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Showing posts with label Construction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Construction. Show all posts

Monday, February 6, 2023

Thoughts on India's structural transformation path

A new NBER working paper (here) looks at the nature of industrialisation in the US between 1880 and 1940, when the country transformed from a largely agrarian to an industrialised country.   
This short paper studies the co-movement of workers across sectors and space during a pivotal period of the US economy: its second wave of industrialization between 1880 and 1940. We show that industrialization was primarily a local phenomenon, with most sectoral reallocation happening not through long-distance moves towards industrial hubs but within counties. Moreover, within counties, the most significant sectoral shifts did not occur via the expansion of incumbent cities but rather through the birth of new cities and towns in the rural hinterland. Interestingly, the new urban structures had a much higher employment share in manufacturing than incumbent cities, which specialized more in providing non-tradable services. In other words, “factory towns” sprouting across Rural America were central to both US industrialization and urbanization.

The paper contrasts the contributions of spatial reallocation of workers from rural to industrialised counties with local transformation or the sectoral shifts due to within-county changes in industrial structure. 

In Panel B, we implement this decomposition for each decade between 1880 and 1940. Structural change was mainly about the transformation of local economies: the “Within” component, shown in orange, explains between 45%-85% of the decline in agricultural employment in each decade and 63% over the entire period. The “Across” component could reflect moves within the local labor market or long-distance migration across states. To quantify the importance of these different types of reallocations, we further decompose the across-county component into reallocations across counties within commuting zones, across commuting zones within states, and across states.

Panel B shows this decomposition of the across-county component in various hues of blue. Long-distance, cross-state moves from remote rural locations towards large industrial centers such as Cook County (Chicago) or New York County (Manhattan) played a minor role in the aggregate structural change. The within-state component accounts for at least 80% of aggregate structural change every year. Interestingly, the era of the Great Migration toward Northern States between 1910 and 1920 is the only decade for which cross-state migration accounts for a non-trivial part of sectoral reallocation...
The industrialization of Rural America (the union of counties with the highest agricultural employment shares that collectively accounted for 50% of total employment in 1880) occurred in two ways. First, workers moved to its industrialized cities... Second, within the hinterland, the importance of the agricultural sector also declined swiftly. In an accounting sense, the second channel is much more important for the industrialization of Rural America than the first since the hinterland accounted for a much larger share of Rural America’s population... In 1880, Rural America had only four incorporated cities identified in the US Census. By 1940, there were almost 250 cities, and their populationshare had risen by a factor of 50 from 0.3% in 1880 to 16.8%. Crucially, the entirety of this increase is accounted for by new cities sprouting in the hinterland: the incumbent “old” cities that already existed in 1880 only accounted for 0.5% of Rural America’s population in 1940... the gradual transformation of parts of the hinterland into towns and, from there, into incorporated cities... 

The newly founded cities were heavily specialized in manufacturing and corresponded precisely to the textbook idea of factory towns. While the manufacturing share also grew in old cities, by 1940, it was only half as large as in the new cities. Old cities continued to rely more on (consumer) services. However, despite the formation of new cities, the hinterland still accounted for more than 80% of the population in Rural America and contributed substantially to the fall in agricultural employment... Even outside the proliferating cities, Rural America urbanized: the hinterland’s share of urban workers increased from 4.9% to 17.6% between 1880 and 1940. Moreover, the rise in the hinterland’s manufacturing employment share was particularly pronounced among urban workers, highlighting the general trend of “densification” in Rural America: workers came together in and around factory towns long before their incorporation as cities.

Interestingly, this kind of sectoral shifts due to within-county/region changes has been the major driver of industrialisation in developing countries too. 

Changes in the local employment structure accounted for between 86-94% of the decline in agricultural employment shares in Brazil, Indonesia, India, and China. Interestingly, spatial reallocation plays the most negligible role in China, known for its stringent migration restrictions (e.g., “Hukou system”). 

The data above does not disaggregate the types and quality of non-agriculture within-county employment. More specifically, it does not make the distinction between rural non-farm informal employment and productive urban manufacturing and formal services employment. 

In other words, it was not migration to larger cities and towns, not even daily commutes to the nearest urban centres, but the creation of new urban localities centred on manufacturing that helped achieve the structural transformation in the US. 

This has important learnings for India, especially since it means taking jobs closer to the majority of population instead of making the majority of population migrate to where there are jobs. This assumes significance since one of the most important labour market frictions in India is the distance between labour  and jobs locations, and labour's higher marginal wage expectations for moving outside their commute zones. 

I believe that the biggest challenge for India in the years ahead is to manage the quality of its economic growth and create jobs to absorb its youthful population. On the former, I've blogged here and here about the need to ensure that economic growth is broad-based. It's on jobs that the structural transformation pathway is important. Specifically the nature and quality of the structural transformation. 

I'll describe this in terms of long and short routes to change. 

Notwithstanding India's 1987-2009 numbers in the table above, I'm inclined to argue that India's structural transformation and socio-economic mobility has followed what I will call the long longest route to change. Though farm productivity growth has lagged, thanks to a combination of horticulture and animal husbandry activities and migration, farm incomes have increased gradually. In the typical poor rural household (and they form the vast majority), the male migrates for work seasonally or all-year to the nearest metropolis or large city or another part of the country. They do mostly unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, especially in the construction or in urban informal services sectors, and mostly earn just slightly more than would have in the village. 

This kind of structural transformation and socio-economic mobility has its limits. Bar the tiny few who get into professional courses (this too may no longer apply to an Engineering degree from the local college) definitively exit poverty and those lucky fewer do well by entrepreneurship, the vast majority of rural poor migrant households remain stuck there. In any case, it does not create the broad base of consumption class required to sustain high growth rates for long periods. It's only in the degrees of poverty that their lives change.

A good measure of structural transformation and social mobility would be to get the trends on the proportion of rural poor who are qualitatively better off than their parents. Or that on those who have migrated into the lower middle class status. What's the trend on intergenerational mobility at different income quintiles? 

Instead the short route to change which the East Asian countries followed combined high intensity small-holder agriculture which sharply increased farm productivity and incomes, with exports-led manufacturing factories which created millions of jobs nearer the hinterlands. In these cases, rural incomes increased sharply resulting in the emergence of large rural consumption class, who provided the market for the emergence of new towns which in turn attracted manufacturing and other industries. These in turn further increased incomes, and the virtuous cycle went on. Local transformation trumped spatial reallocation. 

India needs to adopt something similar as its structural transformation pathway. It needs to spread industrialisation and productive economic activity beyond the current few urban cores to cover the hinterland areas. At least some of its currently numerous sub-optimally productive urban centres (largely parasitic economies dependent on government activities, like many state capital cities are) should embrace productive industrial activities, especially of the labour intensive kind.

I do not recollect coming across a study examining these trends in the Indian context. It would be good to have someone dive deep into this issue in the Indian context. It would require layering the trends in urbanisation with economic growth. What are the identifiable markers of local transformation? How many new towns/cities have emerged in the last two decades? What's the profile of jobs which have emerged in these new towns/cities and in the hinterland? How has inter-generational mobility changed, and to what extent?

In this context, I'll also draw attention to the much hyped point about India's entrepreneurship. As I have co-written here, most of the entrepreneurship that we associate with the poor in India is of the non-productive subsistence kind which arises out of their compulsion to earn something to survive. It's not the productive dynamic kind which arises out of an interest in creating something new and which builds companies and generates productive jobs. In an ideal world, such subsistence entrepreneurship should be replaced with wage earning jobs.  

The political leadership needs to formulate a narrative that prioritises local transformation and the bureaucracy needs to provide the policy enablers and instruments to catalyse and promote such growth. For this to happen, the academics, opinion makers and commentators should catalyse a credible and actionable discourse, trigger public debates, and influence important stakeholders to embrace this theory of change. 

Saturday, December 18, 2021

Weekend reading links

1. New Zealand bans cigarette smoking,

New Zealand unveiled a plan on Thursday to eventually ban all sales of cigarettes in the country, a decades-long effort unique in the world to prevent young people from taking up smoking. The proposed legislation, which is expected to become law next year, would leave current smokers free to continue buying cigarettes. But it would gradually raise the smoking age, year by year, until it covers the entire population. Starting in 2023, anyone under age 15 would be barred for life from buying cigarettes. So, for instance, in 2050 people 42 and older would still be able to buy tobacco products — but anyone younger would not.

The calibrated and long-drawn nature of the policy is interesting.  

2. Like in many areas, European Commission has taken the lead in greater regulation of technology platforms by unveiling draft rules that, if implemented, would require "companies like Uber to consider their drivers and couriers as employees entitled to a minimum wage and legal protections."

The new labor rules follow a landmark case in February, when Britain’s top court ruled that Uber drivers should be classified as workers entitled to a minimum wage and holiday pay. In the Netherlands, a court ruled in September that Uber drivers should be paid under collective rules in place for taxi drivers... The new European rules would require companies to disclose more about how their software systems made decisions affecting workers. For those who may remain independent, the new rules would also require companies to grant more autonomy that self-employment entails... Spain offers a preview of the potential effects of the E.U. proposal. The country’s so-called Riders Law, enacted in August, required food delivery services such as Uber and Deliveroo to reclassify workers as employees, covering an estimated 30,000 workers.

3. Nice listing of behavioural biases. 

4. A sub-plot to the global supply chain disruptions induced shortages,

Medical device manufacturers have this year spent an estimated $6.4 billion on computer chips, according to Gartner, a research firm. The automotive industry has spent $49 billion. Makers of wireless communications gadgets like cellphones and tablets have purchased nearly $170 billion worth of chips — more than 26 times as much as medical device manufacturers, according to Gartner. The shortages are assailing every industry. But much as airlines prioritize their most frequent fliers in the face of a flight-canceling blizzard, chip makers are in many cases favoring their largest customers, expert say.

This on what caused the disruptions,

The shortages are in large part the result of botched efforts to anticipate the economic impact of the pandemic. As Covid-19 emerged from China in early 2020, it sowed fears of a global recession that would destroy demand for a vast range of products. That prompted major buyers of chips — especially automakers — to slash their orders. In response, semiconductor plants reduced their production. That proved a colossal mistake. The pandemic shut down restaurants, movie theaters and hotels, while slashing demand for cars. But lockdowns imposed to choke off the virus increased demand for an array of products that use chips, like desktop monitors and printers for newly outfitted home offices. By the time global industry figured out that demand for chips was surging, it was too late. Adding chip-making capacity requires as much as two years of lead time and billions of dollars. 

This about the transmission of disruptions in one part of the supply chain throughout the entire chain,

Once a company like ResMed gains regulatory clearance to use a supplier, it cannot simply seek out a new one that might have a ready stock of chips without first going through a time-consuming approval process. That meant that ResMed had to figure out how to squeeze more chips out of its existing supply chain... Faced with the prospect of getting shut out, Mr. Farrell rooted through his supply chain, identifying the suppliers of his suppliers, in the hopes of persuading them to prioritize ResMed’s factories. Mr. Farrell soon realized that a primary reason that his chip supplier could not meet his demand was that — five levels up the chain — a Taiwanese manufacturer of silicon wafers had exhausted its inventory.

Because that plant could not deliver extra products, the next link in the chain — a company that combines wafers and circuitry — could not produce more of its components. That meant that another company that buys those components and packages them into clusters was unable to make more of them. And that meant that ResMed’s supplier of circuit boards could not buy enough of those clusters, leaving ResMed’s factories in Singapore, Sydney and Atlanta short of circuit boards.

See also this excellent FT series on supply chains in times of Covid 19.

5. By Beata Javorcik, Chief Economist at EBRD, in the FT on the possibility of shifts in the prevailing ideology on supply chain management,

The quest to find the most cost-effective suppliers has left many companies without a plan B. More than half of firms surveyed by the Shanghai Japanese Commerce and Industry Club reported their supply chains were affected by the outbreak. Less than a quarter said they had alternative production or procurement plans in case of a prolonged disruption... Businesses will be forced to rethink their global value chains. These chains were shaped to maximise efficiency and profits. And while just-in-time manufacturing may be the optimal way of producing a highly complex item such as a car, the disadvantages of a system that requires all of its elements to work like clockwork have now been exposed... Resilience will become the new buzzword. Firms will think harder about diversifying their supplier base to hedge against disruptions to a particular producer, geographic region or changes in trade policy. This means building in redundancy and perhaps even moving away from the practice of holding near-zero inventories. Costs will certainly rise but, in the post-Covid world, concerns about supply chain fragility will come right after those over cost. Firms will be expected to assess resilience of their second and third-tier suppliers, too. We may see some reshoring as automation reduces labour costs.

6. John Thornhill argues that the mathematics of animal populations may have important insights for the prospects of digital networks. He points to the work of Andrew Chen, a partner at the VC firm Andreessen Horowitz who claims that the Metcalfe's Law, which states that the systemic value of communicating devices/nodes grows as a square of their number, is misleading. 

To take two obvious objections: no two networks are the same, and the value of individual connections varies... In Chen’s view, it may be more useful to study the mathematics of animal populations, including meerkats, sardines, bees and penguins, to understand the life cycles of networks. His insights largely derive from the work of Warder Clyde Allee, a pioneering ecologist from the 1930s who devised the “Allee threshold” to explain the growth and contraction of social animal populations. For example, when mobs of meerkats are too small then they are easily picked off by predators because there are not enough lookouts to scan the skies for raptors. When they pass the “Allee threshold” they multiply and thrive. But when they grow too populous they eat too many bugs and fruits and deplete their surrounding environment. “Allee’s population curves describe a sort of ecological version of the network effect,” writes Chen. 

Look at Uber, for example. Although it would appear to be one global network benefiting from vast economies of scale, it is more accurately understood as a network of networks. As Chen describes in his book, Uber’s war room in San Francisco focused on hyperlocal competition in each and every one of its locations, figuring out ways to outsmart rival taxi firms and exploit regulatory loopholes. But now that Uber has achieved critical mass in most of its markets and is nudging up prices to recoup its massive investments, it is in danger of overeating bugs and fruits. “They are focusing on efficiency and profitability. But if you are a city-by-city network you can be picked off by competitors,” says Chen, pointing to the threat from hungrier food delivery rivals, such as DoorDash and Gopuff.

7. Good table of anti-trust cases globally filed against big technology companies here.

8. Since over two decades, the central government has set aside 5% of its receipts from telecommunications sector to a Universal Service Obligation (USO) fund to bridge market failures in the sector. The fund collection till date exceeds Rs 1 trillion. However, its utilisation remains poor, with nearly Rs 60,000 Cr of un-utilised amount. 

The Comptroller and Auditor General has repeatedly pulled up the government for how it is managing the fund. In the past, the statutory obligation to pass dues on to the USO fund has not always been observed in a timely manner; as a consequence, the money has remained in the Consolidated Fund of India while the Union Budget’s mathematics are being worked out, thereby artificially reducing the fiscal deficit. But, even more worryingly, the CAG has also pointed out that the fund, even when topped up, has been only half used.

9. Neelkanth Mishra has an informative oped with figures on the residential construction industry in India. The argument is simple - the country has too few of houses of the required sizes and good quality, and with increasing incomes this will get addressed and attract massive investments.

India also has fewer houses than households (in comparison, China has 20 per cent more houses than households; and the US 10 per cent more), and still has “mixed-use” dwellings, like a shopkeeper’s family sleeping in the shop at night... the average American house is five times the size of an average Indian house, and has expanded by more than a third since the 1980s... Even though more than 80 per cent of India’s houses are now pukka, either the roof, the walls or the floor for many still need better quality material. Moreover, the pressure of a growing population means taller buildings. Today, 93 per cent of India’s houses are in buildings of one or two storeys and only 0.2 per cent in buildings with more than 10 storeys. In the latter set, which is growing rapidly, construction cost per square foot is nearly 10 times the cost of building a one-floor house in a village.

Rising land prices has been an important constraint to growth of housing, 

The value of dwelling construction was more than a sixth of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012, and rent is the single largest component of the consumption basket after food. However, growth has been less than 6 per cent annually since 2012 in nominal terms, and nearly zero once adjusted for inflation. Its share of GDP has fallen by 5 percentage points to at least a 17-year low. Why did this happen? The reason may lie in land price movements: On average, they have risen by 10 per cent to 12 per cent a year in the last few decades, but between 2002 and 2013 urban land prices rose 19 per cent annually, and likely well over 25 per cent a year between 2006 and 2013. This overshoot meant that a correction was necessary: The pace slowed to less than 4 per cent a year between 2013 and 2019.

This is a positive trend,

In the last four years, rents have grown faster than real-estate prices, even as the share of rents in overall consumption has fallen from 11.5 per cent in 2012 to 9.5 per cent now.

10. Mahesh Vyas points to the index of consumer sentiments, a barometer of the well-being of households and their income growth perceptions. 

The index of consumer sentiments in November 2021 was 16.1 per cent higher than it was during the pandemic-affected November 2020. What is important is that it was a substantial 43 per cent lower than it was during the pre-pandemic month of November 2019, or in fiscal 2019-20... we are today worse off today compared to where we were two years ago by as much as 43 per cent. The index had reached its nadir in May 2020, when it was over 60 per cent lower than the 2019-20 level. From there, it has scaled back 44 per cent... In November, 39 per cent of the households reported that their income was lower than it was a year ago, and 37 per cent expected their income a year ahead to be worse than their current income. Only 6 per cent of the households believed this was a better time to buy non-durables compared to a year ago compared to the over 50 per cent who believed this was a worse time... 

Rural India saw a much faster improvement in sentiments compared to urban regions. The index of consumer sentiments grew by 18 per cent in urban India between June and November 2021. It grew by a much faster 30 per cent in rural India in this period. With this, the gap between rural and urban sentiments has widened. What is remarkable about this starkly divergent improvement is that even the better-off regions are significantly worse off than they were before the pandemic struck India. Rural sentiments in Novem­ber 2021 were 40 per cent worse than their level in 2019-20. In urban regions, sentim­ents are 49 per cent lower than in 2019-20... Only about 8.5 per cent of the households report income levels that are better than a year ago and even lesser expect these to improve in the coming 12 months. Even fewer, about 6.5 per cent, expect economic conditions in ge­neral to improve over the next one year—or even five years. As a result, less than 6 per cent of the urban households feel that this is a better time to buy non-essentials.

11. Striking figures on the economic contribution of migrants,

The next 25 years will see 33m people retiring with no replacements, thus shrinking the combined UK and EU workforces from 240m to 207m... Migrants usually create far more wealth abroad than if they’d stayed home. When the mass exodus from Syria and its neighbours sparked Europe’s “migrant crisis” in 2015, a study reported that migrants’ worldwide economic contribution was $6.7tn, about 40 per cent more than their likely domestic value. Although only 3.4 per cent of the global population, they accounted for 9.4 per cent of its gross domestic product.

12. Indian stock markets are the frothiest

13. Sharp increase in the pace of digital credit growth of banks and NBFCs

14. The Economist has a briefing on the rise of a movement against the use of personal transport vehicles in global cities.
In New York Eric Adams, the incoming mayor, though famous for flouting parking rules, has promised to implement congestion-charging in Manhattan at last. In Boston Michelle Wu, another newly elected mayor, promises to make several important bus routes free for the next two years. In Cleveland, Ohio, Justin Bibb, the mayor-elect, promises to put “people over cars”, and to encourage more people to bike and walk, largely by turning traffic lanes into protected bike lanes. Cities as diverse as Buffalo, New York, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, have begun to ditch “parking minimum” rules, which required developers to provide ample free parking at new buildings. Even in California, a state where driving is practically a way of life, state-assembly members have proposed bills to ban cities from imposing parking minimums near public transport. la Metro, Los Angeles’s transport authority, is studying congestion pricing.

European cities have been doing this in some cases for decades. London established its congestion charge in 2003. The leading city now is arguably Paris, the capital of France. Under Anne Hidalgo, the socialist mayor, and her predecessor, Bertrand DelanoĆ«, cars were banned from the left and then the right banks of the Seine in 2013 and 2017. On the right bank, an expressway named for Georges Pompidou, who proudly opened it in 1967 when he was prime minister, has been converted into a sort of urban park. Ms Hidalgo, who achieved this despite lawsuits led by the right, called it a “reconquest” of the city for its residents. Bars now line the open sections of the road, while families on bicycles zoom through the eerily quiet (and now unpolluted) tunnels. Ms Hidalgo has been a vocal proponent of “15-minute cities”, the idea that almost everything a person needs for daily life ought to be within a 15-minute walk or cycle... 
Britain’s government gave local councils the power to close roads to create “low-traffic neighbourhoods” (ltns) without the usual consultations with residents that block them. Planter bollards have proliferated across England’s cities, blocking off residential streets to all but bicycles (typically, residents can enter and exit with their cars, but cannot drive through). When lockdowns started, Amsterdam temporarily banned cars from Spuistraat, Haarlemmerdijk, and Haarlemmerstraat, three central boulevards. The change now seems likely to be made permanent. As Glasgow, Scotland’s biggest city, played host to cop26 last month, city leaders announced plans to ban all cars from the centre over the next five years, in the hope of reducing carbon-dioxide emissions. In New York City, as in many places, street parking was converted into outdoor dining space, so that restaurants could stay open. Chicago has unveiled plans for a further 160km of segregated cycle lanes.

The results have been impressive, with car ownership in Paris dropping from 60% of households to 35%. But these municipal government measures, apart from raising local opposition from vehicle owners, also come up against the incentives of politicians at the national and provincial levels, who prefer the expand vehicle manufacturing (for revenue generation and job creation) and ownership (for feel-good income effect). 

15. Shyam Saran has a very good oped about the latest political trends in China in the build up to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 which will also decide on President Xi Jinping's tenure extension. In particular, the recently organised annual Central Economic Work Conference which sets the overall policy guidance for China's economic managers within the overall framework of the 14th Five Year Plan, stressed on "maintenance of macroeconomic stability in 2022". It identified three risks - declining demand, supply shocks, and weakening outlook for future growth. Saran has a good summary of the challenges facing China, 

The country is clearly on a slowing growth trajectory. Even Chinese analysts expect the GDP to grow by 4.5-5 per cent per annum during the 14th Five-Year Plan. The economy is likely to become more domestic-oriented and inward-looking. If the pandemic lingers, the domestic orientation will become more pronounced. China is aware of the headwinds it will be confronting, most importantly the rapid aging of its population and the declining competitiveness of its manufacturing sector. It is betting on technological innovation to avoid a middle-income trap. However, keeping wages low and resisting the secular increase in the exchange value of the Chinese currency slows down the transition of the Chinese economy towards a higher value-added and more service-oriented economic activity. It is not clear how China’s leaders will deal with such contradictions.
16. In an important development, India has lost the dispute at the WTO's DSB over subsidies for sugar exports on a complaint that Brazil, Australia, and Guatemala had filed. The DSB report's finding,
We find that, for five consecutive sugar seasons, from 2014-15 to 2018-19, India provided non-exempt product-specific domestic support to sugarcane producers in excess of the permitted level of 10 per cent of the total value of sugarcane production. Therefore, we find that India is acting inconsistently with its obligations under Article 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture.

However, in the absence of a functional appellate tribunal, means that if India decides to appeal, the DSB's decision is unlikely to take effect anytime soon.  

18. Scott Galloway has some stunning data on the rise of Apple.

It took 42 years for Apple to reach a $1 trillion valuation — the first ever company to do so. But it took just 2 years to add another $1 trillion in value. Today, Apple’s market cap is roughly equal to all the world’s unicorns combined!


19. The Union Cabinet in India has approved a five-year Rs 76,000 Cr ($10 bn) production linked incentive (PLI) scheme to catalyse a semiconductor manufacturing eco-system in India. It aims to support firms in semiconductor fabs, display fabs, compound semiconductors/silicon photonics/sensors (including MEMS) fabs, semiconductor packaging (ATMP/OSAT), semiconductor design. 

20. It's remarkable that the US Fed FOMC meeting decision to take a more aggressive stance against inflation by indicating that they expected to raise rates thrice in 2022 instead of spooking the markets evoked a 2.2% rise in Nasdaq Composite. The Fed also announced that it would cut its bond purchases by $30 bn a month in January, double its previous pace. FT points to this market rationalisation, 
Investors were not put off by the prospect of reduced direct market stimulus from the Fed, and instead focused on the message that the central bank would not let inflation spiral out of hand. James McCann, deputy chief economist at Abrdn, the asset manager, said: “The Fed really had to demonstrate that they’re willing to move faster and go further to tighten policy more than previously planned as they’ve slipped behind the curve over recent months. It was vital that the Fed acted now to protect its credibility on inflation.”

This is an example of markets collectively suspending logic and preferring to believe that the stock market boom will continue no matter what. 

Tuesday, December 10, 2019

What drives sub-way costs - imitate, don't innovate!

Alex Tabarrok has a very good post linking to the work of Alon Levy in compiling and analysing the data on construction costs of over 205 metro rail projects in 40 countries. The data set is very rich and impressive. Sample this,
New York is planning to have spent around $35 billion between 2005 and 2030 on subway and commuter rail expansion. But it’s only getting 15 km of new tunnel! Paris is spending a similar amount over the same period: Euro 40 billion, for a total of 228 km, 187 underground. Madrid, a much smaller city, spent Euro10 billion in 1995-2015 on 234 km, around 180 underground.


This is also perhaps a great example of how academic research can add significant value to real world issues. Levy's main point is that lack of awareness and siloed thinking in structuring contracts and choice of construction techniques is the main contributor to the exorbitantly high subway costs in New York compared to other countries. It is an example of how US can learn to imitate from Europeans and Koreans.

This is interesting,
Levy is to be lauded for his pioneering work on this issue yet isn’t it weird that a Patreon supported blogger has done the best work on comparative construction costs mostly using data from newspapers and trade publications? New York plans to spend billions on railway and subway expansion. If better research could cut construction costs by 1%, it would be worth spending tens of millions on that research. So why doesn’t the MTA embed accountants with every major project in the world and get to the bottom of this cost disease? (See previous point). Perhaps the greatest value of Levy’s work is in drawing attention to the issue so that the public gets mad enough about excess costs to get politicians to put pressure on agencies like the MTA.
This is something for perhaps the World Bank to take forward. In particular, comparing across emerging technologies, and also life-cycle costs of various systems can be very useful decision-support for governments planning new metro systems. 

The main takeaways from the study

1. Geographic and geological factors are not responsible for the wide variations in project costs of sub-way systems. 

2. Station costs are a big factor in the variations. 

3. In terms of total cost, cut-and-cover method is cheaper than bored tunnel with cut-and-cover stations, by a factor of 1.5 to 2, which in turn is cheaper than bored tunnel with mined stations. 

4. The cost of mined stations is often 4-8 times that of cut-and-cover stations. So the best approach is shallow cut-and-cover construction, disrupting the street for a period of time, and refrain from mining except at under-crossings. Further, avoid mezzanines, with all circulation, including fare barriers to be on the platform level or at street level. And have an island platform, ideally accessed from a street median, to avoid duplicating elevators, stairs etc. Finally standardised station designs.

5. City centre tunnels cost more because cut-and-cover is not possible and because of number of crossing of older lines.

6. Contracts should avoid design-build approach and should be flexible and strictly separate design and construction. They should also not be lump-sum construction contracts, and the bills should be itemised to limit litigation during renegotiations and changes. 

7. Contract awards should be quality and cost-based, rather than purely cost-based ones, awarded to the lowest bidder. Madrid used technical score (50%), speed (20%) and cost (30%)

8. Finally, instead of relying on consultants, use an in-house team to oversee the design and project management. The in-house team costs 25-33% less than consultants and are also likely more effective and constructive. 

The Madrid metro is a good example of a project which incorporated these principles into its construction, and one of the cheapest in the world.

Update 1 (5.01.2020)

This is a good Citylab article by Alon Levy explaining why it is so expensive to build in New York.

Monday, October 22, 2018

Construction industry fact of the day

From the FT, on the need for a modular revolution in construction industry,
Nine out of 10 buildings worldwide run over budget and the average cost overrun is 51 per cent, said Bent Flyberg, professor of construction at SaĆÆd Business School. “The construction-site has to become an assembly-site,” he said. “Until this happens, construction will be stuck in the Stone Ages as regards productivity.”... The off-site model not only halves the build time but leads to an 80 per cent reduction in waste, encourages a 95 per cent recycling rate, and produces higher quality buildings because it’s “easier to impose strict controls on the factory floor than on a building site”.