Much before the AI revolution threatened to disrupt India’s IT outsourcing firms, the proliferation of Global Capability Centres (GCCs) of global multinational corporations were already impacting them. For at first glance, GCCs involve in-sourcing and off-shoring of those activities previously performed by these IT firms. 

This post will examine three questions. What is likely to be the impact of GCCs on the IT firms? What is the likely net impact of GCCs on the Indian economy? How would the GCCs be viewed politically in the era of protectionism and reshoring?

A useful framework to think about the issue is to view GCCs in two dimensions - who does the work (outsource/insource) and where it is done (offshore/onshore or reshore). This is likely to impact India in three measurable ways - substitution (insource work from IT firms to client-owned GCCs), expansion (offshore to the GCC those higher value added R&D and core functions that previously stayed with the parent), and linkages (creation of local supplier ecosystems around the GCC). 

It can be argued that substitution is a direct threat to Indian IT firms, expansion is a new opportunity for India (though benefits are captured by MNCs), and linkages are significantly beneficial in terms of knowledge spillovers and new business for the local firms. 

I used Claude to generate a taxonomy of activities with tasks that undergo substitution and expansion. For each activity category, the table outlines the parts of it done by the IT firms and GCC respectively, and their potential expansion areas.

In 2024, the 1900 odd GCCs generated revenues of $64.6 bn, forming 32% of the total IT exports of about $200 bn. At such volumes, even if they are substituting a small share of their total revenues, it can be a major top-line drag on the IT majors. 

While neat causal attribution may be difficult, there are several signatures of stagnation and even decline in the fortunes of the IT firms, and they predate the emergence of AI. At a headline level, TCS reported its first-ever annual revenue contraction in FY26, Wipro has shrunk for three consecutive years, and Infosys’s FY27 guidance of 1.5–3.5% is the lowest in two decades. In the three years till 2024-25, GCCs added more net headcount in India than the four largest IT services firms combined.

TCS, Infosys and Wipro have decelerated from double-digit growth in 2021-22 and 2022-23 to low-single-digits or outright contraction since then. While GCCs may be substituting their work, on the AI side, the likes of Accenture appears to have taken a head start in capturing the AI consulting work. Reflecting this, Accenture grew 7% in 2024-25 and has crossed $69bn in revenue.

These trends are already reflected in the labour market. The GCCs are now hiring the same IT engineers from their previous outsourcing vendors, and at 25-40% higher pay. 

The clearest proof that GCCs are taking share from Indian IT vendors (rather than only expanding the pie) comes from the labour-market. Employees of the IT majors (TCS/Infosys/Wipro) are now being hired by the GCCs of the same multinationals that used to be their clients, at 25–40% higher pay. There may be signs that the IT vendors are now suffering a talent drain to their former clients. 

To summarise, Claude offered this assessment

Of the ~$65bn GCC revenue in 2024, roughly $35–40bn is expansion (work that would never have come to Indian vendors) and $25–30bn is substitution (work that was, or would have been, done by Indian IT services firms). That substitution slice is still only ~15% of total Indian IT services revenue, which is why the vendor firms are decelerating rather than collapsing. But at current GCC growth rates, the substitution slice compounds at 20%+ per year while the vendor base compounds at 3–5% — so the ratio reaches 25% by 2027 and 35%+ by 2030. That is when it becomes an existential risk to the current Indian IT services business model.

In the circumstances, for the Indian IT firms, the emergence of GCCs (and AI) bring down the curtain on the lower value added volume game of manpower outsourcing, and reveals that the only credible path is to compete on AI-first consulting at Accenture-like margins, which requires talent, human resource capabilities, and brand investments they historically avoided. 

The linkages possible from GCCs are also likely to be significant. Apart from the support services, the GCCs will also catalyse a supplier services ecosystem that serve the main activities. Services sector ecosystems are unlikely to be in the nature of physical input-output linkages. Instead, they are likely to be in the form of various kinds of externalities. 

The GCC’s local ecosystem is more likely to emerge through specialist technology vendors, subcontracting, employee mobility, start-ups, collaboration and the circulation of knowledge. The depth of the ecosystem depends on the nature of the GCC's activities, procurement practices, autonomy and connections to local firms. 

For example, GCC’s performing like product engineering, R&D, advanced analytics or software-platform/product development, are likely to have greater spillovers than those performing highly standardised internal processing with limited technical autonomy or few local commercial relationships. Further, it can create demand for specialised services and contribute to the concentration of technical expertise that makes local firms more viable, supply a pipeline of employees who can be prospective entrepreneurs, etc. 

There is evidence from studies on the impact of multinational IT firms in India of collaboration with local firms, knowledge flows and acess to resources and networks, innovation spillovers, productivity spillovers, and increased export intensity of domestic firms. 

Given the objective of maximising expansion and linkages, there is a case for close monitoring of the nature of the GCC’s activities to guide policy making. Are the GCCs procuring technology and professional services, thereby creating creating domestic demand that goes beyond routine facilities, staffing, and support services? What is the level of sophistication of Indian suppliers, and are they are moving into higher value activities? The nature and number of startups established by employees of GCCs, and their trends? How many joint R&D, and university and startup collaborations, that promote local innovation networks? What are the trends with the productivity, exports, sophistication and product development capabilities of domestic firms that are associated with the GCCs?

The answers to these questions can be useful inputs to guiding policy making that advance the objectives on expansion and linkages. It is also an area where applied research partnerships with universities and think tanks can be helpful. 

In any case, the overall impact of the emergence of GCCs on the Indian economy is significantly positive. The table below is likely an underestimate since it does not fully account for many of the externalities mentioned above. 

The real problem is likely to come from the third question about how the trend on off-shoring of activities through GCCs will be perceived in their parent countries. Hit by the China shock and weakening economies, advanced countries like the US are trying to reshore manufacturing base and protectionist measures are pervasive. In the US, these measures have extended to a crack down on visas for foreigners in the IT industry. 

As the GCCs start to become a salient part of the revenues and employment of the MNCs, they will come to be viewed as a backdoor to send local jobs to countries like India. This is all the more likely at a time when good jobs are becoming scarce and youth unemployment is already high and rising in the US and elsewhere. 

In this backdrop, a trend of off-shoring of IT services, which includes higher value added activities, even if within the same company, is certain to invite scrutiny and backlash. It is only a matter of time. Countries like India may have a far shorter window than imagined to capitalise on the GCC opportunity and make themselves indispensable parts of the global IT services supply chain just as China did in manufacturing.

Mass transit and land use planning drives economic clusters

Large urban agglomerations are engines of national economic growth. The fuels that power these engines are the transportation infrastructure and mass transit, supported with enabling land use and development control regulations, value capture and revenue sharing, and institutional architecture. This is the topic of the post.

Such urban agglomerations are characterised by clusters of dense, specialised nodes of employment connected to residential nodes by commuter networks. This is the classic model of metropolitan downtowns connected with densified suburban satellite towns that coordinates agglomeration economies at the centre for high productivity job creation.

Accordingly, the central parts of major metropolitan cities of the world are predominantly workplaces, with people commuting to work from suburban areas on commuter railway systems. Mumbai, London, and New York are great examples. This is in keeping with the economic logic of ensuring the most productive use of the highest value lands in the city.

It also unlocks affordable housing supply by locating them predominantly in those areas with lower land prices, thereby relaxing the biggest constraint to affordable housing.

The ingredient that binds the nodes together and creates a dynamic regional cluster is a well-connected mass transit network. In cities globally, commuter and metro railway systems have played this role.

High-volume mass transit systems connect the nodes and bring people closer to jobs. They reshape the geography of what an hour reaches. This trip-shortening effect — making longer distance commutes faster than shorter car trips — is especially powerful in India, where the spatial mismatch between jobs in metropolitan cores and job-seekers in the hinterland has been found to be unusually large. They shrink the distances, thereby increasing the pool of jobs available for people in the hinterland, and expanding the talent accessible for employers in the core.

But evidence also informs us that merely laying the mass transit network is not sufficient. This study by Rana Hasan et albuilt a spatial model of Bengaluru and run the metro against alternative land-use policies and came up with the following quantified impacts. 

Holding the metro investment identical, the difference in net benefits between the best and worst land-use plans is roughly 32 percentage points of city GDP. In other words, the land-use plan determines whether the transit investment creates value or destroys it.

The requirement is to locate sufficient density of homes and workplaces within conveniently accessible distance from the stations, either through walk or feeder services. This is transit oriented development (TOD).

TOD is about commuting using mass transit by walking to/from station (to/from home and workplace) or feeder services. A big collateral benefit from TOD is that it avoids the use of cars, thereby decreasing traffic congestion, reducing productivity losses from long commutes, and lowering air pollution.

As I blogged here, TOD also increases the commercial viability of the massive investments made in mass transit systems (~ Rs 8 lakh Cr and counting, with 20-30% ridership realised, and massive debt repayment fiscal burden looming). It induces traffic by creating new trips (by locating more people within the transit zone influence area), shortening trip distances (thereby expanding the effective commute catchment), and mode shifts (from cars to mass transit).

Effective implementation of TOD requires addressing three constraints. One, relaxing development control regulations to make it attractive to build density in the vicinity of the stations, and creating the complementary pedestrian infrastructure. It also requires appropriate mixed land-use planning that allows the market to respond in the most efficient manner to order commute patterns and shape spatial growth. 

Two, funding of the mass transit capex, especially by enabling with the right kind of value capture instruments, with the right sequencing, and also the appropriate revenue sharing between the rail company and the local government/UDA. Try to capture value too quickly, before value gets created, and the cluster remains still born.

Three, an institutional architecture that aligns the incentives between those constructing the transit system (and repaying the debt mobilised) and those responsible for the land use and other decisions that determine the commercial viability of the system. This could, for example, entail the radical change of making the urban development authorities the owner of metro railway systems in metropolitan areas.

Observations on India’s external exposure in the age of capital wars

There are two important trends that are likely to impact cross-border capital flows for the foreseeable future. The first is the already high and increasing public debt burdens and persistently high budget deficits across the developed world. The second is the growing efforts to reshore manufacturing and reduce the dependency on China. The US is at the forefront of both these trends. 

Both are having large and growing spillovers across the global financial markets, especially adversely impacting developing countries. The first trend is raising sovereign bond yields, forcing interest rate hikes, and weakening currencies. The second trend is triggering a rising competition to attract manufacturing investment and retain domestic savings. 

I blogged here arguing that these trends will intensify the competition for capital, and most likely trigger capital wars. I had also discussed the possible implications for India. 

These trends come at a time when India is continuing the opening up of its financial markets and actively courting foreign investment. What do these trends mean for the RBI’s monetary policy, the rupee, India’s foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment, external commercial borrowings, and bilateral and multilateral aid flows? 

Finance 101 and historical experience tells us that rising US Treasury yields trigger capital flow reversals, puts pressure on the rupee, worsens the trade deficit, and reduces RBI’s monetary policy autonomy. And there is a self-reinforcing spiral associated with this cycle. On top come the squeeze on FDI inflows arising from the efforts to retain domestic savings and reshore manufacturing. 

Globally, the rising stock and flows of public debt portend a long period of higher interest rates, also because of the inflationary pressures that are already on play and will remain so for the foreseeable future. 

In this backdrop, this post will use data analysed with Claude to examine the consequences of India’s external exposure. 

Arguably the biggest deterrent to foreign capital inflows into India today is the weakening trend of the rupee. A weaker rupee raises the hurdle rate that any investor, FDI or FPI, would demand for investing in India. The rupee depreciation, therefore, functions as a direct tax on foreign investors' dollar-denominated returns. Every 1% of depreciation eats roughly 1% of the foreign investor's return. 

As an illustration, the rupee has weakened from ₹74/$ in 2021 to ₹96/$ in 2026, a cumulative decline of 30% over five years. This means that any foreign investors who remained invested in India should have earned an additional 30% returns to offset the depreciating currency. 

So what drives rupee depreciation? 

The obvious candidates are inflation differential, US Federal Funds rate, current account deficit, and oil prices. While a contemporaneous model OLS regression of annual rupee depreciation on these four structural drivers barely fits, a one year lagged model fits well (R-sq = 0.62, F-stat p = 0.001). The rupee depreciation correlates primarily with oil prices (the import-bill channel), the inflation differential (mediated by the RBI’s response), and the current-account balance, but with a one-year lag. 

Going by this, given the prevailing global market conditions and with no signs of an end to the Iran war, the rupee is primed for further declines in the year ahead.

The prospects of further rupee weakening is reflected in the USD/INR forward premium, which compressed dramatically from ~5% in early 2021 to barely 1% by mid-2024 as Fed hikes narrowed the India-US rate gap, but has since been rising and is about 3.5-4.1% in October 2026. For ECB borrowers, the forward premium is the hedging cost.

What does all this mean for RBI’s monetary policy choices? 

The Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), which is an unobserved theoretical construct, states that the difference in interest rates between two countries should equal the expected change in exchange rates between their currencies, so that there is no arbitrage opportunity. The reality though is complicated by risk premiums and transaction frictions. 

The higher-for-longer global interest rates narrow the monetary policy space to cut or even maintain neutral stance in India without triggering outflows and rupee depreciation. In an open-economy framework where India’s capital account is substantially open on the debt side, the UIP floor on the repo rate rises mechanically. And, as the graphic below shows, it has been rising since 2021. With the Fed at 4.25% and the BoJ no longer anchored at zero, the UIP floor on the repo rate is around 6.3%.

This has created a situation where the UIP floor today is above the RBI’s repo rate. This puts pressure on the rupee to depreciate, something backstopped only the RBI’s large reserves. In fact, the RBI’s 5.5% repo rate works today only because of the forex-reserve buffer. 

However, now with US looking at the beginning of a rate hike cycle, the RBI’s room for monetary policy autonomy is considerably squeezed. It has little choice but to respond with raising rates. 

The capital wars channel compounds the problem. A big risk is the US net Treasury issuance estimate of $2tn/yr through 2028. It will be a major sink for global savings, and will raise the hurdle rate for all EM sovereign and corporate issuance.

An associated signature of this squeeze is the narrowing of the spread between Indian and US 10 year sovereign bonds. It has more than halved since the beginning of 2021. Coupled with the currency hedging cost, the spread disappears, thereby eliminating any incentive among those pursuing carry trade opportunities. 

What does this imply for India’s external debt exposures? 

In the aggregate, India’s external debt looks moderate at 20.8% of GDP. But there are two dimensions that need monitoring. The first is that the historical access to cheap, long-tenor, concessional fixed rate debt, primarily from bilateral and multilateral institutions, has now given way to floating rate loans benchmarked to SOFR/TONA/TORF (the transition from LIBOR happened by 2023). Of the $174.3 bn sovereign debt exposure (as of June 2026), 58% are now floating rate loans. More on this latter.

The second is the composition of external debt is now shifting away from the government to the private sector. This composition deserves closer monitoring given the rising share of External Commercial Borrowings (ECBs). 

At 32.8% of India’s external debt, ECBs are now bigger than the combined value of multilateral and bilateral loans and NRI deposits. The downward pressure on the rupee is a major risk for ECBs. This risk is amplified by the rising rates globally since most ECBs are floating-rate (SOFR-linked).

Of the $255bn outstanding ECBs, only 66% are hedged, and the remaining are direct, uninsured pass-through. The 34% unhedged slice ($87bn) is where the first stress will surface. It will fall most likely at NBFCs, airlines and renewable-energy developers that borrowed at low SOFR in 2021–22 and now must roll.

The impact of rupee depreciation on the $87 bn of unhedged ECBs is significant. 

These risks are also serious also because of the shorter repayment schedules of the ECBs. About $120 bn are due for repayment till March 2028. 

Another cause for concern may be the nature of ECB borrowers. An Indian corporate borrowing via ECB faces three cost layers - the base rate, currency depreciation, and the cost of hedging. The chart below shows that at least since 2023, ECBs should have been losing their attractiveness, especially for the higher rated borrowers. Nevertheless the ECBs have continued to rise, though issuance has fallen 33% in FY26. This raises a concern that some proportion of the ECB borrowers may be coming from the riskier market segments. 

The rising ECB exposure necessitates greater RBI oversight and microprudential regulation. For example, it should mandate higher ECB hedging ratios for sectors where revenues are in rupees (airlines, renewables, NBFCs). It should keep a close watch on higher cost commercial borrowings by by systemically important corporates.

The impact of rising interest rates globally is also showing up on India’s bilateral and multilateral borrowing windows. The notion that multilateral and bilateral lending is cheap, long-tenor and insulated from financial-market cycles is no longer true. ADB, World Bank and JICA have all transitioned from LIBOR to the new overnight benchmarks — USD SOFR, Yen TONA and the newer TORF. Each is 300–350 bps above its 2020 floor.

For four decades, yen funding has been India’s cheapest formal external finance. JICA has been the backbone of financing for Delhi Metro, Mumbai Trans Harbour Link, Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), Western Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) and the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train. All of them were conceived when the all-in yen cost was below 1%. But BoJ’s rate hikes, at 1.25% in Sep 2026, has already taken interest rates to their highest since 1995, and much more is expected as Japan normalises its financial markets. India has roughly $50bn of yen-denominated external debt (6.4% of total). 

Each 100 bps of additional yen funding cost on a 30-year ¥1 trillion exposure is roughly ¥100bn in extra lifetime interest. This shifts the IRR calculus materially.

A JICA yen loan signed today has an all-in cost of about1.3–1.4%, still the cheapest money India can get, but roughly double the 0.6–0.8% that typical JICA loans carried in 2015–2022. More consequentially, as new BoJ hikes feed through, the TORF benchmark will keep rising. 

Put simply, India’s historical reliance on JICA for metro rail, DMIC, and large infrastructure is predicated on a yen funding cost that is quietly disappearing. This is not a cyclical shift, but structural one.

For the government, and including state governments, there is a need for a serious revisit of the external aided project (EAP) financing windows. Does it make fiscal sense to continue the same levels of such borrowings given the rate risks? 

Beyond the direct interest cost, higher global rates reset India’s external exposure through three further channels. They are the foreign portfolio flows into Indian debt markets, the yield that must be offered on NRI deposits to retain the stock, and the capital-wars channel through which US issuance crowds out EM access.

Finally, as we wrote in The Rise of Finance, thanks to the unavoidable spillovers from the dominance of the US economy and the dollar, the space available for developing countries to pursue autonomous monetary policy was already constrained. This is set to shrink further on the face of the trends discussed above.