Substack

Thursday, February 7, 2008

Rectifying incentive distortions for bankers

Martin Wolf diagnoses the present crisis as arising from an extraordinary growth of credit in the economy since the new millennium. This in turn led to important distortions in incentives and fundamental imbalances to creep into the economy. Wolf encapsulates the story so far thus: "financial innovation and an enthusiasm for risk-taking generate rapid increases in credit, which drive up asset prices, thereby justifying still more credit expansion and yet higher asset prices. Then comes a top to asset prices, panic selling, a credit freeze, mass insolvency and recession. An unregulated credit system, then, is inherently unstable and destabilising."

George Magnus of UBS had argued very early that the present crisis is a “Minsky moment”, “A collapse of debt structures and entities in the wake of asset price decay, the breakdown of ‘normal’ banking functions and the active intervention of central banks”.

The fundamental incentive distortions were
1. Very loose monetary policy after the collapse of the tech stocks bubble burst in 2000 meant that credit was chasing consumers.
2. The financial deregulation and securitisation of the most recent cycle encouraged an unusually wide circle of people to believe they would be winners, while somebody else would bear the risks and, ultimately, the costs.
3. Complexity of the latest products of financial innovation like structured asset backed securities (ABS), meant that risk could be hidden away. It also meant that, as Martin Wolf says, "gains could be privatized and losses socialized".
4. Moral hazard arising from the knowledge that in a rapidly integrating global financial markets, government could not allow financial institutions to fail, encouraged financial institutions to innovate their way irresponsibly to destruction. The "Greenspan put" and other actions of governments furthered this moral hazard.
5. Certain derivative instruments and trading strategies like short sales, presents the possibility of spectacular gains with small investments. This potential for high return encourages investors to discount the downside probability of unlimited losses.
6. The huge surpluses built up by the Asian, East European and Oil exporting economies, lubricated the credit engines at little cost. American consumers could finance their spending binge by easy credit from Asian foreign exchange surpluses.
7. Inherent conflict of interest in large financial institutions. The central conflict is between the employees (above all, management) and everybody else. By paying huge bonuses on the basis of short-term performance in a system in which negative bonuses are impossible, banks and other financial institutions create gigantic incentives to disguise risk-taking as value-creation.

Martin Wolf argues that one way of preventing these incentive distortions from running amuck in the financial markets is to restructure the pay of bankers and fund managers. In order to align their incentives with the sustainable and long term health of the system, their pay should be "made in restricted stock redeemable over a run of years (ideally, as many as 10)". All bonuses and a portion of salary for top managers should be paid in restricted stock, redeemable in instalments. And since individual institutions will not do this on their own, regulators will need to step in.

In a FT column, Bankers’ pay is deeply flawed, Raghuram Rajan argues that the true merit of fund managers and bankers can only be judged from their alphas, which in turn can be evaluated only from their long run performance. But as the events of the recent past have shown, products of complex financial engineering, which take advantage of the ignorance and weaknesses of investors, appear to create high alphas. This illusion is engendered by the hidden tail risks taken, which produce a steady positive return most of the time as compensation for a rare, very negative, return. In reality these returns are betas dressed up as alphas.

Raghu Rajan's prescription for eliminating such distortions are, "Compensation structures that reward managers annually for profits, but do not claw these rewards back when losses materialise, encourage the creation of fake alpha. Significant portions of compensation should be held in escrow to be paid only long after the activities that generated that compensation occur."

Update 1
NYT editorial excoriates how the ongoing bailout socializes the costs of private bests gone bad. It writes, "Bear Stearns isn’t enormous. It doesn’t take deposits from the public. Yet the Fed believed that letting it implode could unleash a domino effect among other banks, and the Fed provided a $30 billion guarantee for JPMorgan to snap it up. Compared to the cold shoulder given to struggling homeowners, the cash and attention lavished by the government on the nation’s financial titans provides telling insight into the priorities of the Bush administration."

It calls for restructuring the incentives facing bankers, "But if the objective is to encourage prudent banking and keep Wall Street’s wizards from periodically driving financial markets over the cliff, it is imperative to devise a remuneration system for bankers that puts more of their skin in the game."

It brilliantly sums up the situation facing bankers, "Bankers operate under a system that provides stellar rewards when the investment strategies do well yet puts a floor on their losses when they go bad. They might have to forgo a bonus if investments turn sour. They might even be fired. Their equity might become worthless — or not, if the Fed feels it must step in. But as a rule, they won’t have to return the money they made in the good days when they were making all the crazy bets that eventually took their banks down."

It too suggests making bankers remuneration contingent on the performance of their investments over several years — releasing their compensation gradually. It asserts that "until bankers face a real risk of losing their shirts, they will continue blithely ratcheting up the risks to collect the rewards while letting the rest of us carry the bag when their punts go bad".

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

Moral Hazard and US recession

The past few weeks have seen an ever increasing chorus of voices among the academia and political establishment in the US about the need to do everything possible to prevent a recession. The recipes being suggested to save Wall Street and Main Street include the full spectrum of monetary and fiscal policy options. The irony in the situation that appears to have been largely missed is that, the same distinguished voices (eg Lawrence Summers) calling for aggressive government intervention now had argued vehemently against similar action under much the same conditions a few years back in East Asia and Latin America. This selective amnesia, apart from conveying an impression of hypocrisy, also generates significant moral hazard concerns.

The Director of the Harvard University's Center for International Development, Prof Ricardo Hausmann puts in perspective the ongoing debate about combating recession and a financial meltdown,
"Main Street consumers have overspent and over-borrowed and are unable to meet their obligations. The fact that households may have so behaved because they were enticed by “teaser loans” does not change the facts; it only assigns blame. Consumption has been above sustainable levels and needs to adjust down, whatever view one has about the responsibility of adults over their financial decisions. The adjustment of private consumption to sustainable levels is necessary, but is likely to have a negative influence in the short run on the growth of aggregate demand, of which it represents more than 70 per cent. It is hard for this adjustment to take place without bringing down the rate of growth of gross domestic product, possibly to negative numbers."

There is surely no painless way to shed off all the excesses and imbalances accumulated during the consumption orgy and the "irrational exuberance" in the equity and real estate markets during the past decade. As Prof Hausman says, any effort to alleviate the pain and misery arising from the situation should not involve "giving the US consumer more rope with which to hang himself". Any policy should seek to temper the unsustainable consumption and eliminate the solvency problems, without any long term effect on the US economic growth.

Prof Hausman's last word is instructive, "It should stop behaving as the whiner of first resort, ready to waste all its dry powder on a short-sighted attempt to prevent a 2008 recession. Many poorer countries with weaker markets and institutions have survived and benefited from an adjustment that involves a year of negative growth. Faster bank recapitalisation, fiscal investment stimulus and international co-ordination should be first on the ­policy agenda."

Update
Ken Rogoff brings out the hypocrisy in the prescriptions being given for tiding over the US recession, "The US treasury strongly encouraged Asia to tighten fiscal policy during its 1990s crisis. But today the US Congress and president are tripping over themselves to adopt an ill-advised giant fiscal stimulus package, whose main effects will be to tie the hands of the next president in simplifying the US tax code and closing the budget deficit.

Americans firmly told Japan that the only way to clean up its economy was to purge insolvent banks and regenerate the financial system through Schumpeterian "creative destruction." Today, US authorities appear willing to contemplate any measure, no matter how inflationary, to insure that none of its major banks and investment houses fails.

For years, foreign governments complained about American hedge funds, arguing that their non-transparent behavior posed unacceptable risks to stability. Now, many US politicians are complaining about the transparency of sovereign wealth funds (big government investors mainly from Asia and the Middle East), which are taking shares in trophy American assets such as Citibank and Merrill Lynch."

Monday, February 4, 2008

Interest rates and the mortgage loan crisis

Advocates of aggressive monetary easing argue that that housing and other long term investments are very sensitive to interest rate changes. Paul Krugman clarifies this with an example, "Suppose you take out a loan to buy a machine whose economic life is only 5 years — which is highly likely, given both physical wear and tear and technological obsolescence. How much difference does it make whether the interest rate on the loan is 4 percent or 6 percent? Not much: the monthly payment on a 5-year loan at 4% is less than 5% lower than the monthly payment on a loan at 6%. So interest rates don’t have much effect on business investment. On the other hand, suppose you buy a house with a 30-year mortgage. The monthly payment on a 4% mortgage is more than 20 percent lower than on a 6% mortgage. So interest rates make a lot of difference to housing."

Does this provide useful information about the circumstances under which monetary policy should be used? While there may be a case for aggressive monetary easing to combat a housing crisis, it also means that other credit-driven consumption (which is more short-term loans) is less sensitive to rate changes. This assumes importance given that consumption forms 70% share of the US GDP. Though this consumption is itself linked to the wealth effect from real estate, it contributes a much smaller proportion to the GDP growth. Therefore, the interest rate easing will predominantly help in cushioning the housing mortgage market and the broader financial markets that boomed with it. But surely there are better prepscriptions like temporary freezes and rescheduling of these loans, that helps both the housing borrowers and lenders, while addressing the possible moral hazard concerns. By contrast, lower rates will only help the greedy and irresponsible, and postpone or even paper over the solvency problems more than adding any liquidity.

Sunday, February 3, 2008

Robert Reich's recipe for the new US President

Robert Reich faces upto the future of the American economy, and calls for progressive taxation and greater spending to finance the common good. He widens the scope of the public debate to include "what the public needs, rather than (merely) over the size of government or amount of taxes". The challenges facing US today seem no different from that facing many large developing economies - widening inequality (Median wages remain flat while almost all the growth has gone to the top. Wealthiest 1 percent of Americans are earning more than 21 percent of all income, while the bottom 50 percent of Americans combined are earning just 12.8 percent of total income) , unsustainable deficits, need for massive infrastructure investments (From New Orleans levees to Minneapolis bridges to New York City's water lines, the nation is literally falling apart), failing health care system (At least 10 million more Americans lack health insurance than they did in 1993, and among the 13 wealthiest nations, America now ranks last or nearly last in infant mortality, low birth weight, and life expectancy), declining school standards and infrastructure (classrooms more overcrowded, and school buildings, falling apart), and cronyism and corruption.

Reich argues that addressing these problems require greater government spending, which in turn necessitates rationalising the taxation, reallocating expenditures and even newer taxes. He even claims that these measures are not likely to be unpopular, "Because many of America's deferred needs are felt so directly by a large majority of citizens -- health care, early education, child care, training for good jobs, better public transit, and so on -- you can gain support for additional revenue if you educate the public about what you're doing and why."

He calls for a peace dividend (more than $100bn a year) by ending the war in Iraq, progressive taxation and modest deficit spending. About progressive taxation he claims, "According to the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, if the marginal income tax rate on Americans whose yearly income exceeds $10 million were raised to 70 percent, and the rate for those who earn between $5 million and $10 million a year were raised to 50 percent, federal revenues in 2008 would increase by $105 billion. By my calculation, a tiny annual wealth tax of one-tenth of 1 percent on all net worth exceeding $5 million -- a tax that would affect only 50,000 households, or fewer than one-tenth of 1 percent of the nation's taxpayers -- would yield an additional $100 billion."

About deficit spending, he argues there is a "difference between public spending that builds the future productivity of the nation's workforce - spending on education and infrastructure, for example -- and spending that improves today's living standards. Borrowing in order to accomplish the former is wise because it enhances the capacity of the nation to produce goods and services, and thereby shrinks both the deficit and debt as percentages of the total economy. By analogy, while it makes no sense for a family already in debt to borrow more money to finance a cruise, it makes eminent sense for it to borrow more in order to send a child to college."

Paul Krugman calls the bluff of the conservatives who call for reduction in government spending and also tax cuts. The federal spending as percentage of GDP grew from 18.5% in 2001 to 20% in 2007, thanks largely to rise in defense, medicare and medicaid spending.

Plastic tax

One of the biggest solid waste management challenges facing any City relates to disposing the huge quantities of plastics, especially those coming from disposable shopping bags. The website reusablebags.com claims that in January almost 42 billion plastic bags were used worldwide, and the figure increases by more than half a million bags every minute. A vast majority are not reused, ending up as waste — in landfills or as litter. Because plastic bags are light and compressible, they constitute only 2 percent of landfill, but since most are not bio-degradable, they will remain there. Many approaches have been adopted to tackle the plastic bag challenge, but with limited success. But Ireland, as with many other things, has had a different experience with a plastics tax.

In 2002, Ireland introduced a tax on plastic bags, with customers wanting a plastic bag having to pay 33 cents at the cash register. The results have been nothing short of remarkable, with plastic bag use dropping by over 94% in a few weeks itself. Coupled with an aggressive awareness campaign, this has ushered in a revolution in shopping experience, as using plastic bags has now become socially unacceptable.

While this is not likely to achieve similar success in countries like India, it can be tried out in the fast expanding organized retail market. In fact, the organized retailers association can take up elimination of plastic shopping bags as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) campaign. A host of options are available - refundable deposit, tax, and outright ban. There can be a local solution, instead of a single, one-size-fits-all prescription.

Saturday, February 2, 2008

Turning the clock backwards in India

This is bit of an outrageous post! The conventional clock time and our daily activities have always been a bit of an enigma. It is pretty obvious that we end up wasting a large proportion of our valuable daylight, by sticking to this arrangement. Consider this usual Indian daily routine - sunlight breaks at 6.00 AM, wake up at 7.00 AM, off to office at 10.00 AM, work till 6.00 PM (or 8.00 PM), sunset at 6.00 PM, get back home by 8.00 PM (or 10.00 PM).

Office timings across the country are typically from 10.00 AM to 5.00 PM. But late evenings, most often extend up to 8.00 PM or 9.00 PM, which means working 2-3 hours after it becomes dark. Late evenings and even nights at workplace, has become the norm in most private sector firms, especially in the new generation of knowledge-based companies. Surprisingly, theĠsame is true of Government departments, especially above a certain level.

This arrangement leads to a very inefficient utilization of daylight and human productivity. Here is how the daylight balance sheet squares up.

Total daylight hours - 12 hours
Daylight hours before work in morning - 4 hours
Daylight hours spent working - 8 hours
Night hours spent working - 2-3 hours
Night hours spent travelling - 1-2 hours
Total night hours spent on work - 3-5 hours
Leisure time - Only night and late night hours

In light of the above, it would seem only too logical to argue in favor of starting work at 7.00 AM and closing it officially by 3.00 PM, so that even granting for overtime, all work closes by atleast 6.00 PM when darkness descends. To reduce the psychological dislocation, we can turn the clock forward by three hours, so that the present 7.00 AM corresponds to the familiar office time of 10.00 AM! We can rationalize internally that it is an eternally long winter in which dawn comes very late, and hence wake up before sunlight breaks! This would be an economically efficient outcome and will make more optimum use of available daylight.

What are the benefits of more efficiently utilizing our daylight? I have tried to list out a few,
1. Less energy consumption during daytime. Hence potential for energy savings is huge if our work is mostly done during daytime.
2. Early mornings bring out higher productivity, and late afternoons lowers productivity. The employer gets the most productive times of the employee.
3. Gives employees enough meaningfully usable leisure time after work. Any leisure time in the mornings is not of much use, and late evenings means limited time for leisure. And leisure too needs daylight!
4. Commuting to and from work takes place during the daytime, and this improves the logistics and reduces costs, besides increasing safety. (Traffic congestion is much higher during the night than mornings, and road accidents are higher during nights!)
5. Early mornings are the most productive times and also the least leisure providing (working women have to cook, get children ready, and even catch water!). It makes sense to compress the mornings at the expense of the more socially useful evenings and nights.

Finally, with this new timings, we can all go to sleep earlier than now, and will also be forced to wake up early. This is good, for as the saying goes, "Early to bed and early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise!"

There is a good article on this by John Kay in the FT, We should turn the clocks forward, not back.

Friday, February 1, 2008

Monetary policymaking

Forget the finance ministries of the world, the new power centers are the boardrooms of the Central Banks. Like Kremlin watching during the Cold War, scrutinizing and analyzing every move of these Central Banks and their powerful Chairmen have become the latest fad. Every statement is dissected and vivisected to glean out some underlying message about the policy trends of these Banks. Based on these perceptions, the financial markets and following them the economy at large, form expectations about the future monetary policy actions. And in an increasingly complex and integrated global financial markets, where market sentiment and confidence is of critical importance, the importance of expectations cannot be over-emphasized.

On 29th January, 2008, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) came out with the annual credit policy review and on 30th January, 2008, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the US Federal Reserve had its regular periodic meeting. Both these pre-designated events are forums where the RBI and the Fed are expected to announce the latest interest rates. Predictably, both were preceeded by massive and frenzied media speculation, flying in all directions, about the possible interest rate decisions. The speculative excesses, focussed on the decision expected to be taken on a fixed day and time, had started a good 2-3 weeks ahead. It also generated a whole spectrum of expectations among the market participants, revolving around the likely consequences of whatever decision was taken. It may not be incorrect to even claim that the market had travelled well in advance of the decision.

In many respects, it can be argued that the market speculation had foreclosed the options available before the Fed. For example, following the un-scheduled and dramatic 75 basis points cut of the Federal Funds rate by the Fed on 22 January, 2008, the markets had jumped to the conclusion that come the FOMC meeting on 30th, January, another 50 basis points cut was inevitable. These expectations effectively tied the Fed's hands. If contrary to the market expectations, it did not lower rates by 50 basis points, the markets would in all probability have reacted negatively. The financial markets had already betted so heavily in favor of a 50 points rate cut, that any other alternative would have triggered off a crisis.

Further, by providing the build-up time, the Fed may have even defeated many of its own objectives. In times of a liquidity and solvency crisis, one of the important objectives of monetary policy is to provide some time-cushion for the affected market participants to get their balance sheets into some semblance of order. However, speculative excesses that invariably get formed during the build-up time may outweigh the likely benefits of any monetary easing. The FOMC meeting on January 30, provided an anchor for the market to pre-empt the Fed, thereby reduce the impact of the January 30th rate cut and also effectively present a fait accompli to the Fed. Instead of providing cushion-time, it becomes an opportunity for more speculation.

Any policy decision, more so the monetary policy, will achieve its desired objectives only if the market reacts to it. If on the contrary, the market is allowed to form expectations of such decisions, which in turn determines the policy itself, then we have the recipe for bad policy making. While the present dispensation of announcing interest rate changes may have been suitable previously, it no longer appears the most ideal way of announcing interest rate decisions.

In light of the aforementioned, a few questions are in order. Has monetary policy emerged to such pre-eminence as to over-ride all other macro-economic policy levers? Are interest rates, such a critical macroeconomic variable, to the near total exclusion of all others? If yes, is this a desirable or healthy outcome? Given the extremely volatile and fluid nature of the global financial markets, are fixed and pre-specified meetings like the FOMC or annual credit policy statements, the appropriate forums to announce interest rate decisions? Does it not leave the Central Banks vulnerable to being pre-empted by the financial markets? Are we not experiencing an increasingly media dictated monetary policy? Is all the media attention and speculation surrounding interest rate reviews good for monetary policy? Or is the "wisdom of the crowds" beneficial in arriving at the right interest rates? Is interest rates driving inflationary expectations or the other way round?

In any case, I am convinced that like Sun Tzu's description of a good general, "An effective Central Bank should be felt and not seen!"