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Thursday, December 25, 2014

Technology and disemployment fact of the day

Nouriel Roubini has an essay on the impact of automation and technology on the economy, in particular the labor market. He points to three "downside biases" associated with the technologies associated with the "third industrial revolution" - capital-intensive (favoring those with money and resources), skill-biased (favoring those already having a high degree of technical proficiency), and labor saving (reducing total number of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy). The example of e-books and e-publishing is illustrative,
Think of what e-books have already done: with a click, you can now download almost any book for about $10 on your iPad or Amazon Kindle. This is a great service and convenience for consumers. But most of the jobs in the printing and distribution of books—and soon in the newspaper and magazine industry—are already gone. And so are tons of jobs in the pulp paper industry... 

Monday, December 22, 2014

The next wave of Chinese investments and lessons for India

A Times article highlights Xinjiang region as the target of the Chinese government's hinterland development thrust. The Communist Party proposes to develop the north-western part of the province as the country's energy hub,
Xinjiang has an estimated 21 billion tons of oil reserves, a fifth of China’s total, and major new deposits are still being found... Xinjiang is expected to produce 35 million tons of crude oil by 2020, a 23 percent increase over 2012, according to the Ministry of Land Resources. Xinjiang also has the country’s largest coal reserves, an estimated 40 percent of the national total, and the largest natural gas reserves. Those three components form an energy hat trick that China is capitalizing on to power its cities and industries...  Xinjiang is where all the growth in oil, gas and coal is going to be coming from... all the imported resources from Central Asia, oil and gas, go through Xinjiang and then get distributed from there... Xinjiang will export electricity to more populated parts of China and perhaps to Central Asia... its economy will be further bolstered by President Xi Jinping’s vision of a “New Silk Road,” an ambitious plan to rebuild the ancient trade route into a 21st-century network of transportation and trade across Xinjiang, Central Asia and Europe.
Like with all its regional development interventions, massive public investments will drive this development,
In May, Beijing said that 53 state-owned enterprises — from energy to construction to technology companies — were investing $300 billion in 685 projects in Xinjiang. The State Council, China’s cabinet, announced in June that the Xinjiang government was investing $130 billion to build infrastructure such as roads, highways and railways.
The scale of the investments being planned is staggering. If the Chinese government can raise the resources to finance these investments, that would go a long way towards sustaining the country's spectacular growth rates for the foreseeable future.

This holds important lessons for India. As the mid-term economic analysis acknowledges, at a time of strained balance sheets - corporate and household - India's quest for a higher economic growth trajectory has to be driven by public investments. The new government has announced a slew of ambitious projects - one hundred smart cities, highways construction, housing for all by 2019, diamond quadrilateral of high-speed rail (the budget allocation is inadequate for even one feasibility study), inter-linking rivers, clean Ganga river, Digital India initiative, ten Coastal Economic Regions (CERs) under the Sagar Mala Project, National Investment and Manufacturing Zones (NIMZ) under the National Manufacturing Policy etc.

But none of these projects have a credible resource mobilization plan. In fact, the investment plans for all these projects outlined in their concept reports appear motivated more by wishful thinking than any reasonable assessment of commercial viability. Accordingly, public investments committed are minuscule and limited to technical grants for project development and viability gap funding. The major share of resources for these projects are proposed from the private sector, multilateral agencies, external commercial borrowings, and public private partnerships. However, given the public good nature of most of these investments and experience from across the world, private resources are unlikely to drive such projects, especially in their initial stages. Multilateral lending is marginal to be of any significance. It is amply clear that public resources have to bear the major share of the burden.

The financing problems are exacerbated by a triple whammy of fiscally squeezed governments, debt-laden corporates (especially those in the construction and infrastructure sectors), and bruised bank balance sheets. In the circumstances, the prospects of finding the resources to sustain such ambitions appear not very promising.

Update 1 (18/01/2015)

China has embarked on its latest investment splurge. The Times writes,
In November, for instance, the powerful National Development and Reform Commission approved plans to spend nearly $115 billion on 21 supersize infrastructure projects, including new airports and high-speed rail lines... Throughout China, equally ambitious projects with multibillion-dollar price tags are already underway. The world’s largest bridge. The biggest airport. The longest gas pipeline. An $80 billion effort to divert water from the south of the country, where it is abundant, to a parched section of the north, along a route that covers more than 1,500 miles.

Sunday, December 21, 2014

China's role in Latin America

Eduardo Porter has a story examining China's role in Latin America's recent economic prosperity. The benign side first,
In 2010, Chinese lending to Latin America roughly equaled that of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United States Ex-Im Bank combined. 
And the less benign side,
Not only did China’s cheap labor out-compete Latin American industry and draw the lion’s share of global manufacturing investment, but its appetite for Latin America’s minerals, oil and agricultural products also raised the value of currencies around the region, making their manufactured goods even less competitive. Manufacturing’s share in Latin America’s economic output has declined steadily for more than a decade, ever since China inserted itself aggressively into the global economy by entering the World Trade Organization. At the same time, the share of raw materials in Latin America’s exports, which had fallen to a low of 27 percent in the late 1990s, from about 52 percent in the early 1980s, surged back to more than 50 percent on the eve of the global financial crisis.

Saturday, December 20, 2014

Value subtraction in India's public schools

In a new paper, Lant Pritchett and Yamini Aiyar finds that public schools in India subtract value when compared to private schools. Public schools cost more than twice private schools, and that too to deliver a far inferior learning outcomes output. Their estimate of what it would take public schools, at their existing efficacy in producing learning, to achieve the learning results of the private sector - 2.78% of GDP (or Rs 232,000 Cr or $ 50 bn)!

The graphic below captures this massive value subtraction.
Any serious effort at attaining and sustaining high economic growth rates should necessarily involve fixing the country's woeful school education system. 

Monday, December 15, 2014

India's disappointing economic growth recovery

The latest IIP figures on the Indian economy makes dismal reading. It fell 4.2%, its worst performance in three years, on the back of weak manufacturing performance. This was despite the festival season and a favorable base-effect. So, despite all the "animal spirits" released in recent months, what's going on?

Madan Sabnavis of CARE Ratings captures symptoms of the malaise,
Growth in consumer durable goods for instance was 2.6% and 2.0% in 2011-12 and 2012-13 respectively, and then declined by 12.2% in 2013-14 and further by 12.6% in the first half of 2014-15. Clearly, households are not spending on non-food items. The reason is not hard to guess. Food inflation has eroded the spending power, as Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation has been high averaging 10.2% in 2012-13, 9.5% in 2013-14 and 7.4% in 2014-15... industry has cut back on investment. This is mainly due to surplus capacity with the average capacity utilization rate coming down from 77.7% in first quarter if 2011-12 to 70.2% in the June quarter if 2014-15. Quite clearly, low consumer demand translates into lower demand for intermediate, basic and capital goods. Add to that the surplus capacity in a high interest rate environment and investment is bound to be curtailed.
For an economy where consumption makes up nearly 60% of the output and therefore critical to do the heavy lifting, this weakness is very damaging. As Mr Sabnavis identifies rightly, the prolonged period of inflation is the major culprit, having significantly eroded purchasing power among the workforce. To get a sense of the wealth erosion - the 9% average inflation over the 2008-14 period, exactly halved our purchasing power. It is reasonable to assume that incomes would have grown by far less to compensate for the loss. The steep negative impact on aggregate demand is understandable. The importance of RBI's stance on inflation has to be seen against this backdrop.

In the circumstances, as I have blogged earlier, there are two important parts to restoring economic growth - revival of credit growth and investment. Non-food credit growth, currently languishing at less than 10% has to return to atleast 15-20% levels. More importantly, infrastructure credit growth has fallen precipitously from its heady 35-40% growth rates in 2010-12 to less than 15% in 2013-14. Excluding power sector, itself weak, the infrastructure lending performance is poorer still. There are two important requirements to meet this target.

One, any rise in credit growth is contingent on the ability of banks to meet the demand. Here the weak balance sheets of the public sector banks, who supply over 80% of the bank credit, is a major constraint on lending, even if investment demand picks up. Large scale recapitalization is arguably the most urgent macroeconomic policy requirement and it is unlikely to materialize by merely divesting bank share holding. In fact, even if most of the Rs 18 lakh Cr worth projects currently stuck up in various tangles are disentangled, a very small proportion of them are likely to find the capital to start work.

Two, in the absence of investment demand - due to debt-laden corporate balance sheets, weak infrastructure investments, and the anemic consumer demand - the government becomes the engine to trigger investment revival. Unfortunately, it does not have the fiscal space to finance infrastructure investments. This is reflected in the marginal budget allocations made for even flagship projects of the government, with unrealistic hopes being thrust on private sector and public private partnerships.

The additional fiscal space come from either increased tax revenues and squeezing expenditures elsewhere. But both direct and indirect tax collections have been disappointing - 5.8% growth in indirect taxes against the budget estimates of 25% and 7.09% growth in direct taxes against the budget estimates of 15.31% in the April-September half year. This is not surprising given weak demand, low corporate investment appetite, and anemic economy. Cutting welfare spending is politically contentious and better targeting through Aadhaar will take time. Thanks to the one-step forward, half-step backward reforms, the windfall from the more than 40% drop in oil price appears unlikely to be fully reaped. Most of the measures to improve revenues and optimize expenditures are diffuse and long-drawn and unlikely to yield similar windfall.

All this highlights the adverse headwinds that the Indian economy has to navigate before it can start growing at 6-7%, leave alone the heady 8-9% rates. And I am not even talking about these long-term trends. In the circumstances, the journey towards regaining a 6-7% growth rate looks likely to be painstaking and long-drawn. Talking up the economy can only take you so far, and there are no magic reform pills available in the government's armor.

Update 1 (20/12/2014)

In its mid-term economic policy review, the Finance Ministry too comes to the same conclusion - public spending has to do the heavy lifting for reviving the economy. It points to corporate's median debt-to-equity ratio of 70%, one of the highest in the world, and posits a "balance sheet syndrome with Indian characteristics". The report's argument that household balance sheets are alright overlooks the harm done by the "income erosion effect" from persistent high inflation.

It identifies fiscal space by highlighting that the country has a debt flow (high fiscal deficit) problem and not a debt stock (reasonable and declining public debt to GDP ratio) problem. Though it finds "growing ground for hope", I am not sure.

Update 2 (4/1/2015)

Business Standard reports that the power sector pipeline for the 13th Plan (2017-22) is barren as developers struggle with a host of problems, including strained balance sheets. Highlighting this, the order book of BHEL, the primary equipment supplier, is thin for the 13th Plan period. Half the 12th Plan commissioned capacity (48000 MW till date against 88537 MW for the entire plan) are in-operational because of fuel supply issues. A plant takes 4-5 years to become operational.

Further, recent bids called by the government for the 4000 MW UMPPs in Tamil Nadu (Cheyyur, using imported coal, Case II bid) and Odisha (Bedabahal, pithead plant, Case II bid) have met with lukewarm response. It is likely that no private developer will bid for these design-build-finance-operate-transfer (DBFOT) model projects, which do not have a power purchase agreement.   

Sunday, December 14, 2014

China manufacturing facts of the day

From Forbes, on China's claim to be the factory of the world,
In 2011, for example, it manufactured 90% of all the personal computers produced globally that year, as well as 80% of the air conditioners, 74% of the solar cells, and 70% of the mobile phones.
From Nicholas Lardy, on the changing nature of Chinese economy and how private firms are its growth engines,
State firms now account for only one-fifth of manufacturing output, compared to four-fifths when reform began. They account for only one-tenth of investment in manufacturing. State firms in all sectors account for only one-tenth of urban employment and only one-tenth of China’s exports... According to data released by the People’s Bank of China, private firms received 52 per cent of all credit flowing to firms from 2010–2012, while the share of state firms was only 32 per cent.

Friday, December 12, 2014

Labor market reforms - deregulation or lower taxation?

I have briefly observed that instead of wading into the controversial hire-and-fire reforms, the next round of labor market reforms should involve addressing the dual price market in labor wages.

The fundamental problem is that Indian manufacturing firms start and remain small and informal. This engenders an inefficient equilibrium of low productivity, low wages, deficient social protections, limited investments, and stunted growth. What is required to break out of this equilibrium?

The likes of Arvind Panagariya argue that the restrictive hire and fire policies encourage firms to start small and informal and remain so. There is another possibility, as highlighted by Manish Sabharwal, that the high rate of labor taxation, payable by both employers and employees (upto 45% of wages are deducted for pensions and insurance for those with smaller incomes, whereas just over 5% of wages are deducted from those with higher wages), encourages much the same as above. It is certain that both - restrictive labor regulations and high rate of labor taxation - contribute to keeping firms small and informal. What is not certain is which is a greater constraint facing firms.

In this context, I have argued in detail that restrictive regulations may not be as binding a constraint as prohibitive taxation rates are. Consider this story. If you are the typical entrepreneur starting a textile unit, you are more likely  to start small and not be able to afford higher salaries. However, at such salaries, you are also unlikely to be able to attract workers, especially given the prohibitively high payroll deductions. So the firm prefers to either start informal or contract labor. Once it starts informal, it gets entrapped in a low-level equilibrium, exiting from which is constrained by several factors, including informality itself as well as restrictive labor regulations.

A more prudent strategy involving labor market reforms would revolve around lowering mandatory payroll deductions and replacing it with publicly funded social protection that is programmed for a gradual phase out.