Substack

Friday, February 15, 2008

Why our flagship programs fail to meet their targets?

Every year the budget reels out depressing statistics of our abysmal failure in utilizing plan funds earmarked for the various government programs. The Union Finance Minister Mr P Chidambaram, recently claimed that as many as 301 projects, costing Rs 20 crore and above each, were delayed between one and 96 months, and the cumulative cost overrun was Rs 48,961 crore.

The Economic Times reports that, "The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) completed only 32% of its target during 2007-08, or upgrading and strengthening just 917 km of highways in the nine months ending December 2007, as against the target of 2,885 km. It spent Rs 10,500 crore during this period, out of a total budget of Rs 17,615 crore for the fiscal. The government offered contracts for only 278 km of highways up to October 2007 against the target of awarding 3,278 km under NHDP-III in 2007-08. Even for NHDP-II projects, consultants could not be appointed. According to a report submitted by NHAI to the road transport department, 54 contracts covering 544 km were delayed as on December 31, 2007. Under NHDP-IV, the government has so far awarded only 1,048 km as against a target of 2,995 km during the current financial year."

The story of failure to meet the targets is captured in the two graphics shown below




A first glance of the list of the schemes gives some inference about the reasons for the huge performance shortfall. All of them (except National Highways) are implemented through the regular Government agencies and their executing or engineering wings. There is a serious limitation with implementing such major programs and schemes which have earmarked budgets and fixed time-lines, through the regular engineering departments. These projects demand professional expertise, experience, intense monitoring and supervision, and requires considerable flexibility in execution, all of which are difficult to infuse into Government systems. Apart from it being a great challenge to introduce project management practices into Government administrative systems, private Project Management agencies also find it difficult to work within the scope of Government bureaucracies.

It is no wonder then that the one successful example of project implementation in India in the past decade has been the Golden Quadrilateral Project, implemented as it is through an autonomous and professionally staffed agency like the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). By successfully insulating the Project from political and other external influences and from bureaucratic red tape, the NHAI has implemented many works well in advance of schedule. It has successfully embraced land acquisition methods acceptable to land losers, new construction technologies, latest contracting procedures, innovative business models, private sector participation, and independent project monitoring and evaluation systems.

By exploring and actively encouraging various Public Private Partnership (PPP) and fully private models, the NHAI has been instrumental in bringing in modern technologies and developing a very vibrant market of private construction companies. It has shown the way for similar professionally executed PPP transport projects like the Delhi Metro, airports in Hderabad and Bangalore, and a few ports.

But unfortunately, the success in the highway roads and transport sector has been more an exception to the norm. The cupboard of professionally executed and managed PPP projects remains bare for the other sectors, especially in rural and urban infrastructure.

Here is a laundry list of a few government and market side problems associated with utilizing plan funds, especially in construction-based sectors. Government side deficiencies first.

1. Many layers of bureaucracy and multiple filters is responsible for exasperating delays and provides ample opportunities for rent seekers. Even small clarifications while executing projects tend to require clearances from the top, thereby often leaving the projects stranded mid-way directionless.
2. Most of our big projects are not conceived and executed in any integrated manner, after finalizing all backward and forward linkages. It is common place for big projects to be initiated without a proper Detailed Project Report (DPR) or financial closure.
3. Inappropriate and outdated tendering and work contracting procedures. A legacy of a bygone era of closed and over-regulated market, these rules and regulations stand out as clear anachronism in the modern age where the private sector and the market is a critical influence and integral partner in the process of development. Restrictive tender eligibility conditions often shuts out many interested and qualified contractors.
4. Inadequate monitoring and implementation mechanism. Independent Project Monitoring and Implementation Units, Third Party Quality Control (TPQC), Accrual-based double entry Accounting Systems etc have made little headway into Government bureaucracies.
5. Low penetration of sophisticated process automation technologies like Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), intelligent transport systems (ITS), Global Positioning System (GPS) based networks, energy savings devices etc in public service utilities and government works.
6. Failure to quickly and adequately embrace concepts like PPP and Management Contracts.
7. Failure to adopt professional project management approach in project execution.

I have dwelt on the supply side issues affecting this in a previous post. But let me reiterate them with a few more specific additions.
1. Limited number of eligible works contractors in all sectors except roads. Most often there are only three or four qualified and eligible contractors for the big projects.
2. High entry barriers to the contracting market arising from rigid and unreasonable pre-qualification and eligibility norms. This ensures that the market is trapped in a limited circle of participants.
3. Limited number of suppliers and manufacturers. For example, there is only one manufacturer in the entire country of large ductile Iron pipes used in water supply, sewerage and irrigation.
4. Extremely under-developed market for services like outsourcing and Operation & Maintenance of public service utilities,
5. Lack of process modernization, manifested by the very low penetration of Ready Mix Concrete (RMC), non-invasive road cutting technologies like lateral drilling, pre-cast materials etc
6. Limited or even no large vendors of sophisticated technologies like ITS, SACADA, GPS based networks, GIS systems.
7. Poorly developed backward or downward linkages - limited number of qualified consultants for preparing Master Plans and DPRs, undeveloped market in debt financing etc.
8. Acute scarcity of skilled personnel like structural and environmental engineers, process control analysts, designers, surveyors, architects, accountants etc
9. Nascent market in monitoring systems for Government works and activities - Project Monitoring Softwares, TPQC etc.
10. High perceived risk associated with infrastructure projects and in financing them. (except roads)
11. All the big contractors are based in the metros and the big cities, and have limited presence in even the Tier II cities. They do not even have their branches in many of the smaller cities. Given the large overhead costs and the expenditure in mobilizing personnel and other logistics, it therefore becomes less profitable for them to bid for even larger works in these cities. And whenever they do bid for these works in the larger cities, they invariably sub-contract it to the smaller contractors. But unfortunately many of the smaller cities do not even have the sub-contractors with the minimum required experience.

China scores over India in executing large projects without time and cost over-runs, thanks mainly to the infusion of professionalism in project conception, design, tendering, execution and monitoring. But execution through a separate project management unit may not be easy, given the geographically spread out and piecemeal nature of works like rural water supply, housing, civic infrastructure, medical and health care etc. However, all the other components of project conception and design, tendering and monitoring can surely be done in a more professional manner. More about this in a later post. Unless we get these things right, we will continue to have the same story and graphics to tell next year too!

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Why high taxes on alcohol and tobacco are counterproductive?

The one constant in every Indian budget have been the fiscal proposals on ever higher taxes on tobacco and alcohol products. The taxes on these products are today many times more than the actual price of the product. Have you ever wondered who among the customer and the tobacco company pays what share of the tax? Before we go on, let us examine the markets for tobacco and alcohol products.

Tobacco and alcohol generally have a captive or "addicted" group of consumers. Though there are also those occassional users, they are a small minority and are not the focus of our attention. The major category consists of the former, whose demand for these products is relatively invariant with respect to changes in price, or thier price elasticity of demand is very low. In other words, the demand for these products among this former category, is inelastic. Eco 101 (or a simple graphical illustration would show) says that for products with inelastic demand, the incidence of taxation is much higher on the consumers than on the sellers.

Further, a large share of those chronically addicted are likely to be those with difficult social and even crime backgrounds. They are also more likely to be the economically weaker sections. As we have seen, under the circumstances, there is a very strong chance that the higher prices forces these socially challenged addicts to become more desperate and resort to more crime and other anti-social activities to finance their purchases. This is surely going to impact crime rates.

There is another interesting dimension to raising prices on cigarettes, brought out in an NBER article Do Higher Cigarette Prices Encourage Youth to Use Marijuana? by Frank J Chaloupka et al. It is conventionally thought that higher cigarette prices results in marijuana substitution. The article argues that marijuana and cigarettes are not substitutes, and also claims that any reduction in cigarette smoking (due to higher prices) also results in a fall in the use of similar substance abuse like drinking, marijuana and other illicit drug use.

Interestingly, in the US, adjusted for inflation, taxes on alcoholic drinks have been falling, because taxes on them have hardly budged since early 1990s. Arguing in favor of higher taxes on products like tobacco and alcohol, David Leonhardt has highlighted this.

Update 1 (13/3/2010)
Deliana Kostova, Hana Ross, Evan Blecher, and Sara Markowitz used individual-level data from 20 developing countries, and estimated that the price elasticity of cigarette demand among youth is -1.83. They tehrefore argue that policymakers in developing countries could reduce cigarette consumption by youths by raising taxes. A 10% increase in the price will reduce youth cigarette demand by 18.3%.

Sunday, February 10, 2008

Health Care economics

Health care services market is different from the market for any other service in many respects. It suffers from a number of incentive distortion problems and market failures, which causes classical free markets to fail. It has been observed across the world that as real income rises, people expect more medical care. This demand is accelerated by the rapidly aging populations and the expanding list of lifestyle diseases and problems. This increasing demand, coupled with the proliferation of sophisticated technologies and advances in diagnostic tests and surgical procedures, all of which are invariably expensive, have meant that health care costs have been soaring.

For the last 30 years, health-care costs have been rising 6 percent to 8 percent a year in the US - more than double the inflation rate in the rest of the economy - because demand keeps outstripping supply. To give one example, in 2001, with prices across the US economy up less than 2 percent, hospital costs rose 8 percent, drug costs increased 16 percent, physician costs jumped 9 percent, and insurance premiums increased 10 percent.

Why health care costs are so prone to inflation? What are these incentive distortions and market failures that bedevil the health care services market? What is the influence of medical insurance on the development of the health care services market?

I have tried to list out some of the major incentive distortions and market failures that distinguish the health care market from other services.

1. Market suffers from inherent monopoly characateristics. Surgical procedures or drugs are most often unique, thereby relying on one or a few suppliers/producers. Further, the availability of specialists is also limited, thereby giving them considerable bargaining power. There are no cheaper alternatives to fall back on, if prices rise.

2. Health care services cannot be substituted. Unlike other services, health care cannot be substituted and the costs associated with not accessing it are often unacceptably high and even fatal.

3. Health care services market, especially for the emergency, life saving treatments is inelastic. In fact, in many ways, primary health care services atleast, exhibit Giffen characteristics of demand rising even as the prices rise.

4. Given the specific, skilled and doctor-centric nature of health care services, it will always experience supply side contraints. Supply side limitations by way of the numbers of doctors and specialists, and the small numbers of skilled specialists cannot be easily overcome. These constraints will get exacerbated as more an more people get covered by better medical facilities, both through rising incomes and better medical insurance cover.

5. The market suffers from an information assymetry problem. The inherently technical nature of tests and procedures, ensures that there is a heavily skewed information assymetry between the doctors and the patients. Most patients are in no position to make a choice between treatment options, and have to place their full trust on the judgement of the doctors. As we have seen, this often gets betrayed. There is a genuine difficulty in converging the faith in doctor's judgement and the patient's apprehensions in an objective, quantifiable manner.

6. Inherent difficulty in achieving convergence between the financial incentives of the sellers (doctors) and the buyers (patients). The patients want to receive health care at the lowest cost, but do not possess the technical expertise to be aware of what they need. The doctors, who know what the patient needs, is often incentivized by pharmaceutical companies and medical equipment and service providers to over treat the patient.

7. Trade off between the diagnostic optimum and doctor's experience, distorted by the potential costs of legal claims. Doctors make their diagnosis of the patients condition based on both their professional experience of similar symptoms and situations, and the results of the diagnostic tests conducted. But in view of the ever present danger of legal damages in the case of wrong or mis-diagnosis, doctors tend to become over cautious in making their diagnosis. Even for the simplest ailments, doctors insist on conducting the full protocol of medical tests before making their diagnosis and prescription. Apart from contributing to delays in delivering treatments with its attendant consequences, this also increases health care costs for little marginal benefit. An experienced doctor should be able to easily, with more or less assured certainty, make accurate diagnosis of simpler ailments and medical problems. Medical insurance only accentuates this problem, as insurance companies hedge themselves against any possible legal claims.

8. The intermediation role of diagnosis in confirming treatment options increases the costs substantially. In many ways, diagnosis form the critical determinant in deciding the treatment option, and is increasingly forming a major share of the full treatment. The scope of diagnosis has expanded over the years to include tests that not only confirm the presence of certain ailments, but also preclude the possibilty of others not always related or relevant to the ailment under treatment. This also leads to over use of medical tests and thereby increases demand.

9. Medical Insurance suffers from the moral hazard problem. With their premiums having been paid, the patients have an incentive to approach the doctor and carry out the full spectrum of medical tests and undergo all necessary and unnecessary surgical procedures, so as to reassure themselevs that they have availed off all the possible diagnostic and treatment options. The easy availability of information in media like the internet makes patients demand the maximum possible standards in their treatment. In other words, since it does not cost them any more, insured patients tend to over-use medical care even for minor complaints. It has been found that even teh use of deductibles for each treatment visit, does little to deter frivolous visits. This artificially generated demand, in turn contributes towards cost inflation, besides causing supply compression and other market distortions.

10. Unlike other services, medical insurance sellers stand to gain by selling their policies to those who need it the least and denying the service to those need it the most. This means that they go great lengths to screen the applicants, in the process sharply increasing the transaction costs. It is estimated that 19 cents in every dollar spent in medical health care in the US is taken away by transaction costs.

11. Health Insurance generates certain cognitive biases. Since people do not pay directly the premium costs, being shared with the employer and deducted from the salary, they tend to be not directly aware of the costs incurred. This is exacerbated by the tax concessions given to both employers and employees for their respective contributions.

12. Unlike other services, comparing drugs, devices and procedures are difficult. Comparative effectivenesss studies for them are very rare. Past comparative effectiveness trials have shown that older and cheaper anti-psychotic drugs are often just as good as expensive new ones. Similar comparison of two rival treatments of patients with stable coronary artery disease - a traditional combination of angioplasty and drugs versus drugs alone - measured by heart attacks and survival rates, found no difference. This difficulty to compare prevents the patients from doing any cost-benefit analysis of treatment options.

There is an excellent article in the Slate by Robert Shapiro, which brings out some of these problems.

Saturday, February 9, 2008

Who is an Insurgent?

It is widely acknowledged that terrorism and terrorists draw their sustenance from economic deprivation and exploitation, coupled with lack of proper education. This analysis has been applied to both sub-national insurgencies and international terrorism. In India, the naxalite movement has been traced back to relative deprivation and regional disparities. But increasing evidence points to the explanation not being as simple as thought.

A cursory analysis of all the leadership of the insurgent Naxalite movement in India reveals that its leaders mostly come from financially well-off and educated backgrounds. Though the foot soldiers are recruited from the deprived and aggrieved communities, the leadership is dominated by outsiders, most often from outside the community itself. Thus we have upper caste leadership for the predominantly tribal and lower caste naxalite movement. Apart from the intelligentsia, even the more important positions of such groups, like the explosives expert, major suicide bombers, mainly come from outside the aggreived community or from the more well off and educated from the community. More broadly, it has been found that the leadership and the guiding force in shaping such movements come from well educated and financially sound individuals, who are attracted to the cause of the aggrieved.

Alan Krueger, a Princeton professor, has done pathbreaking research on why so many terrorists come from middle-class backgrounds, by drawing in on data from thousands of Middle Eastern and German terrorists. In "What Makes a Terrorist," he presents his argument in full. The Christian Science Monitor called the book a "a concise, accessible argument against the notion that we can defeat terrorism through aid and education." Prof Kruger argues that from both the supply side (with educated recruits better able to understand and appreciate socio-economic and political causes for the grievance) and demand side (terrorist organizations want success in their missions and educated recruits are more likely to succeed), better off and educated individuals are more probable and desirable recruits.

But Gary Becker argues that a few high profile examples like the 9/11 bombing are a red herring and do not convey an accurate picture about the educational and economic backgrounds of terrorists. Positing the counter example of the backgrounds of the suicide bombers in the first Intifada against Israel, who were young (mean age of 20), unmarried, and without college education, he claims that better economic opportunities reduce the attraction of terrorist martyrdom. The educated terrorists with good economic opportunities, who carried out the high profile 9/11 attack, get attracted only by vital leadership roles in an exceptional mission.

He says, "Just as economic progress greatly affects family structure and the amount of freedom available, it also sharply reduces the willingness of people to hide or otherwise protect terrorists because they have more to lose if they are caught. Although leaders of terrorist organizations usually come from more educated classes, these organizations rely on numerous foot soldiers to do a lot of the dirty work. They are generally recruited from younger and less educated groups. It becomes much harder to recruit many of these soldiers when good jobs are available, especially if these recruits are asked to commit suicide."

Gerald Posner takes a different position and argues that given the limited supply and the increasing need for specialised skills and technical sophistication, coupled with courage and training, means that terrorists have to be educated and hence more likely to be from middle class backgrounds. He does an economic analysis of the demand and supply for terrorists, and traces the origins to the presence of a widely-felt public grievance - economic or most often political.

He says, "If demand for terrorism is grievance-driven, then one can expect the supply of terrorists to come mainly from the intelligentsia, for the members of the intelligentsia are more likely than ordinary people to be moved by ideas, resentments, and political ambitions rather than by material concerns. They have the leisure and the education to think big thoughts, like overthrowing a government, which rarely brings material improvements."

While the long term solution may be to eliminate the grievance itself, there are some initiatives that can be taken in the short and medium run. These aforementioned analyses of terrorists and their motivations, seems to indicate that supply side internventions to choke out recruits for terrorist organizations may not be very effective. I am more inclined towards Alan Kruger's demand side interventions like efforts to degrade the terrorist organizations financial and technical capabilities, and vigorous protection and promotion of peaceful means of protest, thereby reducing the demand for pursuing grievances through violent means. Providing many windows for ventilating grievances can be a more effective weapon against terrorism than efforts to choke off recruitment.

Reusing waste water

Eilene Zimmerman describes the world's largest water purification project in Orange COunty, California, "The Groundwater Replenishment System is designed to take sewage water straight from bathrooms in places like Costa Mesa, Fullerton, and Newport Beach and—after an initial cleansing treatment—send it through $490 million worth of pipes, filters, and tanks for purification. The water then flows into lakes in nearby Anaheim, where it seeps through clay, sand, and rock into aquifers in the groundwater basin. Months later, it will travel back into the homes of half a million Orange County residents, through their kitchen taps and showerheads."

But such "toilet to tap" systems apparently face resistance from a "public (that) hasn't yet warmed to the notion of indirect potable reuse (IPR)". Despite most of our major waterbodies, source for most of our drinking water, being heavily polluted, people still find it repulsive to use treated sewerage water. But given the spectre of "water wars" it may not be too far ahead in time when such water becomes perfectly acceptable.

Friday, February 8, 2008

The ghost of Karl Marx is back!

Brad DeLong follows Martin Wolf, in highlighting a crisis of confidence facing the system of capitalist market economy.

Martin Wolf writes that the crisis engulfing the financial markets and the huge rewards generated for the beneficiaries is calling into question "the political legitimacy of the market economy itself". Calling for greater regulation of teh financial markets, he argues that "just as war is too important to be left to generals, banking is too important to be left to bankers, however much one may like them."

Highlighting the failure of the two central arguements of free market orthodoxy - a technologically advancing industrial society produces "positive sum economic games" that benefit everyone; and democratic governments balance market failures by social insurance, education, progressive taxation, and investments in people and community assets - Brad DeLong claims that the old Marxian prophecy of inequitable distribution of wealth, looms large.

He also points to the dilemma facing democratically elected governments, "Social-democratic governments have been on the defensive against those who claim that redistributing wealth exacts too high a cost on economic growth, and unable to convince voters to fund yet another massive expansion of higher education... And increasing rewards for those at the increasingly sharp peak of the income distribution have not called forth enough enterprising market competition to erode that peak. The consequence has been a loss of morale among those of us who trusted market forces and social-democratic governments to prove Marx wrong about income distribution in the long run – and a search for new and different tools of economic management."

In a brilliant article, Dani Rodrik calls to question the obsession with the best practices/institutions/processes ("one economics") that creates blind spots and leads us to overlook reforms that might achieve the desired ends at lower cost. He explores the world of second-best, third-best and other alternative approaches to solving the numerous challenges facing global economies. In his new book, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, he argues that countries develop successfully by following eclectic policies tailored to specific local conditions rather than by following generic best-practice formulas designed by economic theorists.

It is useful to quote him in some detail, "But real-world reformers operate in a second-best environment of their own, which means they need to keep an eye on how proposed solutions affect multiple distortions. Sometimes binding constraints will lie elsewhere and they need to guard against adverse interactions with other distorted margins. At other times, there will be multiple ways of removing a constraint, some of which may be politically much more feasible than others. Finally, the nature of the binding constraint will change over time, requiring a change in focus as well. Best-practice institutions are, almost by definition, non-contextual and do not take account these complications. Insofar as they narrow rather than expand the menu of institutional choices available to reformers, they serve the cause badly."

Dani Rodrik has this advise to policymakers is to "be strategic, rather than comprehensive. They have to do the best with what they have instead of wishing they could transform their society wholesale. They need to identify priorities and opportunities, and work on them. They must seek sequential, cumulative change rather than a single, all-inclusive breakthrough." He excoriates the multi-lateral development institutions like the World Bank, WTO and IMF "as international bureaucracies with a penchant for “best practices” and common standards, and woefully unsuited to the task of seeking innovative, unique pathways suited to each country’s particular circumstances."

He gives examples of the many recipes argument, "Successful countries do share some common features. They all provide some degree of effective property rights protection and contract enforcement, maintain macroeconomic stability, seek to integrate into the world economy, and ensure an appropriate environment for productive diversification and innovation. But how these ends are achieved differs. For example, greater integration with world markets can be achieved via export subsidies (South Korea), export-processing zones (Malaysia), investment incentives for multinational enterprises (Singapore), special economic zones (China), regional free trade agreements (Mexico), or import liberalization (Chile)."

His description of reforms is illuminating, "The best-designed policies are always contingent on local conditions, making use of pre-existing advantages and seeking to overcome domestic constraints. That is why successful reforms often do not travel well. Reforms, after all, are not hothouse plants that can be transplanted at will in any soil."

Thomas Palley has an concise, but broad sweep of the changing face of neo-classical economics. He contrasts the beliefs of the two schools of neo-classical economics - "Chicago School" (pioneered by Milton Friedman and George Stigler), who argue that real-world market economies approximate perfect competition, and the "MIT school" (Paul Samuelson, and his latest line of followers like Rodrik, Krugman, Stiglitz etc) who reject the aforementioned line of thought.

Palley writes, "The Chicago School claims that real-world market economies produce roughly efficient (so-called “Pareto optimal”) outcomes on which public policy cannot improve. Thus, any state intervention in the economy must make someone worse off. The MIT School, by contrast, argues that real-world economies are afflicted by pervasive market failures, including imperfect competition and monopoly, externalities associated with problems like pollution, and an inability to supply public goods such as street lighting or national defense. Consequently, policy interventions that address market failures – as well as widespread information imperfections and the non-existence of many needed markets – can make everyone better off."

Both however do not address the issue of fairness of outcomes. Chicago economists while acknowledging that real world outcomes are inherently unfair, (though acceptably unfair) reject any intervention to remedy this as unacceptably costly and causing economic inefficiency. They feel that any government intervention will fail because of bureacratic incompetence and rent seeking, which will lead to bureaucratic capture by vested interests. The MIT economists, while not explicitly calling for fairness in outcomes, approve of fairness and government intervention through good institutional design, including democracy.

Thursday, February 7, 2008

Ken Livingston defends his record

Maverick Mayor of London, Ken Livingston outlines his mayoral record - Crossrail, Olympics, Planning policy, congestion pricing, crime control and climate change.

It speaks of enormous pragmatism for a left-wing politician to assert, "My economic strategy is to maintain London as the most international and diverse business city in the world. Where I part company with some advocates of globalisation is that I do not have confidence in an automatic trickle down of wealth that would ensure that all Londoners benefit from the city’s success. That is why I launched a series of measures ranging from free travel on buses for the under-18s to insisting that the Olympics be staged in east London... if support for globalisation is to be maintained against populist protectionism, there must be active policies to ensure that all Londoners benefit from it".