Substack

Sunday, March 17, 2013

The African Bond Bubble?

The FT reports of a number of sub-Saharan African countries rushing to raise foreign currency denominated debt. In September 2012, in a heavily overs-subscribed offering, Zambia raised $750 million as 10 year dollar denominated debt at an yield of 5.625%, lower than Spain sovereign bond yield at that time. Rwanda and Angola have announced plans to raise $350 m and $1 billion respectively, and Nigeria and Ghana too are expected to enter the market.

Unlike Latin America and Asia, Africa has had very few foreign currency denominated bond offerings. Currently, only 13 out of 54 African countries have issued foreign currency denominated debt. Multi-lateral and bilateral financing have formed more than three-quarters of external debts in Africa.


The current interest in emerging market debt has to be seen in light of the global liquidity glut engendered by the ultra-low interest rates in developed economies. With debt market yields hugging the bottom, investors have been looking at exotic markets in search of yields. Even the emerging market bond yields have been falling. Zambia was able to raise debt at such low rates despite its offering being rated "junk" (B+) by S&P.

Predictably, the number of African countries trying to raise foreign currency denominated sovereign debt has led to concerns about its repayment and the "original sin" of a Latin American style potential future debt crisis. The low rates does not tell anything about the risks posed by exchange rate volatility and the country's balance of payments (BoP) position. A depreciating currency would increase the effective repayment rates, while a weak BoP position would strain the repayment capacity.

Zambia, for example, is heavily reliant on Copper, which forms 80% of its export basket. Any volatility in exchange rates will therefore have dramatic effects on its real debt burden. Its currency has depreciated by over 40% against the US dollar since January 2008. Others are similarly exposed, with small variations, to commodity prices and therefore forex market volatility could potentially affect debt sustainability.
Historical Data Chart
Given the widespread governance problems in all these countries, it is important that these debts are for clearly defined objectives. For example, debt raised to finance critical infrastructure investments are more likely to be effectively utilized and compensate the debt cost. In this context, multilateral loans for infrastructure projects can be dovetailed with foreign currency debt. The presence of the multi-lateral lender would not only increase expenditure side discipline, but also serve as a credit enhancement and contribute to lowering of the cost of debt.

Friday, March 15, 2013

The opportunity cost of India's subsidies and the foregone roads

Niranjan Rajadhyaksha writes in Mint,
The subsidy bill since fiscal year 2004 has grown nearly six times, far more than the growth in the underlying economy in nominal terms. The gross number is even starker: the two Manmohan Singh governments have spent a cumulative Rs.11.82 trillion on various subsidies over the past decade... Subsidies have crowded out spending on public goods. Just ask yourself what could have been built if at least half of those Rs.11 trillion had been redirected to build new infrastructure... building a kilometre of a good rural road costs about Rs.5 crore per km, which means that India has effectively given up around 20,000 km of new rural roads, assuming one-tenth of the subsidy spending since 2004 had been used to build new rural roads. One could come to similar conclusions about new schools or drinking water schemes or public toilets... Look at what China has built in the past five years: 19,700km of new rail lines, 609,000km of new roads or 31 airports.
I am in particular struck by the 20000 km new rural roads. This blog has consistently argued that all-weather roads and three-phase electricity supply are the two most effective anti-poverty and development interventions. Furthermore, the absence of all-weather roads attenuates the effectiveness and sustainability of any other development intervention, whereas its presence amplifies their long-term value.

Thursday, March 14, 2013

Cost of monopoly profits - Mexican telecoms edition

An OECD review (pdf here) of the telecommunications policy and regulation in Mexico finds,
The OECD estimates that the lack of competition in Mexico cost the country USD 129.2 billion between 2005 and 2009., equivalent to USD 25.8 billion or an annual 1.8% of GDP... This estimates represents the opportunity costs of lack of competition in Mexico. It does not represent the profit or sales of any single firm. The figure is based on an analysis of the economic loss that Mexicans have suffered as a result of paying higher prices than they would have paid in a more competitive market. It also takes into account thee loss suffered by potential users who were deterred by high prices from subscribing to telecommunications services in Mexico. 
The econometric analysis is here. In a different context, Acemoglu and Robinson makes the point that Mexico has suffered a big net loss since Carlos Slim's latest net worth is only $79 bn.

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

An assessment of "The Economic Complexity Atlas"

I've been thinking of writing about this for sometime. Now that I've passed a preliminary muster of Cesar Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann's concept of diversified productive knowledge within an economy, and its role in economic growth, I am left with mixed feelings.

Obviously (or so atleast I think) the Atlas has a two-fold agenda. It has brilliantly explored the manifestations of growth, as reflected in the profile of each country's export products and mapped them. It has also quantified the productive knowledge of an economy in terms of the Economic Complexity Index (ECI), and has shown that this is a reliable predictor of economic growth. Its next objective would be to explore what can be done to help countries acquire a diversified base of productive knowledge. I am not sure whether we are covering much new ground here.

1. The Atlas tells us where countries stand on the complexity map and that complexity appears to be a better predictor of economic growth prospects. So what? Standard endogenous growth theories have for long dwelt on the importance of accumulation of knowledge - both product variety/diversification and specialization - as the critical driver of economic growth.

Yes, the Atlas qualifies the character and dynamics of this knowledge. And Hausmann and Hidalgo believe that this "new" information (about drivers of growth), with its close relationship with growth, would help countries, presumably unaware of this, focus on its acquisition.

But I'm not sure whether there is compelling enough evidence - qualified interpretation of existing theories or new evidence - in anything presented by them to convince political leaders and policy makers anywhere to re-visit their prevailing notions about economic growth. However, it does undoubtedly add significant value to the continuous refinement of the endogenous growth models. But that is a matter of interest for academicians and to this small group sitting in Sweden.

2. Even assuming that we have learnt something new, what does it tell about how to get there? What can knowledge about the current level of a country's productive knowledge base and the desired level of complexity tell about the actual path of getting there? In broad terms, this quest is similar to industrial policy regimes followed by many countries that have sought to promote the acquisition of knowledge and technology in specific sectors.

In fact, the decades experimentation on industrial policy, and its mixed results, should itself caution us about the difficulty of any effort at promoting growth with the productive knowledge destination map. Obviously, even when we know our current location and future destination, we still need to know the path and the vehicles to get there. And if the path is itself a dynamic target and we also have to travel in multiple vehicles at the same time, then the quest for destination becomes even more difficult.

3. It finds that diversity of productive knowledge is a more important predictor of growth than even investments in human capital. Maybe. But even controlling for various "observable" factors, we simply cannot quite infer causal relationship between acquisition of diversified productive knowledge and economic growth. The interaction dynamics of the contextual (I am wary of using "institutional"!) factors are too complex to do that with any degree of reliability. It could just be that countries with high ECI scores also had the right environments to acquire that knowledge.

4. Then there is the practical difficulty of its assumptions. Clearly, we cannot expect the numerous small least developed countries like Gabon, Sudan, and Malawi, who are languishing at the bottom of the ECI rankings to do anything much, even in the medium to long-run, to acquire a diversified base of productive knowledge. In an ideal world, the inhabitants of these places should merely migrate to other more habitable locations. In the real world though, their most realistic chance of expedited development lies not in acquiring diversified productive knowledge, but in being able to achieve success with a few sectors.

5. The Atlas points to the relatively low growth potential of the richer natural resource endowed economies, attributing it to their low productive knowledge base. But it can also be argued that given the low economic base from which they started, the natural resources provided them to best and fastest path to economic growth. And atleast some of them grew faster than their other similarly placed colleagues. It is true that many of them have not leveraged that growth to diversify their economies (and expand their productive knowledge), which in turn raises questions about the sustainability of their growth.

While we may claim that once we control for the role of oil, the Middle Eastern economies, with their low productive knowledge base, would have been as backward as any other developing country, it cannot be denied that the people of these countries today enjoy lives which are far better than those in non-resource developing countries, including those with much higher productive knowledge base. If they, like Norway, had used resource windfall to build up a modern economy, we would today have been talking about that as a growth model. There is no reason to lend any more credibility to the productive knowledge base model than one which advocates leveraging natural resources to develop an economic base and then move up the technology frontier.

6. Finally, the Atlas is created using export data. This may be a less reliable proxy for the productive knowledge base of the larger economies, whose domestic economy may contain a diversity of productive knowledge that may not be appropriately reflected in the exports.

Lest we need any more reminders, all "holy grail" explanations of economic growth and development are futile exercises. It all ultimately boils down to exercises in circular logic. Critics will rightly point out that countries lagging behind on diversified productive knowledge base do so because of lack of effective institutions, culture, inadequate investments in human capital, geography, historical factors, weak governance systems, and a series of other factors. Supporters will say that the process of acquisition of productive knowledge will help overcome these other deficiencies. And so on...

Saturday, March 9, 2013

India decoupled?

Amidst all the gloom surrounding India's fading economic growth, we risk glossing over the large variance in economic growth rates and quality of governance across Indian states. The fact that many of these states are comparable to large national economies, should alone be enough for us to be more nuanced in analyzing India's economic prospects.

As the recent Economic Survey points out, states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, have grown in excess or close to double-digit rates. In fact, even as national GDP growth rate slumped to 6.5% in 2011-12, half the states grew at double-digit rates for the 2010-12 period. One of the surprisingly less discussed stories is the remarkable success of state governments in reining in their fiscal deficits, reducing them from 4.1% for 1998-2004 to an estimated 2.1% for 2012-13, and even running a revenue surplus. This stands out in sharp contrast to the fiscal mess that has characterized the federal government. Some of the traditional laggard states have become trendsetters with progressive reforms. A recent article in Forbes summed up the successes,
Gujarat has emerged as arguably the best destination for investors... Bihar and Orissa have pioneered legislation to stamp out corruption. Karnataka is putting gender equality and women’s empowerment at the heart of planning. Kerala, as mentioned earlier, wants to be on par with Nordic nations. West Bengal now allows free movement of goods, having removed checkposts and trusting businesses to be honest. Punjab has introduced a Right to Services Act. The idea is to reduce citizens’ interaction with government officials and subsequently reduce the opportunity for corruption. 
A few observations in this context

1. Many of these successes are not built on any of the structural reforms that have been the staple of debates surrounding what needs to be done to get the Indian economy back on track. In fact, all these states have done well on the back of plain simple good governance.

Sure, there are benefits from some of these macro-level structural reforms. But, given the low level of inefficiency equilibrium, there are substantial low-hanging fruits to be plucked by good governance and effective implementation of the existing programs and schemes. It is a pointer to the federal government itself that simple governance reforms can itself dramatically improve outcomes.

2. It is well past time to reform the one-size-fits-all centrally sponsored schemes. Given the varying growth trajectories and requirements of states, such uniform programs are an extremely inefficient use of scarce resources. But instead of reforming or phasing them out, the federal government has in recent years, in deference to populist political considerations, dramatically increased the spending on such programs.

Consider this. The high-profile centrally designed programs NRHM, SSA, NREGA, NRLM, NSAP, IAY, and JNNURM form overwhelming share of financing in critical sectors like health, education, employment guarantee, livelihoods, social safety, housing, and urban development respectively. In other words, the agenda for addressing almost all the major development problems of a state is being framed in New Delhi, leaving the state as a passive recipient of central dole.

Many state governments have even scaled back their local need-based sectoral initiatives to accommodate these central programs. Apart from regular establishment expenditures, state government's own spending in these sectors is now mostly confined to meeting its share of the central allocation or in the complementarities to the national program. The rigid program guidelines, with norms and components, ostensibly aimed at facilitating the achievement of objectives, end up distorting incentives and distracting from addressing the real local problems.

3. Redesigning these programs require reforming the mandate of the Planning Commission itself. It is widely acknowledged that the current process of plan consultations are merely an exercise to annually re-validate the ongoing central schemes. Instead of planning top-down (sic), the Planning Commission should collaborate with the state governments and help prepare need-based state plans. It should provide state governments with the necessary professional expertise in the preparation of such plans.

This would mean dispensing with many of the central schemes and replacing it with sectoral bulk transfers. Such allocations should be made as part of comprehensive sectoral plan with clearly defined outcomes and accountability measures.  

4. We need to be careful with the promulgation of nation-wide regulations on economic issues. As the economy diversifies, private sector expands, the role of government changes, and India integrates more with the world economy, there will be the natural technocratic temptation to harmonize regulations to lower transaction costs. We need to be cautious about rushing with hasty legislations.

The need for harmonization, with its attendant benefits, has to be balanced against both political economy considerations and also economic issues arising from asymmetric economic cycles. In this context, TV Somanathan has forcefully argued in this article that proponents of a national Goods and Services Tax (GST) have overlooked important political economy considerations and its impact on the fiscal space available for state governments.

The Eurozone crisis has show that excessive harmonization carries with it considerable economic risks. Harmonization often leaves regions exposed to asymmetric economic shocks without the traditional cushions against the vagaries of the economic cycle. We need to be aware of the need to leave sufficient fiscal and regulatory flexibility that is necessary to effectively manage a continental size economy.

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

Where will the funds for infrastructure finance come from?

Theoretical wisdom on financing infrastructure projects would have it that these long-gestation projects be funded through long-term debt. Such debt is raised primarily from the bond markets since banks are constrained by potential for asset liability mismatch arising from their business model (their deposits are short to medium term, making them borrow short and lend long).

However, India's nascent infrastructure sector growth story goes against this wisdom and relies mainly on bank loans for project funding. The last decade saw a massive increase in private sector investments in infrastructure, especially in power and roads, mostly financed with domestic bank loans. In the wave that swept the sector, many banks lend disproportionately to the sector. This has predictably had the effect of raising concerns about the un-sustainability of bank's exposure to the sector.

Consider these figures from a recent report in Mint,
Infrastructure is the sector to which Indian banks have the greatest exposure... Among the banks that have significant exposure to the power and infrastructure sectors are Central Bank of India (34% of its loans), IDBI Bank Ltd (32.9%), UCO Bank (32.3%), Canara Bank (22.4%) and Andhra Bank (24.5%)... At least 50% of the highway projects in the rated portfolio scheduled for completion in 2013 have already reported three-six months delays due to land/right of way not being handed over by the concession grantor
The outstanding bank loans to infrastructure projects stood at Rs 6.9 trillion as on 31st December 2012.  Of this, Rs 3.8 trillion dollars are to the power sector (mostly generation) alone and Rs 1.26 trillion to road sector. A number of these projects, which are due for commissioning now, are delayed and are likely to request for debt restructuring. The close relationship these projects have with the fluctuations in the business cycle makes debt restructuring even more likely.

Interestingly, both these sectors are very long gestation projects, with returns generated over 23-30 years. Evidently, the most efficient way to finance such projects is through long-term debt. Further, these projects, with distinct project assets and operational contours, are ideally suited for project finance.

The RBI norms stipulate that bank lending to a borrower should not cross 15% of its capital and to a borrower group should not exceed 40%. But most banks have either crossed their sectoral exposure limits to infrastructure or are close to that point. This is important in light of the ambitious $1 trillion infrastructure investment estimates for the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-17). Since banks are currently the primary source of funding for infrastructure projects and are close to reaching their lending limits, the source of funds to meet the Plan targets becomes a matter of great concern.

In the circumstances, there are only two other alternatives. One, encourage foreign capital investments in infrastructure. Two, sharply increase the depth and breadth of India's long-term corporate debt market. The second assumes great significance and urgency if we are to have any chance of even achieving half the 12th Plan target. It is also critical to enable banks to securitize and off-load the infrastructure loans from their balance sheet and rectify their unsustainable asset-liability mismatches.

Saturday, March 2, 2013

The challenge with law enforcement

My latest Governance Agenda column in Pragati talks about the difficulty with enforcing laws in India. It argues that top-down enforcement works at the margins and fails when deviation or violation is the norm and not the exception.