Substack

Friday, January 4, 2019

The hiding hand that shifts the rural water supply paradigm

The Mission Bhagiratha program of the Government of Telangana that provides treated water through a piped network is truly an impressive achievement. If the numbers are to be believed, this has to stand up with the best in terms of project execution efficiency.

Sample this,
Launched in August 2016, Mission Bhagiratha, Telangana’s ambitious project to supply drinking water to every household outside municipal corporation limits, is nearing its March 31, 2019 deadline. And government officials say 1,00,200 km of the 1,04,749-km network of pipelines — around two-and-a-half times the Earth’s circumference — has been laid... As of today, drinking water reaches bulk collection points in 22,947 villages. The deadline to provide water at these collection points to the remaining 1,021 villages is January 10. The deadline to complete the project to provide drinking water through individual household taps is March 31, 2019... houses in 17,000 habitations were provided individual drinking water tap connections as on December 18, 2018. These households will start receiving purified drinking water shortly. About 95 per cent work of laying pipelines to the remaining 6,968 villages is completed and only last-mile pipes and taps have to be fixed... The 49,120-km primary pipeline network has already been laid through which water is being pumped. Around 51,080 km of a separate 55,629-km intra-village pipeline network has been completed.
Those conversant with the challenge of executing such projects in such tight timelines will vouch that this is a big deal, real world-class project execution, even with the discount for the quality and other parameters.

Hopefully it upends the conventional wisdom on rural drinking water supply and made Indian states re-imagine the delivery of drinking water to villages. 

Such projects naturally raise concerns across the spectrum of opinion makers. Will the water sources be always available? How will the infrastructure facilities be maintained? How will the leakages be plugged? Will water be billed? Who will pay for it? How will the bills be collected? How do we ensure quality of supply is acceptable? Given leakages and collection problems, will the delivery be efficient? And so on.

Needless to say, all of these are important questions. And for sure, in the coming years, there will be several examples of villages falling off the grid for various reasons and going back to bores, treatment facilities falling into disrepair, water leakages across the network, water pilferage and uncollected arrears, episodes of people in villages falling sick due to water contamination, mounting electricity arrears, discovery of poor quality works and materials, and so on. Several of them will, ex-post, be decried by opinion makers as being examples of populist misadventures and bureaucratic inefficiency. 

All fair points for arm-chair analysis, research publications and op-eds, and talking heads on television. 

But they miss the point about the re-imagination here. There is no developed country which supplies drinking water to the predominant share of its rural population through ground water bores. They all deliver surface water treated and piped to small habitations. No surprise here since this is perhaps the only way to sustainably and at scale deliver drinking water to population habitations, rural or urban. 

The journey to that destination can happen either in a planned and piecemeal manner or in the one-swoop manner of Telangana. Opinion makers and consultants would prefer the former. But if the Telangana government decided to plan everything and mitigate all these risks before venturing out with this project, it can safely be said that it would never have taken off. And Telangana would have lost the opportunity to break out of an entrenched retrograde development narrative and adopt perhaps the only sustainable approach to delivering drinking water to rural areas. Albert Hirschman's principle of hiding hand assumes relevance here. 

Undoubtedly, in the years ahead, all the aforementioned scenarios will materialise and the government will be criticised for this plunge. 

Looking ahead, perhaps the only fair prospective criticism of the government, in my opinion, would be, apart from egregious project execution failures and corruption, for not having put in place the required mechanism and response to emergent problems. And the latter failing is most likely. 

Wednesday, January 2, 2019

China reading links - crony capitalism, real estate market, growth model etc

1. A fascinating account of corporate relationship building associated with political turnovers in China.
In this paper we empirically study how firms build their relationship with local government officials in China. We focus on two mechanisms: perk spending and personnel changes. We find that, following the turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially private firms) headquartered in that city significantly increase their “perk spending” (e.g., travel expenses, business entertainment expenses, overseas training expenses, board meeting expenses, company car expenses, and meeting expenses)... we also find that the perk expenses increase more when the demand to build relation is stronger, e.g., when the incoming official is young, or is from a different city, and when the firm is less connected. This effect is weaker when officials are more reluctant to accept perks due to elevated risks of discipline, for example, after the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, or after an arrest of local politicians for corruption cases. Our evidence also shows that firms with more perk expenses receive more future benefits such as government subsidy and access to financing, but do not have better future performance as measured by returns on assets or equity.

Interestingly, the second relation building mechanism, personnel change, is only effective among local SOEs. Local political turnover tends to be followed by changes of Chairmen or CEOs of state-owned enterprises located in that city, particularly for those controlled by the local government. In contrast, private firms and SOEs that are controlled by the central government do not seem to engage in personnel changes following the turnover in the local government leadership. We also find that those Chairmen or CEOs of local SOEs are the protégés of the local government officials: they are less likely to be replaced in the future as long as their “mentors” remain in offices. 
2. Wei Xiong develops the "mandarin model" of economic growth to explain China's mixed economy. 

Fundamentally, though regional (province, city, county, and township) government officials are appointed by the central government (the party) and not appointed by local electorate, the local governments have large fiscal independence - regional governments make up over 70% of the fiscal spending in China. The federal government put in place a tournament system to incentivise regional government officials - those achieving fast economic growth were promoted and those with poor performance penalised. Thus officials at different levels had both the incentive and fiscal resources to compete and promote local economic growth. 

He points to two features of the country's economy,
First, the government takes a central role in driving the economy through its active investment in infrastructure. Second, agency problems in the government system generate a rich set of phenomena in the Chinese economy, including not only rapid economic growth propelled by the tournament among local governors but also short-termist behaviors of local governors, which directly affect China's economic and financial stability... The latter channel helps to explain a series of challenges that confront the Chinese economy, such as overleverage through shadow banking and unreliable economic statistics.
The focus on economic growth on the one hand encouraged investments in infrastructure (since it contributed to aggregate economic growth), but on the other hand encouraged local officials to over-report growth and also leverage to expand their fiscal budget and over-invest. 

The agency problems triggered an unhealthy competition between provincial governors to over-report and leverage up. While the central government was aware of the over-reporting and leverage and tried to control it, their support for innovations also meant that the governors had enough flexibility to over-report and hide leverage in innovative financing approaches (eg different types of local government financing vehicles and shadow banks). Short-termist behaviours prevailed and motivated governor to indulge in them. 

3. In another paper, Wei Xiong and Chang Liu have an excellent account of the evolution of China's real estate market. This summary of the current challenge is apt,
First, housing holdings are the biggest component of Chinese households’ asset portfolios, partly due to a lack of other investment vehicles for both households and firms in China’s still underdeveloped financial markets. Second, China’s local governments heavily rely on land sale revenues and use future land sale revenues as collateral to raise debt financing through “Local Government Financing Platform” (LGFP). Third, firms also rely on real estate assets as collateral to borrow, and since 2007, firms, especially well-capitalized firms, have engaged heavily in acquiring land for investment purposes. Finally, banks are heavily exposed to real estate risks through loans made to households, real estate developers, local governments, and firms that are either explicitly or implicitly backed by real estate assets.
They explain the trajectory of policy led development of real estate market. In 1988, the government amended constitution to allow land transactions - it was however not ownership, but "land usage right" for a fixed period of time (upto 70 years for residential use). In 1994, the government allowed for the first time government employees to purchase full or partial property rights, at subsidised prices. 

In 1998, this welfare housing system with its discount was abolished and full-fledged private housing was allowed. This privatisation of housing released the pent-up demand for housing asset accumulation by households and catalysed the real estate market. It also alleviated credit constraints and stimulated entrepreneurship. Simultaneously, banks began to provide residential home mortgages at subsidised interest rates, and these rates were lowered five times between 1998-2002 to boost private house purchases. 

Further, in 1998, the de-jure ownership of land was transferred from the central government to the local governments. They were also authorised to sell usufruct/leasehold rights over their lands. To restrain corruption in sales, in 2002 it was mandated that all residential and commercial leasehold sales be through auctions. 

Then in the early 2000s, urbanisation became the growth strategy, though it was regulated with the hukou permit system (till its abolition in 2014, except in case of some very large cities). This led to the development of numerous greenfield townships which further boosted the real estate market. Doubtless it led to excesses and ghost towns, but over time, once built and infrastructure completed, these towns became fully occupied. All through this, the government fulfilled its responsibility in supporting growth by developing all the required infrastructure in quick time. 

Land was similarly central to industrial growth - while residential and commercial land prices boomed, industrial land prices remained stagnant since local governments offered it at heavily subsidised prices to attract industries. 
The housing boom also explains China's high savings rate and low consumption. The authors feels that the relatively high, 30%, minimum down payment condition for mortgage loans mitigates some of the risks that banks face from a property market collapse. 

This summary of what backstops the real estate market is important,
To the extent that local governments are local monopolies of land supply and heavily rely on land sale revenues for their own fiscal budgets, the markets for residential properties and commercial real estate are crucially tied to land sale policies and strategies of local governments. This is a special feature of China’s real estate market.
The under-developed and restrictive financial market too is perhaps a backstop for the real estate market. 

Two further reforms were important in steering local governments to focus more on real estate to realise resources. The Tax Sharing Reform Law 1994, apportioned a greater share of the tax revenues (all collected by local governments and shared with the centre) to the central government. The Budget Law 1995 prohibited local governments from running budgetary deficits or obtaining external financing. Both these forced local governments to expand their non-budgetary finances, especially from land sales. 
In 2008, in response to the global crisis, the central government eased the 1995 restrain on budget deficits and allowed local governments to float local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and raise debt. This, as we know now, spawned its set of excesses. The LGFV is an entity to which some land reserves are transferred or which owns future land sale revenues. It then uses this collateral to raise money from banks and elsewhere. The LGFV can carry an implicit or explicit local government guarantee. 

According to Chinese National Audit Office, in 2013 total volume of outstanding local government debt was 19.2% of GDP, of which 37.23% used future land sale revenue as collateral. Further, governments have an explicit obligation in 61% of the debts. Since then, restrictions on bank lending to LGFVs has pushed the costlier and opaque shadow banking system to prominence as lenders to LGFVs. 

In recent years, the government has tried out some reforms to diversify away from land as a source of local government revenue. In 2011, property tax was trialled on second homes in Shanghai and Chongqing, but not expanded due to fears of public opposition and a real estate crash.

Sunday, December 30, 2018

Year-end graphical summary

1. A summary of what to look out for in 2019 - Donald Trump (what the President does on trade, squeezing China, foreign policy, stand-off with Fed, domestic policy, Mueller investigations, and anything new always likely with him), China (the uncertainties on credit flow and debt sustainability coupled with the impact of trade wars), Europe (Brexit end-game, the fate of the Italian Job and its influence on others), EMs (elections in Nigeria, India, Indonesia etc; domestic growth), and geo-politics (Iran and Middle-east on oil, China in its near abroad).

There are likely other side-events - regulatory actions on technology companies in the US, . The equity prices and bond yields will respond accordingly.

2. At 114 months, the current US economic expansion is the second longest since the War, and will break the record if it survives 2019. One model predicts an impending recession.
3. As a turbulent December ends and uncertainty looms, this progression of IMF's forecasts of the world economy and its constant downwards revision is instructive.

4. The equity markets tanked in the last quarter, but not before continuing its run that catapulted Apple to the top of the charts. Reflecting on the froth in the tech market, this from Ruchir Sharma is stunning,
For the price of Apple you could have bought all the companies in three of the largest markets of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Or all the public companies in the three largest markets of Eastern Europe — Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary — nearly three times over... the markets of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia together trade less than $1 billion a day, compared with about $6 billion a day for Apple alone.
5. Cash and Treasuries emerged as the best performing asset categories. EMs slipped from top of class last year to bottom of class!
6. This graphic captures Argentina's periodic efforts to sharply devalue its currency.
7. How the chart below plays itself out on the actual implementation of the proposed trade sanctions will be critical for the fortunes of the global economy.
8. Like it has been each of recent years, what happens in China will perhaps be the most important contributor to the prospects for 2019. Credit growth (led by steep decline in shadow banking credit), land sales, manufacturing activity, and consumer sentiments are all facing headwinds and showing downward trends.

9. The stock market story of 2018 was the "de-faanging" of the FAANG stocks. All of them under-performed the S&P 500.
10. EM Currencies had a bad year, falling against the dollar. India was the worst performing Asian currency.
11. All the major indices returned negative for the year.
12. Finally, capturing the near complete partisan nature of political debates in the US is the graphic below.

Wednesday, December 26, 2018

Central banks and independence from politics and Wall Street

The year may have initiated a decisive debate on the issue of central bank autonomy. And if it ends up upending the conventional wisdom, then the central bankers and their supporters in the financial media have none but themselves to blame. 

In the aftermath of the taper-tantrum I had cautioned about the dangers of central banks' hankering for technocratic independence from the political economy. More recently, after the RBI Deputy Governor's speech, I had questioned the empirical basis for the claims of the superiority of pure technocracy over democratic political economy in macroeconomic decision-making. 

Robert Skidelsky hits the nail on its head and makes a clarion call, 
Monetary policy is neither particularly effective nor politically neutral. Since governments, not central banks, are accountable for the results of policy, macroeconomic management cannot be outsourced to central banks. The two arms of policy, fiscal and monetary, need to be integrated. The experiment of independent central banks has to be brought to an end.
Let's examine the balance sheet of central banks from two dimensions - macroeconomic stability and financial market stability. The first demands independence from politics and the second independence from financial markets. 

It is impossible to credibly assert that central bankers and their actions have been major contributors to the Great Moderation with its low inflation basis. It's just that there have been too many structural things going on - trade liberalisation, globalisation, wage restraints, technology, EMs and China etc - which undoubtedly kept inflation down and helped the world economy chugging along. The only thing that we can definitively say is that they did not screw up things or played along. 

At no point during the quarter century did they face the sort of political economy trade-offs that Paul Volcker undoubtedly faced in early eighties. Central banks played along to keep the party going - invariably being behind the curve in deflating bubbles (and engendering bubbles) and tightening late, and rarely being behind the curve during recessions to loosen the strings. Why would therefore the political masters have had any problem with central bank policy stances? What did the rockstar central bank governors actually do to enjoy their current reputations, beyond being actors in a narrative that has limited empirical basis? It also begs the question whether central bankers' aura of importance is just a legacy of the memory of Volcker's rate hikes to slay inflation?

So the central bankers did little to earn independence from politics. In fact, there was nothing in their actions for politicians to demur. 

On financial market stability, it cannot be denied that they have to take a good share of the blame for the financial instability engendered by both erring on the side of caution to keep credit taps loose at all times and in offering the monetary policy 'put' to backstop equity markets. Sample this from John Mauldin,
The last three Federal Reserve Chairs have acted like the Fed has three mandates: the two official ones (low inflation and full employment) and an unofficial third one: making sure asset prices rise as the market wants. Not just the stock market, but real estate and all other investment assets. It started with the Greenspan “Put” which morphed into the Bernanke Put (remember the taper tantrum?) and reached its apex with the Yellen Put. And what did we get? A series of bubbles. As Stan Druckenmiller says, the really big Fed mistake was when Greenspan kept rates too low for too long in 2003–2004, setting up the housing bubble and Great Recession. He clearly helped the massive bubble in 1999–2000. Then Bernanke’s reluctance to raise rates above zero in 2012–2013, when the economy was manifestly recovering, refueled the asset price bubble. Yellen continued that course. Her reluctance to raise rates until Trump won the election, the economy was booming, and unemployment clearly falling was inexcusable. The Federal Reserve should be just as concerned about Main Street as it is about Wall Street.The serial bubbles of the last 30 years all had serious negative consequences.
So, in terms of independence from financial markets, the central bankers have shown a remarkable consistency in responding to its concerns even at the cost of all others. As Mauldin highlights, they have had their opportunities to break-free and squeeze the credit taps to pre-empt the build-up of bubbles. That would have a demonstration of true independence, from both the politicians and the financial market. But nothing of that sort happened.

If their role in the Great Moderation was neutral and in engendering financial bubbles was negative, then on the net, how do we explain the superiority of technocratic wisdom which has had a free-run over the past quarter century in the developed economies? They have exhibited independence from neither politics nor financial markets.

In fact, the true test of the mettle of a critical decision-maker like a central bank Governor is how they respond in difficult times. To follow the models and conventional wisdom in good and bad times (and generally, or always, in terms of expanding) is perhaps the easiest thing to do, especially for an academician or a technocrat. Further, it is unlikely to trigger opposition from politicians. The difficult thing is to constructively engage with the government in responding to difficult situations, where there are trade-offs to be made. Sadly the last two Governors of RBI have fallen short in this regard, in stark contrast to their predecessors.

In contrast, and especially in light of what their rockstar counterparts in the West did, in India, the RBI, manned by mere bureaucrat Governors, did a remarkably good job in the lead-up to and in the management of the global financial crisis. Their scepticism about excessive financialisation, caution with capital flow liberalisation, and application of a heterodox toolkit to address financial market stability has now come to be applauded. 

Then too the poor bureaucrats were criticised for their conservatism. Many leading economists, including Raghuram Rajan, and organisations like the IMF have long called for India to allow capital account convertibility in varying degrees. The financial media opinion makers had been assailing the government for dragging its feet. As an aside, when I wrote urging caution with capital account liberalisation, one worthy among India's opinion makers showered ad hominem on bureaucrats,
When some Indian bureaucrats have argued in favour of a closed capital account at international forums, they have faced amusement from the audience. No country has taken this idea seriously.
As a perfectly plausible counterfactual, it would have been very easy for Dr YV Reddy to have accepted the superior wisdom and ease capital flows. Given the prevailing global market trends and the domestic growth momentum, capital would have rushed in. The markets would have doubtless cheered. The politicians too would have been happier.

And we would have been picking up the pieces from an even bigger banking crisis. But thank God, these bureaucrats did what they do best and did not fall into the thrall of the supposedly superior wisdom of academic scholars. 

Given all this, ironically, doesn't it make sense to say that one of the signatures of a good monetary policy action during boom times is the "wrath of markets"? Then it is more likely that the central bank is actually doing its job. 

Mauldin applauds Jerome Powell and writes that his words and actions are a reminder to everyone that the Federal Reserve is regaining its independence from Wall Street. Powell's determination to put sand on the wheels of financial markets and stabilise market activity comes out looking like a breath of fresh air. If he survives and continues with what he would be doing, this would perhaps become a neo-Volckerian moment in central bank history. But it is not a good reflection on central bank independence that it has a taken almost three decades of rockstar Fed Governors to have someone actually indulge in a substantially high-stakes trade-off monetary policy stand-off (with both the politicians and the markets). 

This by TT Rammohan is a very balanced commentary on the debate in India about RBI's autonomy.

I feel that the Indian financial media commentators and academic researchers (especially the foreign-based ones), the former feeding from the latter, have completely lost their objectivity in assessing the issue of RBI autonomy. Captured (to varying degrees) by the hegemony around the superior wisdom of central banking technocracy, they appear blind to the empirical evidence.

It is perhaps not incorrect to say that they have become a self-serving clique which feed on each other. Once someone who fits the narrative becomes the Governor, the hosannas begin, the 'confidence fairy' rises, stocks boom, the Governor is praised even more, and central bankers start behaving like infallible rockstars. In this environment, anything that government disagrees with the central bank, irrespective of the merits, is scorned on. Governments are criticised. The central bank    plays along conveniently. Some of the articles in Indian media in recent days disparaging the appointment of bureaucrats and endowing some other-worldly wisdom on economists are downright pathetic.

Forget this government in Delhi, the opinion makers would be shrill with anything seen (and actually pretty much anything can get projected so in today's world) as an attempt to encroach on the so-called central bank independence. This government only makes the noise shriller.

In conclusion. There is nothing superior about the technocracy of central bankers compared to the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics. There is also nothing superior about the wisdom of academic researchers that endow them to be better central bankers. These are narratives that have no empirical basis. 

Tuesday, December 25, 2018

The development value proposition of consultants

The NYT had this takedown of McKinsey accusing it of shoring up the stature of authoritarian governments and indulging in dubious business practices.

Now Tyler Cowen of Marginal Revolution springs to the support with this article. He writes,
One of the biggest, most positive (and most neglected) global trends over the last 30 years has been the spread of managerial and technocratic expertise to what used to be called “third world governments.” In most countries, the central banks, the public health authorities, the treasuries and many other public-sector institutions now collect good data, hire Western-educated advisers, and try to implement good solutions. This is true in both the democracies and most of the autocracies, with North Korea a notable exception. Although there is still a long way to go, this spread of technocracy has helped bring amazing increases in life expectancy and declines in child poverty, while making the world far wealthier and freer... these developments are what McKinsey stands for and has tried to accomplish, and any highlighting of the negative should be counterbalanced by this positive trend.
Well, this is a teachable moment in terms of regurgitation of an entrenched narrative. Talk about evidence-free claims. Where is the evidence that the public bureaucracies in developing countries have internalised some new expertise which has contributed to their achievements? Where is the evidence that it is this "managerial and technocratic expertise" that has contributed significantly to all that great progress? Even assuming the value of such expertise, where is the evidence that they have seeped into public bureaucracies from management consultants? 

In countries like India, where consultants nowadays roam around freely across government corridors dispensing largely spurious damaging wisdom, I am inclined to think that the net balance is now increasingly negative. Sample this on their impact on international development.

Update 1 (23.04.2020)

FT has this article about the rise of consulting services within government. This story of passport service outsourcing is perhaps less a success of consulting than of policy reform and work-flow engineering,
Obtaining an Indian passport was once notoriously complex, with applicants forced to wait several weeks or months and fight through a maze of bureaucracy. In 2008, that began to change when the government handed Tata Consultancy Services a mandate to overhaul the country’s passport system and operate a new network of passport issuance centres. Today, citizens can be issued a passport within three days after a simple online application and a visit to one of 88 application centres, run by TCS alongside the government. At these centres, private employees collect biometric data and carry out document checks before passing applications to public servants for approval. 

Sunday, December 23, 2018

Weekend reading links

1. Mumbai just needs to prioritise its transportation infrastructure resources on its commuter rail and buses. Sample this,
Many more commuters (150,000) arrive in South Mumbai by train in one hour than the number that travels by car on the Sea Link (100,000) all day. In just three hours during the morning rush, the trains ferry many more people (450,000) than all four road arteries do (400,000) all day.
2.  Fascinating article in The Economist on the idiosyncrasies associated with American cities. Sample this,
Los Angeles is a striking example. The county is home to 88 incorporated cities, ranging in population from 76 (Vernon) to 3.9m (Los Angeles itself). Beverly Hills (population 34,506) is its own city, with its own police force, fire department and school district. So is Santa Monica (92,495). Even Vernon has a police department, with some 50-odd staff. All told, the county has about 30 fire departments, more than 40 police departments and 80 school districts. Los Angeles is extreme but not unusual. Alabama’s Jefferson County, which is one of seven counties in the Birmingham area, is home to 35 municipalities, including Cardiff, population 45.
The reason,
America’s constitution goes to great lengths to demarcate state and federal powers. The Tenth Amendment explicitly reaffirms that “powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” Cities derive their power from state governments... All but 11 states follow “Dillon’s Rule”, named after a 19th-century judge, which holds that municipalities only possess powers specifically granted to them by state law... Most states make it difficult for a city to force its neighbours to join it. Only eight states allow municipalities to annex territory unilaterally. Eight require the state legislature to change municipal boundaries. The overwhelming majority, 29 states, require a referendum in the areas to be annexed, according to an analysis by Greg Lindsey of the University of Minnesota. These votes often fail. Residents of unincorporated areas resist annexation, fearing a greater tax burden. Those in already rich suburbs fret about sharing their taxes with the poorer core city and merging of school districts. Municipalities avoid annexing poor neighbourhoods because they cost more to service than they provide in revenue. In places like Birmingham, blacks worry that rich, white suburbanites will usurp their hard-won power.
The result,
A map of the incorporated areas of Jefferson County clarifies matters somewhat: dozens of independent cities slot neatly into the gaps around Birmingham like a tricky jigsaw puzzle. From the air, it may appear that Birmingham sprawls but, in an administrative sense, the city is constrained. This is a problem. Cities that are unable easily to expand their boundaries are poorer, more segregated, have higher concentrations of poverty, lower growth, worse municipal bond ratings and less well-educated workforces... 
The result is duplication and waste as municipalities each pay councillors, police and fire departments, waste-collection agencies and school administrators to perform the same services. Cities are reluctant to co-operate even on menial things like waste collection, fearing an erosion of their independence. Fragmentation is one of the main reasons that many cities are poor at providing public transport. Businesses use fragmentation to their advantage, making known their interest in moving to a metropolitan area and playing its constituent cities off against each other... Firms win tax breaks and other enticements; employees’ use of infrastructure puts a further burden on the whole conglomeration. 
And this about how it deepens inequality,
The jigsaws also deepen inequality. Small, wealthy cities can afford better schools. No matter how much young white couples enjoy living in restored downtown lofts and strolling to artisan coffee shops full of reclaimed wood, they eventually move to suburban houses in superior school districts when they have children, taking their taxes with them. Struggling cities get poorer; comfortable ones get richer. It is, for families, a sensible decision: four of the five best school districts in Alabama are in the suburbs of Birmingham, according to Niche, a website. Mountain Brook, a Birmingham suburb, is home to the highest-ranked school system in the state. Its median household income is four times that of the mother city. Its poverty rate is one-seventh.
3. A new paper finds evidence of what was always suspected, that corporate philanthropic donations often carry a business agenda. The authors examined a comprehensive sample of public commentary made by firms and non-profits within US federal rule making in the 2003-15 period and the IRS data on those firms' donations. They analysed the interaction of non-profit organisations and large corporations within the US federal regulatory environment across a wide variety of sectors ranging from banking to environment and found,
First, we show that, shortly after a firm donates to a non- profit, the grantee is more likely to comment on rules for which the firm has also provided a comment. Second, when a firm comments on a rule, the comments by non-profits that recently received grants from the firm's foundation are systematically closer in content similarity to the firm's own comments than to those submitted by other non-profits commenting on that rule. This content similarity does not result from similarly-worded comments that express divergent sentiment. Third, when a firm comments on a new rule, the discussion of the final rule is more similar to the firm's comments when the firm's recent grantees also comment on that rule. These patterns, taken together, suggest that corporations strategically deploy charitable grants to induce non-profit grantees to make comments that favor their benefactors, and that this translates into regulatory discussion that is closer to the firm's own comments...


The paper presents evidence that corporate foundations’ charitable grants reach targeted non-profits just before those same non-profits engage in public commentary... the content of the messages simultaneously communicated by non-profits and by corporations appears systematically closer in terms of textual and semantic similarity in presence of a charitable contribution provided immediately before those comments are filed. While circumstantial, the evidence seems to point to potential concerns in the assessment of prima facie independent information on the part of targeted regulators, who may be unaware of the philanthropic grants that realize in the backdrop and may interpret similar comments stemming from different segment of the public spectrum as indicative of merit.
4. As this NYT investigation on Facebooks user's private data sharing partnerships with corporate clients without the prior informed consent of its users show, the company's management (and that is effectively two  people) continues to plunge new depths in demonstrating its incompetence in management.
For years, Facebook gave some of the world’s largest technology companies more intrusive access to users’ personal data than it has disclosed, effectively exempting those business partners from its usual privacy rules... The exchange was intended to benefit everyone. Pushing for explosive growth, Facebook got more users, lifting its advertising revenue. Partner companies acquired features to make their products more attractive. Facebook users connected with friends across different devices and websites. But Facebook also assumed extraordinary power over the personal information of its 2.2 billion users — control it has wielded with little transparency or outside oversight. Facebook allowed Microsoft’s Bing search engine to see the names of virtually all Facebook users’ friends without consent, the records show, and gave Netflix and Spotify the ability to read Facebook users’ private messages. The social network permitted Amazon to obtain users’ names and contact information through their friends, and it let Yahoo view streams of friends’ posts as recently as this summer, despite public statements that it had stopped that type of sharing years earlier... They also raise questions about whether Facebook ran afoul of a 2011 consent agreement with the Federal Trade Commission that barred the social network from sharing user data without explicit permission.
These violations go much beyond poor management and border on personal data theft and malfeasance. It is staggering that the Chairman and COO of Facebook are still ensconced on their jobs. Like earlier instances, in keeping with incompetence in crisis management, the company delayed, denied, and deflected in responding to the latest exposure.

As Rana Faroohar has written here, the management disasters at Facebook and Tesla demonstrate the challenges when businesses grow too fast and continue with the culture and ownership structure of growth-seeking start-ups, and its owners and managers do not have the talent and expertise required to develop robust management capacity needed to run big businesses. 

It's one thing to invent a new technology. It's an altogether different thing to make a sustainable commercial business out of that. This is one of the best known axioms among investors. The how did they trust the likes of Zuckerberg and Musk (and continue to do so with their ownership) to manage large companies?

5. Finally, Anil Swarup lays the blame on Vinod Rai for decision-paralysis in Indian bureaucracy. He tears apart the presumptive loss audit on coal blocks. And I concur completely on his role, but think it goes much beyond Vinod Rai.

Friday, December 21, 2018

Mass transit project woes

Triple-blows before the year end for transportation projects in UK.

The smallest one was the delay in the £1 bn Northern Line extension to the Battersea area by a year to 2021, with attendant, as yet unassessed, cost over-runs.

But the bigger blows came by way of similar assessments of HS2 high speed rail project and Crossrail. The former is expected to significantly overshoot its £56 bn budget. The project has been constantly under the spotlight over questions about the reliability of its project reports and estimates. 

The latter, expected to increase London metro's network by 10%, had been showcased as an example of Britain's ability to deliver large infrastructure projects on time and was expected to have opened this month. Instead the £16.8 bn project is expected to open atleast two years late and with a cost over-run now of £2.2 bn. The project which involved digging 26 miles of tunnels below London's honeycombed soil and clay and 10 large stations was initiated in 2008 and was being executed autonomously through an SPV under the Transport for London (TfL). 

The news comes as a surprise given the aura of private sector efficiency which the project has projected till date,
Crossrail was supposed to be a state of the art scheme, transforming travel in London by adding more than 10 per cent to the capacity of the network. Delivered by a commercially savvy team insulated from politicians’ meddling, it would show that private-sector discipline could deliver public-sector projects on time and to cost... The mess has claimed the scalp of Terry Morgan, who stepped down as Crossrail and HS2’s chairman this month amid allegations of mismanagement... Keen to insulate a publicly funded project from political tweaking, protections were wired into Crossrail’s governance. While the project remained within its new tight budget “envelope”, its sponsors — Transport for London and the government — would have no rights of intervention. They were confined to one board member each with limited rights to receive information, TfL officials claim. They had no say in hiring, contracts or the salaries and incentives paid to staff. The deal gave Crossrail’s bosses great freedom so long as they lived within their budget. They took full advantage, paying themselves handsomely. When Mr Wolstenholme left this year, he received £765,689, including a £160,000 bonus, and £97,000 for “loss of employment”, despite numerous signs that the project was unravelling. The previous year, he banked £950,000, including a £481,460 bonus.
The delays have been caused by power supply installation failures, and integration of five different signalling systems across different metro lines and network rail. There have been reports of work being done in silos, poor co-ordination among the numerous contractors, badly managed management changeovers at contractors and suppliers, turnover among officials supervising the project, suppression of bad news, and so on. All this was compounded by rising costs, 
“It feels as if they clung on to the schedule they had until it became clear that it absolutely couldn’t be delivered,” Daniel Moylan, a former Crossrail Director, says. “But when they dropped it, it seems that they had nothing left to work to. That would explain what looks like a sudden collapse.”... Mr Shepherd says the issues with the system — where much of the modern signalling and control equipment is on board the trains — could have been predicted up to seven years ago had proper consideration been given to the programme and cost risks arising from its complexity. A shortage of senior signalling engineering experts (part of a global shortage) may also have added an extra challenge to the project, he adds.
This by Philip Shepherd, an industry consultant, nicely sums up the story of large infrastructure projects,
“People are always adventurous on costs and time because they don’t want to tell the truth. Industry often doesn’t want to tell politicians the true story as they want the work, the politicians don’t know enough so take the view of the salesmen, who are going to push the latest, new technology even if it’s untested. And the management often doesn’t care because they know they won’t be there when the project isn’t delivered on time and to budget.”
Germany, the paragon of engineering efficiency, is apparently the worst culprit in recent years of cost and time over-runs. The Stuttgart station has cost €9bn instead of the planned €6.5bn and was delayed by three years. The Berlin’s Brandenburg Airport (BER) has so far cost €6.9bn instead of €2bn and is nine years late, and is expected to open only in October 2020. Last week news emerged that another €1billion may be required. 

But the award for delays and cost overruns has to go to Hamburg’s just opened publicly financed 2100 seat philharmonic concert hall, the Elbphilharmonie, part of the Hamburg Hafen City regeneration project which when completed will almost double the city centre's size. Budgeted at €77 million, the hall’s final cost eventually ballooned to €789 million, an over-run of 925%!