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Saturday, February 7, 2026

Weekend reading links

1. Dame Sarah Mullally, 63, becomes the 106th Archbishop of Canterbury, the first woman to serve as the senior-most bishop of the 85 million-strong Anglican Communion since the role's creation for Augustine of Canterbury in 597 AD!

2. Kevin Warsh as Fed Chairman may pursue significant changes to the way the Fed sets monetary policy.

The Fed’s vast bond-buying programmes, which Warsh initially supported as a Fed governor during the financial crisis, are at the centre of the Trump administration’s allegations that the central bank is acting far beyond its remit to keep prices in check and maximise employment. The... quantitative easing, expanded the Fed’s balance sheet from less than $900bn in 2008 to a peak of almost $9tn. The balance sheet now stands at $6.6tn, following a three-year reversal of QE — dubbed “quantitative tightening” — that the rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee has recently paused amid signs banks were falling short of reserves. Warsh has said he would like to shrink it much further... Warsh in April said successive QE programmes meant politicians found it “considerably easier appropriating money knowing that the government’s financing costs would be subsidised by the central bank”... 

Warsh’s claims that the response to the pandemic “was the biggest monetary policy error in 45 years”... Along with shrinking the balance sheet, Warsh would like to change the Treasury-Fed Accord, a 1951 agreement seen as the foundation for the US central bank’s freedom to set interest rates free from political pressure. Warsh has said he wants a “recommitment” to the accord that would entail a smaller, less powerful central bank, with some control of its balance sheet handed to the Treasury... Trump’s nominee will push the Fed’s staff to gather more “real-time information” to rely less heavily on official government data that comes on a longer lag... He could also deploy economists to find out whether his view is right that an AI-led productivity boom can boost US workers’ pay without stoking inflation — a move that could potentially pave the way for more interest rate cuts.

This is Warsh's WSJ op-ed of March 2023, where he called for an "economic regime change", including stopping the practice of providing forward guidance and stopping the provision of forecasts of the path of interest rates. The expectation now is that Fed may dispense with its widely followed dot plot showing the interest-rate projections of each participant of the FOMC, and end the tradition of press conferences by Fed chair following every FOMC meeting. 

3. Soumaya Keynes points to new research that links commerce and markets to the shaping of cultural norms.

One 2010 study ran money-sharing experiments across a diverse mix of communities, including smaller ones where people foraged or hunted for food. In those less marketised societies, norms around fairness towards strangers seemed weaker... A new study by Max Posch of the University of Exeter and Itzchak Tzachi Raz of Hebrew University takes a different approach, exploring the US economic transformation between 1850 and 1920. Thanks in part to a vast expansion of railroads, internal commerce became much easier. Mail-order catalogues served remote communities with items including shoelaces, suitcases and booze. The researchers compared places and people gaining more and less market access. Unsurprisingly, they found that in the places that enjoyed juicier connections, work shifted to involve co-operation with more distant partners...

Compiling many metrics, they found that on at least three dimensions, new markets did seem to affect culture. First, commercial opportunities made people more outward-looking. In places that became more connected, Americans became more likely to marry someone outside their local community and parents more likely to pick out nationally common names for their children. Second, access to markets raised tolerance levels, as measured by higher religious diversity and greater variation in family size, as well as mothers’ ages at their first birth. (The logic being that more dispersion should reflect more of a “you do you” attitude.) Third, greater market access came with higher trust towards others, as extracted from language in local newspapers. This measure wasn’t perfect, but reassuringly matched trends in more recent survey data, and fell during wars... Instead, they emphasised a story of rapid cultural adaptation among people who were most engaged with impersonal, anonymous exchanges. The changes in naming practices, for example, were concentrated among migrants working in industries that were more exposed to trade with other parts of the country. For those working in construction and entertainment, the market access had no effect.

4. Paul Blustein questions claims about the dollar's dethronement. 

Participants in this market are international banks, securities firms, multinational corporations, insurance companies and pension funds — the biggest private actors in the financial system. Their globe-girdling operations require the movement of immense amounts of money across borders on a constant basis. They use the market to hedge themselves against currency fluctuations by trading a pair of currencies (say, the dollar and Japanese yen) twice, first at the current exchange rate and then swapping back later at an agreed rate. Japanese life insurance companies, for example, invest their portfolios heavily in US Treasuries and other dollar securities. Because they have obligations in yen to their policyholders, they need to protect themselves against movements in the yen-dollar rate and they use swaps to do so. These sorts of transactions occur at such a huge scale that, according to data from the Bank for International Settlements, the amount of outstanding swaps currently stands above $100tn. Some 90 per cent involve the dollar, reflecting the myriad ways it is used. Unwinding all of this activity and subbing in another currency would be staggeringly costly and difficult.

The $12.6 trillion European holdings of US Treasuries confer less leverage to the Europeans than they appear.  

Europe’s US government debt holdings don’t translate into usable leverage, because most of them can’t be politically co-ordinated and selling would be self-defeating. The reason is simple. “Europe” may hold a lot of US assets, but that doesn’t mean Europe can control them or deploy them as a co-ordinated political tool. Much of Europe’s exposure actually sits in private portfolios — pension funds, insurers, banks, and asset managers — not in a single public balance sheet that can be mobilised strategically.

But while a deliberate and coordinated weaponisation is difficult, "a slow, decentralised buyers' strike, as investors gradually stop adding to US assets" is a distinct possibility.

5. Singapore's acclaimed public housing model.

More than three-quarters of its citizen and permanent resident population live in 1.1mn government-built flats, bought at subsidised rates... Rising property costs, notably in the resale market, have sparked concern over affordability, while the lottery system for allocating flats, which favours traditional nuclear families, is being tested by changing social norms. Over the longer term, property values are also being eaten away by the 99-year leases on which they are sold. “The main thing that worries me is that . . . as the lease clock ticks down and as the stock ages, housing equity drops to zero,” Gee added...

When Singapore introduced national service after gaining independence in 1965, home ownership was also encouraged as an incentive for conscripts to fight for their country. Today, more than 90 per cent of Singaporeans live in an owner-occupied home — among the highest rates in the world. Properties are allocated to would-be buyers via a lottery system to applicants who are typically required to be married, engaged or older than 35. Prices are eased through a raft of government subsidies based on personal circumstances. Singaporeans can also dip into their mandated savings and pension plans and obtain mortgages and loans from the HDB directly. But critics have said that the lottery system is unfair to singles and non-traditional families, for whom it is harder to get a flat. Singapore’s marriage rate has been steadily falling in recent decades, dropping from 57 per 1,000 unmarried males in 1994 to 42 in 2024. The HDB system has also been used by Singapore’s government to promote multicultural integration by setting limits on the proportion of different ethnic groups in the same estate. However, this policy has caused problems for some in the resale market by restricting potential buyers... Construction ground to a halt during the Covid-19 pandemic... Wait times to move into a property rose from three years to as many as six. As a result, more buyers turned to the resale market, where HDB owners can sell properties after five years of occupancy. This led to a sharp rise in resale prices, especially in more desirable estates.

6. FT has a long read on Latin America's rightward turn.

“Crime and violence is clearly the top concern of Latin Americans today,” says Jean-Christophe Salles, Latin America chief executive at pollster Ipsos. “It is the biggest concern in almost every country.” Some 55 per cent of Latin Americans name crime and violence as their prime worry, according to Ipsos data, against just 34 per cent worldwide. In Chile, the figure rises to 62 per cent. Fear of crime propelled arch-conservative José Antonio Kast to a landslide presidential election victory last month in Chile over a Communist opponent, Jeannette Jara. His broader rightwing message had failed in two previous elections, but this time he won by focusing on pledges to erect border fortifications, deport illegal migrants and reduce crime...
El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele is the inspiration for many rightwing challengers across the region. His extraordinary success in transforming El Salvador from one of Latin America’s most murderous countries to one of its safest — albeit through mass incarceration and authoritarian rule — is firing up anti-establishment conservatives across the region just as it enters a major election cycle... Bukele’s newly built giant prison, the Centre for Confinement of Terrorists (Cecot), which has capacity to hold about 40,000 inmates, many detained indefinitely... Even Costa Rica, a country so peaceful that it decreed the abolition of its army in 1948, has been shaken by record levels of drug-related murders. Ahead of elections on February 1, its outgoing president, Rodrigo Chaves, appeared with Bukele to lay a foundation stone for Costa Rica’s own version of Cecot, a $35mn maximum security jail project with capacity for 5,100 prisoners... In Peru, which is set to go to the polls in April, leading presidential contender and former mayor of Lima Rafael López Aliaga is promising to fight what he calls “urban terrorism” with life sentences for serious crimes... In Mexico and Uruguay, leftwing incumbents are cracking down on violent crime to curry favour with voters.

7. The rising share of debt raising by hyperscalers (companies like Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle) to finance their AI infrastructure rollouts.

8. What does the India-EU FTA mean for Europe?
9. Ed Luce has this description of the breadth of the Jeffrey Epstein network.
This includes the sitting US president and a previous one, big Wall Street figures, a network of Ivy League luminaries, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, foreign government officials, Democrats, Republicans, a Maga influencer, a far left scholar, British and Norwegian royals, wives and girlfriends of powerful men, government lawyers, heads of law firms, movie directors and endless celebrities. Epstein’s network is an MRI of the establishment. The idea that anyone did not know about Epstein’s conviction as a sex abuser is absurd. Some people spurned his social approaches. Having been invited in 2010 to an Epstein dinner with Woody Allen and then Prince Andrew in New York, the magazine editor, Tina Brown, replied: “What the fuck is this . . .? The paedophile’s ball?” Brown’s reaction should have been everyone’s. So should that of Melinda Gates, the now ex-wife of Bill Gates, who stepped into Epstein’s home once and immediately regretted it. Alas, their reaction was all too rare.

10. Fascinating account of the egregiously one-sided US-Japan trade deal.

Proposed projects are screened for “strategic and legal considerations” by a committee of US and Japanese members, according to a joint MOU and a document prepared by Japanese officials. Projects are then sent to an investment committee headed by US commerce secretary Howard Lutnick, who chooses which proposals to send to the US president for approval. Donald Trump has the final say on which projects are “deemed to advance economic and national security interests”. Japan and its state-backed bank can delay or refuse to proceed but face potential penalties, including higher tariffs. Funds for approved projects — from JBIC or with guarantees from Japan’s insurance corporation — then flow into an SPV alongside “the provision of land, water, power, energy, offtake agreements, regulatory support, etc” from the US. Free cash generated by projects will be split equally until the Japanese loans are paid back, according to officials. After that, the US will receive 90 per cent. Officials believe Japanese companies outside the project can also make agreements with it separately, with terms negotiated that are different from the US-Japan split of cash flow... The way the agreement with the US is structured also means that if Japan delays or refuses to fund a project recommended by Trump, it could be liable for “catch-up” payments or an increase in tariff rates.

11. Elon Musk may have pulled off the biggest bluff of the century by merging SpaceX with xAI to create the most valuable private company at a combined valuation of $1.25 trillion. xAI, which had revenues in the low hundreds last year and is burning through $1 billion a month, was bought by SpaceX at an eye-popping valuation of $250 billion. Musk says that the move was needed to launch data centres into space, build factories on the moon and colonise Mars. Musk controls both the private companies, whose combined valuation has increased by over $1 trillion in 18 months. To pay for the deal, SpaceX will issue $250 bn in new shares, thereby diluting the existing shareholders.

This from the comments section sums up the deal

You set your own price for a company you own, sell it to another you own and, miraculously you can then leverage the hell out of it.
South-east Asia’s second-largest economy has been stuck at about 2 per cent growth for the past five years, with its pivotal drivers of consumption, manufacturing and tourism all in decline... Making matters worse are prolonged political instability and frequent changes in leadership. The royalist-military establishment has been locked in a stand-off with reformist parties that have won the past two elections but have been blocked from power. Thailand has had three prime ministers in as many years... Signs of economic malaise are increasing. Banks worried about defaults are lending less, the property market is in its worst slump in three decades and headline inflation turned negative last year, signalling weak demand. Thailand’s stock market has been the worst performer in Asia over the past 12 months, declining 10 per cent in 2025 in local currency terms. The government has projected 2 per cent growth this year, but the IMF has forecast just 1.6 per cent, the slowest among major south-east Asian economies...
Manufacturing has been on the decline for years, weighed down by weak domestic demand, an influx of cheaper Chinese goods and intense competition from newer manufacturing hubs such as Vietnam. That has also taken a toll on Thailand’s once mighty auto sector. The country was a regional hub for car manufacturing but Nissan, Honda, Suzuki and others have shut down factories or scaled back production in recent years... Household debt-to-GDP is close to 90 per cent, among the highest levels in Asia, as wages have remained stagnant. And Thailand’s population has been shrinking for four years, with the birth rate hitting a 75-year low in 2025... Tourism, another economic engine, is sputtering and this has had a knock-on effect on retail, agriculture and hotel construction... Thailand recorded 32.9mn foreign visitors in 2025, a 7 per cent fall from the previous year and still below the pre-pandemic peak of 40mn tourists in 2019.

13. US federal debt is at pre-war highs.

14. With the purge of General Zhang Youxia and Gen Liu Zhenli, Xi Jinping has removed all the six members of the Central Military Commission (apart from himself), 35 out the 43 generals in leadership positions of the PLA.
While the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs recommends 40-60 buses per 100,000 people, India’s cities together have only about 47,650 buses, nearly 61 per cent of which are concentrated in just nine mega cities.

16. Primer on Project Vault, the $12 bn US program to procure and develop a reserve of critical minerals for civilian and other purposes through a public-private partnership involving the US federal government and US companies. 

Project Vault is a public-private partnership that will buy and store critical minerals and rare earth elements. These include gallium and cobalt, which are essential for modern technology and defence equipment. It will combine $1.67 billion in private seed funding with another $10 billion from the US government’s Export-Import Bank... Companies will make an initial commitment to buy materials later at a fixed inventory price. They will also pay some upfront fees. Based on these commitments, companies can give Project Vault a list of the materials they need. The project will then purchase and store those materials. Manufacturers will pay a carrying cost that covers loan interest and storage expenses.

16. Mihir Sharma has an excellent op-ed that raises the questions about the emerging international order arising from the US National Security Strategy released in December and the more recent National Defence Strategy. Both are anchored around an America First approach that narrowly defines its interests in terms of drug trade, energy security, immigration, etc. 

The rest of the world matters only as a market or as a source of certain raw materials that are not specifically available in the US. This is not a status-quoist view of the world, nor is it radical or aggressive. It is essentially defensive. US interests are defined far more narrowly than earlier, and are more localised. But they will be as aggressively and unilaterally defended as ever, perhaps more.

I'll blog on this in due course.

17. Some staggering numbers in the Big Tech capex plans announced this week, along with their quarterly earnings which have spooked the markets. 

Big Tech stocks sold off heavily after unveiling plans to spend $660bn this year on AI, as investors fret that the “breathtaking” capital expenditures are outpacing the earnings potential of the new technology. Amazon, Google and Microsoft are set to lose a combined $900bn in market value since filing their quarterly earnings over the past week... Along with social media giant Meta, their proposed outlay on data centres and specialised chips needed to train and run advanced AI models would mark a 60 per cent rise from the $410bn they spent in 2025 and a 165 per cent increase from $245bn in 2024... Even a 14 per cent boost to their combined annual revenue to $1.6tn was not enough to overcome the pessimism.
18. Big infrastructure deal in the UK, as Canadian pension fund majors CPPIB and Omers announced sale of their 34% and 33% stakes in Associated British Ports (ABP) in a deal estimated to value the UK's biggest port operator, owning 21 ports in the UK, at more than £10bn. ABP was taken private in 2006 by a group of investors including Goldman Sachs' infrastructure arm and Omers, for £2.8bn. Ownership has chaged over the years, with CPPIB taking stake in 2015, along with others like Singapore's GIC and Kuwait Investment Authority's Wren House Infrastructure. CPPIB manages C$777.5bn ($568bn) of assets and Omers manages C$141bn of assets.

Monday, February 2, 2026

Lessons from India's fiscal policy management

It has become a feature of economic policymaking to define thresholds for fiscal prudence and macroeconomic stability. Accordingly, it is held that fiscal deficits should not exceed 3% of GDP, public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, inflation should not exceed 2% (or 4%), etc. 

I have blogged earlier here and here about the problems with the uniform adoption of such targets. 

This post will examine India’s macroeconomic record over the last fifty years against these benchmarks. It will use data for 1975-2024 from the World Bank’s WDI to assess the impacts of CPI inflation, central government debt (% of GDP), fiscal deficit, and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) on GDP growth rates. 

The table below captures the five-year averages on each of the above parameters. 

This is the same table with ten-year averages.

This is a ChatGPT summary which broadly conforms to the economic orthodoxy on macroeconomic stability. 

A five- and ten-year view of India’s macrofiscal indicators highlights a clear structural shift after the mid-1990s, marked by lower inflation, higher investment, and improved growth outcomes. The FRBM period stands out as the most balanced macro regime. However, major shocks since 2008—particularly the COVID-19 pandemic—have resulted in persistently higher fiscal deficits and public debt, underscoring the importance of restoring fiscal space while protecting capital expenditure.

We get broadly similar conclusions from models with different specifications (lagged multivariate growth regression, structural break regression, and reduced-form VAR).

India’s growth experience shows that fiscal deficits support growth only in the short run and only when macro-credibility is intact. Sustained growth is driven far more by investment and macro-stability than by deficit expansion, while rising public debt increasingly constrains long-term growth.

However, if we disaggregate the fifty years into identifiable macroeconomic regimes and perform lagged GDP growth regressions against each parameter separately, the shorter-term trends become less clear and regime-dependent. It provides some useful takeaways. 

There are some distinct takeaways. The strongest relationship is that between GFCF and growth. It holds in both short and long-run time frames. 

The short-run relationship with fiscal deficits is generally positive. However, the magnitude of this relationship depends on the regime. As can be expected, the three periods with the greatest perceived thrust on macroeconomic stability - post-liberalisation decade, FRBM era (2003-08), and post-Covid 19 years - are also associated with the highest positive impulse from fiscal deficits. 

The trends on fiscal deficit show a distinct shift towards a higher deficit. Interestingly, though the post-pandemic period has had the highest deficits, it has also been associated with the highest economic growth rates. 

In fact, since 2010, the economy has shifted to a regime with fiscal deficits that are much above the 3% of GDP threshold. But it does not appear to have adversely impacted growth rates, nor market perceptions. An obvious reason is the quality of fiscal deficits, which have shifted sharply towards capital expenditures. 

Overall, as the graphic below shows, there’s a very weak correlation between growth and fiscal deficit. At least, there’s nothing to suggest a fiscal deficit threshold around 3% of GDP. 

Since around 1995, successive governments in India have generally exercised fiscal prudence in terms of the public debt to GDP ratio being range-bound in the 45-50% range. However, unlike fiscal deficit, there’s a strong inverse correlation between the stock of public debt and GDP growth rates. Therefore, the rise in the public debt ratio in the post-pandemic period should be a matter of concern. When the state government debt is added, the gross public debt is inching towards 100%, easily the highest among all major developing countries. 

Similar to fiscal deficit, inflation higher than the target rates has been found to co-exist with high growth rates. There’s little relationship between an inflation rate of 2%, or even 4%, and GDP growth rates. In general, inflation effects tend to weaken once macro stability is achieved. 

Over the last decade, India has significantly improved its economic attractiveness. This has come about through a combination of political stability, large infrastructure investments, expansion in the IT services market (GCCs), the emergence of e-commerce and startups with the resultant job creation, gradual but consistent pursuit of economic reforms, interspersed with some critical reforms, and generally good macroeconomic governance through fiscal discipline, quality of public expenditures, and transparency. It has also helped that the country has been growing at steady high rates, and has emerged as the fourth biggest economy in the world and is one of the few big growth markets. 

All this has provided the fiscal credibility to run a higher level of deficits. In fact, the Indian economy has benefited from the free lunch of an additional 2-3 percentage points of GDP of fiscal space for the last decade or so, which was unavailable in the FRBM-constrained regime. This fiscal boost has been central to the high growth rates of recent years. 

This is a good case study for at least two reasons. One, while such quantitative targets do play a fiscal disciplining role, there’s nothing sacrosanct or objective about arbitrarily defined thresholds. In fact, a rigid adherence to such targets is counter-productive and growth-squeezing. Second, in a world where these targets have become accepted norms, market perceptions about reform commitment and fiscal prudence can significantly expand the fiscal space available for governments. Market credibility provides the flexibility for fiscal expansion. 

So what does this all say? Here is the summary from ChatGPT

Over the last five decades, India’s growth experience shows no stable linear relationship between fiscal deficits and growth. Periods of high growth have occurred under both fiscal expansion and consolidation. Inflation control appears growth-enhancing primarily in high-inflation regimes, while capital formation is largely pro-cyclical. The results underscore that fiscal quality, institutional credibility, and macro stability matter more than headline fiscal aggregates.

A major macroeconomic challenge for India going forward will be the management of its fiscal balance. It must pursue fiscal consolidation to significantly reduce its current high flows and stock of debt, while also significantly raising GFCF. And it must do all these at a time when private investment remains caught in a low equilibrium trap with no signs of a breakout, and when global headwinds are likely to squeeze capital inflows and export growth. This is especially daunting since, as the figures show, economic growth since the GFC, and more so since the pandemic, has been largely propped up by public investment, which is now hitting hard fiscal constraints. 

Saturday, January 31, 2026

Weekend reading links

1. While the US tariffs are undoubtedly reducing US imports from China, the imports are substituting towards other developing countries. See this about the trends with mobile phone imports.
And, this about imports of wooden furniture.
The moot point is how much of these imports are merely repackaging and re-routing of supply chains. 

The country has become a solar champion thanks to abundant sunshine and the government’s pro-renewables policies. But a surge in power production has outpaced demand, depressing electricity prices and profits for generators. Some power producers are struggling to offload plants whose valuations have plunged as executives talk of solar “saturation”... Operational solar plants were valued at an average of €916,000 per megawatt in early 2024, but have now dropped to €648,000 per megawatt, according to nTeaser.

... the gloom is even greater over so-called ready-to-build projects, where land, permits and grid access have all been secured, but construction has not begun. A senior executive at an owner of Spanish solar plants said: “The market is flooded with ready-to-build projects that developers want to sell since they’re no longer good enough in the current market.” Some projects were up for sale for just €1, the executive said, reflecting developers’ desperation to avoid further spending, and potential government penalties for not executing agreed construction plans. The least attractive ready-to-build projects are often far from power grid nodes, requiring investment in expensive power lines.

... low prices are painful for producers. When they fall below zero, as they have for more than 500 hours in Spain this year, producers can end up having to choose between paying wholesale customers to take excess power off their hands or switching off. Many producers insulate themselves by selling electricity through long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs), which they sign at fixed prices with corporate clients for 10-20 years... Adding battery storage to solar plants helps to limit price plunges by enabling generators to store electricity when prices drop during the day, then sell it in the evening when demand and prices are higher.
3. John Burn-Murdoch points to a rising inflation in reported children with "special needs" in US and UK, with some distortions. 
38 per cent of undergraduates at Stanford this year are registered as having a disability, as are 21 per cent at Harvard — both up from 5 per cent in 2009... The bulk of the rise in special support for youngsters is cases of non-profound autism spectrum disorder (ASD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) plus anxiety and mental health, all of which have flexible diagnostic criteria… we consistently see mild, not severe, cases driving the rise... As the number of more mild cases receiving support has climbed over the past decade, average funding per child (including the most severe cases) has fallen by a third in real terms… In 2010, 1 per cent of American young people from the poorest school districts were on plans that provide special support, and today that figure is unchanged. But among those in the richest areas, it has tripled from 2 to 6 per cent.
4. The Big 5 Indian IT firms have added just 17 net workers in the first three quarters of Fy26!
5. This is what industrialisation success looks like, the example of Hosur in Tamil Nadu, the leading EV and electronics manufacturing cluster in India.
6. India's industrial power prices are the highest.
7. Consumption's share of China's GDP is lowest among all major economies.
China’s decline in private final consumption expenditure is in sharp contrast to consumption-dependent economies like the United States (US) and India, with their share of private final consumption reaching 68.39 per cent (in 2022) and 61.38 per cent (in 2024) of their GDP, respectively. Among the top five economies of the world, China has the least share of private final consumption in its GDP. On the contrary, China has the highest share of fixed investment in its GDP – almost 10 percentage points higher than India’s share. Further, China has the largest share of net exports, after the EU.

8. The biggest trade promotion policy ever? The shipping container.

Nothing has done more to juice global trade than a simple receptacle—spanning about 40 feet on the long side and eight on the other two. It could be stuffed with cargo and hoisted onto lorries, trains, ships or planes with equal ease. That humble steel box—the standard shipping container—did “more than all trade agreements in the past 50 years put together” to boost globalisation

9. The US government has announced a $1.6 billion investment in USA Rare Earth, a listed Oklahoma-based miner that controls significant US deposits of heavy rare earths. 

One person said the government would get 16.1m shares in USA Rare Earth and warrants for another 17.6m, both at a price of $17.17. The government agreed to pay $277mn for the equity, giving it an implied gain of $490mn for the equity and warrants based on the current share price of $24.77. USA Rare Earth will also receive $1.3bn in senior secured debt financing at market rates from the government. The money will come from a finance facility created for the commerce department as part of the CHIPS and Science Act passed in 2022... A condition of the government investment in USA Rare Earth was that the company raise at least an additional $500mn from investors. It is on track to raise more than $1bn because of high demand for the financing deal, which uses a mechanism known as a private investment into a public equity, often called a “Pipe”...

USA Rare Earth, which has a market value of $3.7bn, is developing a huge mine in Sierra Blanca, Texas that it says contains 15 of the 17 rare earth elements underpinning production of cell phones, missiles and fighter jets. It also plans to open a magnet production facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma... Last year, the Trump administration invested in at least six minerals companies, including MP Materials, Trilogy Metals and Lithium Americas. Some of the investments overlapped with the financial interests of people associated with the administration. The government did a funding deal with Vulcan Elements, a rare earths start-up three months after the president’s son Donald Trump Jr’s venture capital group invested in the company... USA Rare Earth has separately tapped Cantor Fitzgerald, the Wall Street firm previously owned by commerce secretary Howard Lutnick and now run by his sons, to raise more than $1bn in fresh equity financing, the people said.

10. President Trump has announced his intention to cap credit card interest rates at 10% and has enlisted the services of an unlikely partner, Elizabeth Warren, to draft legislation in this regard. 

But a study by Liberty Street Economics found that spreads are high across all levels of credit ratings measured by so-called Fico scores and that default losses cannot explain the huge spreads above FFR... A recent Vanderbilt study concludes that at a 10 per cent cap, banks could continue profitably serving the vast majority of their customers... Americans pay about $160bn a year in credit card interest.

Sheila Bair, the former FDIC Chair, has this alternative proposal.

A better approach would be a permanent cap expressed as a spread over the FFR, say 10 per cent. This would be consistent with pre-crisis spreads. It would ensure that banks pass on the benefits when the Fed lowers rates but also allow them to raise rates when the FFR goes up. At the current FFR, it would bring credit card rates to just under 14 per cent.

11. Debashis Basu on the challenges with tripling exports by 2035, a CAGR of 13%. From history, South Korea increased its exports by a CAGR of around 18% between 1965-85, Taiwan by 16% in the 1965-80 period, Thailand by 14% in 1986-96, Malaysia by 14% in the 1987-2000 period, and Vietnam by 14% from 2005-24. 

History suggests that sustaining export growth of around 13 per cent for a decade requires these conditions: Cheap currency, strong central coordination and disciplined policy execution, a large surplus of labour at low wages, assured access to large and open markets, and a willingness to tolerate overcapacity and frequent failures. India currently possesses none of these in sufficient measure. Instead, it faces headwinds from rising protectionism, aggressive dumping by China, and reforms that are often procedural rather than outcome-oriented.

12. The non-profit only mandate for schools in India is among the biggest charades. 

India’s rules continue to insist that most private schools are “charities”. The result is a system that makes it hard to bring capital in openly or take returns out transparently. Founders instead resort to legal gymnastics. A single school is often split into three entities: a trust to hold recognition and collect fees; a land company to own the campus; and a services firm to run everything from transport to maintenance. Three entities mean three sets of books, audits, and compliance calendars. Even routine decisions, like paying salaries or upgrading infrastructure, require cross-entity coordination that adds weeks of delay. Hanging over all this is the lingering uncertainty of the government suddenly cracking down on the school or changing a rule about the trust... Every rupee that leaves the account must be defensible on paper. Salaries are routed as lease payments to a land-owning entity and as service fees to an operating company. Each transaction is vetted by his chartered accountant, ensuring no regulator can later accuse the school of making a profit—before it has even run payroll.

The arrangement is captured nicely here.

13. Tamal Bandopadhyay has an interesting article on the trends with central and state government borrowings.
In the current year, the central government’s gross borrowing is pegged at Rs 14.72 trillion, and net of redemptions, the net borrowings, at Rs 11.54 trillion... The gross SDL in the current year is Rs 11.83 trillion... Will there be demand for such a large borrowing programme? That’s the challenge before the RBI. In the current year, it has managed this by buying bonds from the market, popularly known as open market operations, or OMO. In FY26, a record Rs 6.45 trillion (till February 12) is being raised through this route, more than double of what the RBI had bought in FY25. The highest OMO before this was in FY21 – a little over Rs 3.13 trillion... 

Until the global financial crisis of 2008, the central government’s gross borrowing never crossed Rs 2 trillion. And SDLs were much lower – in thousands (for instance, Rs 20,825 crore in FY07). In FY09, the central government’s gross borrowing crossed Rs 2 trillion for the first time. The following year, it jumped to over Rs 4 trillion. The next big jump came in the Covid-hit FY21. From a little over Rs 7 trillion in the previous fiscal year, it rose to Rs 13.7 trillion that year. It crossed Rs 15 trillion in FY24, and is now set to cross Rs 16 trillion in FY27. Though the size of borrowing has increased over the years, as a percentage to GDP, it has remained largely in range... But SDL is becoming a burden. Before the global financial crisis, state loans were just 15-20 per cent of central borrowing every year. In FY27, these could be 75-80 per cent; and over the next few years, SDL may even exceed the centre’s annual borrowing. The oversupply of SDL has widened the spread between the yield of 10-year central government and state government papers to 85 basis points. Typically, it is about 40-50 basis points.

14. China is enhancing state capability by recruiting more tax officers to strengthen enforcement amid widening budget deficits. 

Central and local government tax departments plan to recruit 25,004 staff in 2026, accounting for two-thirds of the new bureaucrats to be appointed from among the millions taking part in fiercely competitive national exams, according to the state civil service administration. The plans mark a fourth successive year of heavy recruitment of tax officials, with the number of appointments set to marginally exceed a previous peak of 24,985 in 2023 to reach the highest level since at least 2012… Tax authorities have also announced moves to tighten tax enforcement and to scale back the use of corporate tax breaks by local governments… Authorities are also broadening the tax base by capturing more high-income earners, including those making capital gains on offshore equity investments… China’s tax revenues have fluctuated in recent years and fell 3.4 per cent year on year to Rmb17.5tn ($2.5tn) in 2024.
15. The rise and rise of Gold.

Housing accounts for 18 per cent of employment, making it the second-largest generator of jobs. It has deep linkages with more than 250 ancillary industries, creating powerful multiplier effects. Every investment in a housing unit generates 1.54 direct and indirect jobs and 4.05 induced jobs — much higher than employment multipliers in agriculture (0.8 and 1.2)... The average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is a mere 65 per cent, compelling homebuyers to rely on other expensive borrowing sources for interiors and registration... less than 8 per cent of loan originations have an LTV greater than 80 per cent... even in a relatively safe asset class like mortgages, more than 75 per cent of lending is still to “prime” borrowers (bureau scores of 730 and above). The likelihood of a “near-prime” borrower (bureau score 650-700) getting a loan approval is just 40 per cent... housing finance to GDP ratio at 11-12 per cent is much lower than comparable economies.

17. What explains the weakness in East Asian currencies despite these countries running large surpluses, the general weakening of the US Dollar, and the smallest interest rate spread with the US in years?

Heavy buying of US assets, and concerns on how to fulfil the pledges from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to invest $550bn, $350bn and $250bn in the US, and Sanae Takaichi's large spending plans are contributors. 

18. On the historic India-EU FTA deal.
Under the deal, Indian levies on EU cars will be gradually reduced from 110 per cent to 10 per cent, with a quota of 250,000 vehicles a year. Tariffs of up to 44 per cent on machinery, 22 per cent on chemicals and 11 per cent on pharmaceuticals will be mostly eliminated. Steel and iron levies of up to 22 per cent will also be phased out over a 10-year period... Tariffs of more than 36 per cent on EU food products will be reduced or removed, the bloc said, while those on wine will be slashed from 150 per cent to 75 per cent and eventually to levels as low as 20 per cent. Olive oil tariffs will also fall from 45 per cent to zero over five years. Those on processed agricultural products, such as bread and confectionery, of up to 50 per cent will be eliminated. In exchange, more than 99 per cent of Indian exports, worth about $75bn, will gain preferential entry status to the EU... The Indian dairy industry, a politically important constituency that New Delhi has sought to protect in the past, was excluded from the deal. Sensitive EU agricultural sectors, such as beef, chicken, rice, sugar and ethanol, were also carved out.

Friday, January 30, 2026

Individuals matter, and more so in public bureaucracies

I blogged here about the importance of strong public oversight and in-house expertise for the successful execution and management of infrastructure projects. 

Mainstream development discourse focuses disproportionately on institutional and systemic challenges, and overlooks the important role played by individual officials in effective public services delivery and the realisation of policy outcomes. 

Specifically, I am referring to the commitment and expertise of individual public servants in important positions at all levels of the government. By important, I’m not confining to leadership positions, but any position where they can make significant contributions to influence the agenda. 

The importance of individual officials in the success of development interventions is generally overlooked amidst systemic and institutional factors. This also comes from the belief that the success of development interventions is determined by good ideas, comprehensive planning, and rigorous monitoring. This theory of change overlooks the reality that successful development interventions tend to emerge iteratively over the course of their implementation. Such iteration, in turn, requires capable and committed leadership, especially important given weak state capabilities. 

In fact, it is no exaggeration to argue that capable, proficient, and committed officials are perhaps the most important ingredient of state capability. 

The importance of capable individual officials is also borne out by academic research. I blogged here, drawing attention to the work of Philipp Barteska and Jay Euijung Lee, who examined the impact of the bureaucratic capabilities (of export promotion officers) on the effectiveness of industrial policy in terms of export performance in South Korea. They found the following:

We exploit the three-yearly rotation of managers of South Korea’s export promotion offices in 87 countries between 1965 and 2000 to show that a one standard deviation increase in bureaucrat ability boosts exports by 37%. Under higher-ability bureaucrats, South Korean exports respond more strongly to a country’s import demand, suggesting a more effective transmission of market information.

An increase in exports by nearly two-fifths with just one standard deviation increase in bureaucratic capability tells us that the quality of officials might matter more than (or at least as much as) fiscal incentives and regulatory changes in trade promotion efforts. 

Alessandra Fenizia studied the impacts of managers in the public sector in Italy using a dataset containing an output-based measure of productivity. 

Exploiting the rotation of managers across sites, I find that a one standard deviation increase in managerial talent raises office productivity by 10%. These gains are driven primarily by the exit of older workers who retire when more productive managers take over. I use these estimates to evaluate the optimal allocation of managers to offices. I find that assigning better managers to the largest and most productive offices would increase output by at least 6.9%.

Cristobal Otero and Pablo Munoz study government managers in public health provision in Chile. 

Using novel data from public hospitals in Chile, we document that top managers (CEOs) account for a significant amount of variation in hospital mortality. We then use a staggered difference-in-differences design, and show that a reform which introduced a competitive selection system for recruiting CEOs in public hospitals reduced hospital mortality by approximately 8%. The effect is not explained by a change in patient composition and is robust to several alternative explanations. The financial incentives included in the reform—performance pay and higher wages—do not explain our findings. Instead, we show that the policy changed the pool of CEOs by displacing older doctors with no management training in favor of younger CEOs who had studied management. The mortality effects were driven by hospitals in which the new CEOs had managerial qualifications. These CEOs improved operating room efficiency and reduced staff turnover.

Michael Carlos Best, Jonas Hjort, and David Szakonyi analyse data on public procurements in Russia and find the value of bureaucratic effectiveness. 

Using data on 16 million public purchases in Russia, we show that 39 percent of the variation in prices paid for narrowly defined items is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations who manage procurement. Low-price buyers also display higher spending quality. Theory suggests that such differences in effectiveness can be pivotal for policy design.

R D Metcalfe, A B Sollaci, and C Syverson

In this setting, managers move between stores but management practices are set by firm policy and largely fixed, allowing us to hone in on managers’ personal roles in determining store performance. We find: (i) managers affect and explain a large share of the variance of store-level productivity; (ii) negative assortative matching between managers and stores, which may reflect both firms’ decisions and a selection-driven bias that we characterize and argue might apply in other settings using movers designs; (iii) managers who move do so on average from less productive to more productive stores; (iv) female managers are less likely to move stores than male managers; (v) manager quality is generally hard to explain with the observables in our data, but is correlated with the ratio of full-time to part-time workers; (vi) managers who obtain high labor productivity also tend to obtain high energy productivity, revealing some breadth in managers’ skills applicability; (vii) high-performing managers in stable growth times are also high-performing during turbulent times; and (viii) exogenous productivity shocks improve the quality of initially low quality managers, suggesting managers can learn. We explain implications of these findings for productivity research.

Ricardo Dahis, Laura Schiavon, and Thiago Scot investigated the performance of state judges in Brazil. 

We investigate this question focusing on state judges in Brazil. Exploring monthly data on judicial output and cross-court movement, we estimate that judges account for at least 23% of the observed variation in number of cases disposed. With novel data on admission examinations, we show that judges with higher grades perform better than lower-ranked peers. Our results suggest competitive examinations can be an effective way to screen candidates.

On a slightly different note, Kevin Hawickhorst shows how technical expertise built up within public systems in the US allowed for the nurturing and flourishing of capable officials, created public confidence, and thereby enhanced the credibility of governments. 

However, over time, expertise has come to be crowded out due to the conscious shift in the way government bureaucracies came to be organised. 

At the turn of the twentieth century, agencies followed a distinct blueprint: they were organized by subject matter, not by abstract function. Each bureau focused on a single domain—such as soils, mines, or forests—and combined research, regulation, and grants under one roof. In the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Bureau of Entomology, for example, studied insect-borne diseases, issued rules to contain them, and funded farmers to protect their crops, all as part of a single mission. This structure helped agencies recruit experts by offering broader, more meaningful work than corporations could, and it built a shared sense of mission rooted in a vocational community.

Today’s agencies look very different. After World War II, reformers dismantled the integrated subject matter bureaus and reorganized government along what they called “functional” lines. In this system, regulation is one bureau, research another, and grant administration still another; each bureau covers a wide range of subjects and is defined by its activity rather than its mission. It is the model we now take for granted. The Bureau of Entomology is gone, and USDA now houses all agricultural research in a single unit. New agencies were built this way from the outset: the Department of Housing and Urban Development, created in 1965, was designed as a grantmaking machine, never a vocational community.

The shift was a well-intentioned one and backed by a wide coalition of reformers, businessmen, and interest groups. Functional departments looked modern, rational, and efficient: they simplified charts, tightened chains of command, and promised to reduce duplication. But what seemed like sensible reform gradually hollowed out the structures that had made expertise durable. Once government agencies lost their vocational missions, they stopped drawing on networks of expertise and started looking like paper mills, less able to command political respect, and more vulnerable to capture and drift… logic of the Progressive-era model: that research and administration had to remain intertwined within a unified mission if expertise was to thrive.

However, this wealth of internal technical expertise has, over time, given way to the tribe of generalist managers. 

The core mistake was a shift in what we thought expertise was. The Progressive reformers built vocations that were tied to missions, visible to the public, and legible to politicians. Their successors redefined expertise as a credential: the knowledge of process rather than mastery of a craft. To businessmen and academic reformers alike, competence meant general managerial skill, not professional vocation. As this view took hold within the bureaucracy, “expertise” came to mean knowing the procedures rather than knowing the work. We have traded the civil engineer and the entomologist for the program analyst, the management consultant, and the diversity officer—experts who know how to manage the process but not how to do the work.

This redefinition of expertise hollowed out our idea of representation. We now equate representation with participation and diversity, as if the state were legitimate only when citizens can see themselves in its officials. The Progressives, by contrast, recruited from the country’s varied vocations and made that work visible to the nation. Expertise was representative not because it resembled the public but because it served the public, visibly and competently… Their institutions were built to make expertise endure, by recruiting promising candidates from vocational schools and professional societies, dressing them in uniform, and sending them to work alongside state engineers, agricultural agents, and university researchers…

The Navy cannot build ships. In 1940, faced with the same problem, Congress did the obvious: it created a Bureau of Ships, put engineers in charge, and got ships built. That bureau is gone, and we treat its return as unthinkable. Yet the remedy remains the same. If we want ships, we should once again have a Bureau of Ships to build them… Repairing our institutions will ultimately require returning to the vocational conception of expertise… We have built institutions that valorize process in place of vocation, producing a bureaucracy that neither embodies skill nor commands respect. What matters now is not saving “expertise” in the abstract but rebuilding the institutions where it can serve visibly and credibly.

Hawickhorst’s essay points to several individual public leaders in the US who built institutions and brought credibility and confidence in public agencies through their careers - George Uhler (headed Steamboat Inspection Service for 20 years from 1903), Logan Page (Office of Public Roads, founded in 1905), Joseph Kinyoun (headed the Hygienic Laboratory, a precursor to the National Institutes of Health), and Gifford Pinchot (founded the Forest Service). Every country has such leaders across levels. 

In their search for better outcomes in public policy, governments tend to expend effort and resources on interventions involving financial support, regulatory enablers, and technology adoption, while overlooking personnel choices. This bias is also reflected in public commentary and academic research that shapes public narratives. 

However, as the case of the South Korean export promotion officers starkly demonstrates, for governments intent on reform and impact, personnel choice decisions may be the lowest-hanging fruit. In most policy areas, the range between the opportunity cost of a bad personnel choice and that of a capable personnel choice may be much greater than that for any other policy intervention.

The private sector addresses the issue of the importance of capable individuals by incentivising them with extrinsic material motivations like financial rewards and fast-tracked promotions. While neither of these instruments is available to governments, it can appeal to the intrinsic motivation of public-spirited officials. 

This would require acknowledging capabilities and merit (as borne out strictly by performance track record, not merely in some narrow quantitative sense). This requires differentiating capable bureaucratic leaders from their larger peer group by entrusting them with higher responsibilities, appointing them to identified important positions, drawing on their expertise in various forms, recognising their work through different non-financial channels, and generally signalling their differentiation. 

An explicitly professed intent, let alone a rigorously implemented process, that seeks to differentiate among officials at all levels, can be a powerful force to shape expectations and align incentives within public systems.