth and the creation of good jobs as essential requirements for India’s sustained high-growth prospects. 

This post has been triggered by two articles. First, a recent op-ed in Business Standard by Kavitha Rao of the NIPFP, which analysed the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) for the composition of jobs in India and found,

The PLFS classifies information on the composition of workforce into regular workers, self-employed and casual workers and the corresponding wages. The share of regular workers in total workforce was 23.6 per cent in 2025, a little more than half being in government or public enterprises. The self-employed account for more than half (56 per cent), with the remaining being casual workers. The average wage for regular worker was reported to be at ₹22,699, which is higher than the monthly earnings of self-employed ₹14,861, and of casual workers at ₹10,000, assuming a worker works for 22 days in a month. Even among the regular workers, there is considerable variation — over 50 per cent have no written job contract and no social security benefits. 

To understand the differences in wages across activities, the survey reports a number of occupation divisions — the ratio of the highest to the lowest wages within regular workers is 4:1. Juxtaposing the highest-wage-earning occupation with casual workers, the differential is 7.4 times, assuming that casual workers get to work 22 days in a month. To top this off, there is a public-sector premium, especially in lower-level jobs. On the other hand, the self-employed category includes a number of unpaid family workers, suggesting significant underemployment in the economy and poor returns to effort. Fewer well-paying jobs and a wage premium for public-sector jobs drive a sharp demand for these jobs.

She also points to the increasingly capital-intensive nature of job creation across sectors, and the convergence of labour intensity in manufacturing with that in services.

Second, The Economist had this graphic on the rising number of graduates and their declining monthly salaries. 

Research by the Azim Premji University in Bangalore shows that each year between 2004 and 2023 roughly 5m graduates were added to the workforce; but the number in employment rose by only about 2.8m… Of the young people who report themselves unemployed, fewer than 7% of graduates find permanent salaried work within a year…Education-fuelled aspirations have pushed enrolment in tertiary education to 30% of 18- to 23-year-olds, while the number of higher-education institutions has grown from 6,000 to around 70,000 in the span of 30 years, thanks to a boom in private education… around 45% of Indian graduates have degrees in arts or commerce rather than, say, engineering or medicine. A report by a business body in 2024 estimated that only 55% of India’s graduates were employable.

With this backdrop, I used Claude to dig a bit deeper into the economic growth and labour market. As a framework, broad-based economic growth works at the intensive margin of the labour market to raise disposable incomes, and good job creation works at the extensive margin to expand the meaningful consumption base. 

Consider the headline numbers. The employment elasticity of GDP growth has fallen from ~0.4 in the 1980s to 0.26 for 2000–2012 and near-zero by 2019 (RBI 2024 estimate: 0.18). 

This is also borne out in the widening wedge between aggregate output and employment growth rates.

The economy needs roughly 20 million new non-farm jobs a year to absorb the demographic bulge, whereas formal-sector job creation runs at about 4 million. 

It should be a matter of concern that India, one of the world's largest economies, has one of the smallest formal-sector labour-absorption engines relative to size. It does not help, as I blogged here, that manufacturing’s employment share is stuck at 12%, and every export dollar now buys less domestic employment than a decade ago. As mentioned earlier, the State of Working India 2026 report documents that just under 7% of male graduates secure a permanent salaried job within a year of graduation.

In addition to quantity, another dimension of the extensive margin is the quality of jobs created - i.e., those that pay enough, and reliably enough, to enter the consuming class. Seven rounds of PLFS data (2017-18 to 2023-24) reveal a labour market where employment quantities are rising but quality (measured by contract security, social protection, paid leave, and income sufficiency) has stagnated or worsened for most workers. As a headline number, only 23.6% of workers are regular salaried. 

Further, only about 11% are regular salaried with a written contract and social security. Everyone else is either self-employed at very low earnings (56%), a casual daily-wage worker (20%), or a regular worker without protection.

Of the 23.6% who are regular salaried, more than half have no written contract and no social security. It is good that the share of those in regular employment with all three protections has been rising gradually.

The problem is compounded by the quality problem not sparing even the well-educated, and even worsening for them. From 2017-18 to 2023-24, among graduates, precarious contracts (no contract or less than a year) rose from 49.3% to 53.9%; among post-graduates it rose from 38.7% to 44.1%; among technical diploma holders (who should command skill premiums) it rose to 65.8%. 

The numbers on quality are likely to be even worse if we exclude government jobs. They have high shares in public administration, education and health, financial services, utilities, and transportation. 

On salaries, the average monthly earnings across categories are low enough and vary sharply. The ratio of the wages for regular workers in their highest-paid occupation vs lowest-paid occupation is 4:1, and that for the highest regular vs casual worker earnings is 7.4:1. 

The table below captures the summary statistics on India’s employment market today. Only about 11% of India's workersare in the genuinely formal employment cell (regular salaried with a written contract and social security). And within regular salaried work, the 4:1 within-category wage ratio (for regular workers) and the 7.4:1 regular-to-casual ratio mean that even the "good" tier splits sharply. 

This brings us to the intensive margin, involving wage trends of existing employees. Are incomes rising for those already in work? Nominal wages roughly doubled 2012–2024 but inflation ate almost all of it. In FY24 corporate profits grew 22.3% and reached a 15-year high. 

Real salaried wages fell -4% cumulatively 2012–2024. Real wages for salaried workers were -1.7% lower in Q2 2024 than Q2 2019. 

Rural real wages grew about 7% annually in the 2010–2015 period and have been near-zero since.

A decade of near-zero real wage growth means that even the workers who are employed are not getting the income-per-hour gains they need to expand consumption. The corporate sector is booking those productivity gains as profit rather than passing them into wages. This is the "consumption slowdown" that FMCG, auto and durables companies have been reporting from mid-2024 onwards, and is likely caused by the intensive-margin failure documented above. This failure at the intensive margin is a binding constraint to broad-basing economic growth and expanding the consumption class in a substantial manner. 

Let’s round things off with the labour-intensity point raised in the Rao oped. The India-KLEMS database shows that labour per unit of capital has fallen steadily across all major sectors, and manufacturing and services have converged to a broadly similar labour intensity. In earlier decades, manufacturing was the obvious job-creation engine because it was more labour-intensive than services. That is no longer true and to that extent diminishes manufacturing value in absorbing agricultural surplus labour. 

If labour intensities are similar, the sectors that expands the fastest are the natural venue for large-scale job creation. This points to the importance labour-intensive services like construction, trade, hotels, education, health, etc, as articulated by Rao.

This reality demands a policy strategy that targets improving the quality of education and health services, and increasing their labour productivity. The quality of regulation and formalisation are two instruments in this regard. 

To summarise, neither margin is currently operating as India is stuck with quantities of the wrong kind of jobs, qualities that are eroding, and flat real incomes. 

India is currently producing high GDP growth without producing either broad-based real income growth or broad-based good-job creation. This means that the growth is not translating into a widening consumption base, which in turn is a binding constraint on the private investment cycle that would generate more good jobs. 

Breaking that loop requires action on both margins simultaneously: raising real incomes for those already in work (through productivity gains genuinely passed to wages, and formalisation) and expanding the base of good jobs (prioritising the sectors where labour-intensity remains, and through selective labour-intensive manufacturing where the global window has not fully closed).

India has company in China on the issue of good job creation. An FT long read highlights China’s “great job squeeze”, driving people into low-paying jobs like ride-hailing and food-delivery. This contrasts starkly with the productive factory and construction jobs that underpinned the emergence of China’s middle class and the country’s sustained high-growth era. 

The property bust, consumer spending slowdown, and prolonged deflation have taken a toll on job creation. In this backdrop comes the backlash against exports, a major contributor to jobs and economic growth. The result of these trends is a labour market where low-paying gig jobs have become the major source of labour absorption. The number of gig workers has risen by 10 million in just two years. 

A precarious gig economy of ridesharing drivers and delivery couriers has been soaking up China’s surplus labour. The labour market has long been at the heart of the social contract between China’s government, eager to maintain stability, and a vast population yearning for economic betterment. Today it is under strain as rarely before. While flexible work has served as an economic escape valve, it too now risks becoming overloaded by more people than it can provide jobs for… More than 53mn people as of 2025 work as food delivery or ridesharing drivers in China, up 10mn in two years… Several municipalities have reported an oversupply of ride-hailing drivers and in June, the southern city of Shenzhen declared its ride-hailing market saturated…“I would say the demand for labour is falling faster than the supply of labour is declining,” says HSBC’s Frederic Neumann, citing automation in factories, the property slowdown and the as-yet unquantified impact of AI…

Andrew Batson, China research director at Gavekal, an economic research firm, suggests flexible employment and gig work are “more of a symptom of broad-based labour market weakness in China than a totally independent development”, even if technology has aided the growth of platform workers. “Because aggregate demand is low, the bargaining power of workers is weaker and they have to accept more underemployment and less favourable working conditions,” he says… “The anecdotal evidence suggests that gig worker incomes are trending towards subsistence levels, given the competition among workers in China for jobs,” says Neumann… Gig work is increasingly drawing in graduates, of whom there are more than 12mn entering the labour market this year, as well as offering options for migrant workers.

In this context, John Burn-Murdoch has an excellent article of relevance which highlights the contrasting tales of US and UK labour markets. He makes the point that while the UK has done better than the US in school learning outcomes and adult skill acquisition (30 per cent of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old), the latter has done well in labour market outcomes. 

And this shows the higher wages received by US workers (it remains to be disaggregated as to how much of this is due to higher productivity, and how much due to labour market distortions).

Similar to Germany, factory workers in the US earn 60 per cent more than in the UK after adjusting for differences in living costs. Plumbers and electricians earn 90 per cent more, and retail workers earn double. The same proportion of US workers who score stunningly low on literacy earn an average of almost $30 per hour, and two-thirds of them are in work. Their British counterparts make the equivalent of $20 and fewer than half are employed.

Like India, Britain has invested heavily in skill development, and Burn-Murdoch makes a very important point, of relevance to India.

But if we really want to deliver better outcomes, we must stop thinking of particular qualifications or forms of education as things that produce particular economic outcomes and deliver respect. Rather, we should view education as creating potential that a strong economy unleashes (and a weak one disappoints).

The main point is that, if you cut through everything, good job creation is all that matters. And India has much to do on this front, especially with all the headwinds from geopolitics, trade, technology, climate change, and antecedent problems.