Substack

Monday, May 14, 2012

Eurozone - fiscal irresponsibility was not the problem

The Eurozone crisis is far from a simple story of fiscally irresponsible governments running up huge debts that they are now struggling to repay.

As the graphic below shows, public debt as a percentage of GDP has remained remarkably stable for most countries since the mid-nineties. In fact, it even declined for countries like Italy, Spain, and Ireland - all currently accused of being among those most fiscally irresponsible. Even Greece did not suffer anything like the spectacular explosion in public debt that has currently become conventional wsidom. Now, once the crisis exploded and economies tanked, the sovereign debt ratios have risen steeply and have become dangerously high for many of them.














In fact, apart from Ireland, none of these economies accumulated debt much higher than the prevailing average debt levels for developed economies.


Even government expenditure as a percentage of GDP has remained more or less stable. The graphic below does not have the signatures of the classic fiscal irresponsibility induced financial crisis and economic recession. It exploded in Ireland. But in Greece, Spain, and UK, while it did increase, but not at a rate that merited a financial crisis and recession of this magnitude.












So are households responsible? While household consumption did rise in Ireland and Greece, it was remarkably stable elsewhere. These are not the usual indicators of a crisis of this magnitude.














Clearly closer scrutiny is required. More than government and household balance sheets, those of non-financial corporations and financial institutions in the peripheral economies today look unsustainable.


















The massive inflow of cheap capital in the aftermath of the currency union led to unsustainable resource misallocation and bubbles. Construction activity and real estate markets in many countries boomed. Ireland, Iceland, and Spain, were the three worst affected by this misallocation problem. In fact in Spain, financial institutions have accumulated 323 billion euros ($418 billion) in real estate assets, of which 175 billion euros was labeled “problematic” by the Bank of Spain last year. Notice that construction activity declined throughout this period in Germany.  












Corporates across manyof these peripheral economies binged on these inflows. As the graphic below shows, corporate borrowings boomed, especially in countries like Spain. Again Germany stands out in its restraint. As the Times recently wrote, the Spanish debt crisis is built on corporate borrowing, and its nonfinancial private sector debt at 134% of GDP is higher than any major economy in the world with the exception of Ireland.


















There are two immediate crises that need to be addressed. The most important is the banking crisis, which directly impinges on institutions in the center and the periphery. The core economy banks remain heavily heavily exposed to the peripheral economy banks. As the saying goes, it becomes your problem if someone has borrowed a million dollars as against a few hundred dollars. If recent events are any indication, Spain looks set to go down the Ireland route and nationalize its banking system so as to avert a full-fledged banking crisis.

A series of reform measures have been announced by Spain, where three-fifths of Spanish banks’ €310bn property lending exposure is “problematic”. Increased provisioning for bad loans, including the possibility of a "bad bank" (like was done in Ireland in 2009) to house these "problematic" loans, so as to restore market confidence and ease the credit markets, are among the reforms. Then there are the larger Eurozone reforms required - ECB to become a lender of last resort, the creation of a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund. One immediate policy change could be to permit the euro zone’s new bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, to lend directly to struggling banks rather than solely to national governments.

Then there is the challenge to prop up economic activity. The private sector is hobbled with the double whammy of badly bruised balance sheets and badly frozen credit markets. Households too are in no position to step in with the big-bang required to boost aggregate demand. In the circumstances, there is no alternative to some form of government spending and significant external support. In a recent FT op-ed Nouriel Roubini suggested "monetary easing by the ECB, a weaker euro, fiscal stimulus in the core, less front-loaded austerity in the periphery, more international firewalls and debt mutualisation".

But unfortunately, austerity remains the preferred medicine. A starving man is now being deprived off his only remaining source of food. And all this, even at the cost of pushing him to death, is to drive home the message of prudence and eliminate any moral hazard of him becoming lazier still. 

Saturday, May 12, 2012

Income concentration in India

Just 1.25% of India's income tax assessees, or 406,000 people, with annual earnings above Rs 2 million paid Rs 932 bn or 63% of total personal income tax collections in 2011-12! Our total tax-payer base is 32.5 million.

Which is the most elite school in the world?

Just under half of France’s 40 largest companies are run by graduates of just two schools: ENA, the national school of administration, and the École Polytechnique, which trains the country’s top engineers. Together the schools produce only about 600 graduates a year. There are fewer than 6,000 ENA graduates alive today, compared with at least 160,000 Oxford alumni.
(HT: Times)

Thursday, May 10, 2012

Some lessons from the sub-prime crisis responses

There are very few counterfactuals in social sciences. The closest to such a counterfactual are the contrasting responses of US and Europe to resolving their respective financial market crises. Though in recent months, Europe has taken steps to emulate the US, the initial responses across both sides of the Atlantic bear a striking contrast.

In the US, at the first signs of the sub-prime crisis bursting, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve aggressively intervened to contain the damage. The Treasury came forward with its Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) to directly assist the beleaguered banks and other financial institutions with equity injections. The Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet many times and initiated quantitative easing programs to emerge as the lender, insurer, and buyer of last resort for the financial markets.

However, across the Atlantic, driven both by lack of similar political resolve and strong ideological predilections, the Eurozone governments and the European Central Bank refrained from aggressive intervention. They let events take their own course in the hope that markets would soon resolve the issue. Credit markets froze, driving up sovereign debt yields and nearly shutting off the peripheral economies. Banks, saddled with massive sovereign debt exposures, stumbled to the brink. The ECB refused to lend either to the banks or the battered sovereigns. It stepped in finally only when the situation had worsened considerably.

The contrasting fortunes of both economies, atleast their respective financial sectors, is a clear verdict on the policy courses followed on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe stares at a potential Japan like financial dystopia, whereas American financial institutions have recovered smartly and are back to doing all those things that caused the sub-prime crisis! However, there are a few quick learnings from the situations across both sides,

1. The loudest message from the two different courses of action is that markets do not repair themselves and when faced with such deep financial market crises, governments and central banks have to step in with aggressive policies.This becomes all the more important as the complexity of our banking systems increase and the too-big-to-fail syndrome become entrenched.

2. Related to this is the central and disproportionate importance that financial markets have come to assume in determing the economic fortunes of a country. Despite the fact that the financial sector occupies a far less share of both the economy and the working population, its good health is critical to the fortunes of any modern economy.

3. Similar to the stark contrast between the US and European responses is the difference between the responses by the US Government and the Fed to the condition of over-leveraged financial institutions and debt-ridden individual households. The latter received nothing like the unlimited and cheap liquidity injections, debt rescheduling at very favorable terms, and sweeping credit guarantees offered to the financial institutions. Household foreclosures, even when it happened in a massive scale, became a source of concern only when it threatened to affect an exposed financial institution.

In other words, the disciplining elements of the free-markets are reserved for individual households and small business firms, while the financial sector behemoths, the much trumpeted success stories of deregulated free-market capitalism, face no such constraints. The negative externalities created by financial institutions do not get internalized.

4. All this highlights the increasingly sharp cleavage between the real economy and the financial markets. Are the gains of the financial markets, especially their outsized wins, coming at the expense of the real economy? Is there a recession or even a depression lurking at the end of a sustained period of financial market boom? The financial markets, especially in their current avatar, appear to have become too big a systemic risk to be left as it is.

Wednesday, May 9, 2012

The great lending reversal

Historical stereotypes show that the rich owed a great share of their incomes to leverage. They invested borrowed money in remunerative enterprises and leveraged it to raise their incomes. In contrast, the middle-class and poor were seen as debt-averse and relying on debt only when forced into it. However, as this IMF study indicates, the roles, atleast in terms of the debt-aversion of the non-rich, appear to have changed. Sample this evidence from the US,
In 1983, the top 5 percent had 80 cents of debt for every dollar of income, while the remaining 95 percent had 60 cents for every dollar. By 2007, after decades in which an increasing share of income flowed to the top, the situation had reversed. The top 5 percent had 65 cents of debt for every dollar of income, while the remaining 95 percent had $1.40 in debt for every dollar.



The authors use cross-country data and develop models that try to simulate changes in income distribution and household debt to GDP ratios and its impact on the economy. Their DGSE model, where workers income shares decline at the expense of investors, show,
Loans to workers from domestic and foreign investors support aggregate demand and result in current account deficits. Financial liberalization helps workers smooth consumption, but at the cost of higher household debt and larger current account deficits. In emerging markets, workers cannot borrow from investors, who instead deploy their surplus funds abroad, leading to current account surpluses instead of deficits.  
In other words, the only way to sustain high levels of consumption and national aggregate demand growth in the face of stagnant incomes was for poor and middle-class households to borrow. And its result is widening inequality and eventual debt-default which brings down the whole economic edifice. 

They therefore argue that the only sustainable way to reduce this is to address the critical issue of stagnant incomes. It is now well-established that markets do not generate efficient outcomes with income distribution. The prevailing balance of power in the economic structure and its hand-maiden political establishment, are too skewed to generate the desired level of income distribution.

To address the immediate challenge of debt-reduction among households, an "orderly debt reduction" wherein the process takes a few years may be the most appropriate method. In the medium to long-run, given the skewed distribution of incomes between labour and capital, this market failure will have to be addressed through an institutionalized mechanism that restores some element of collective bargaining. 

India's ratings plateau?

The S&P recently put India on the watchlist for a ratings revision downwards from its current investment grade. Without debating the merits of the downgrade, there is a troubling trend from this, especially when comparing our ratings trend to that of other emerging economies.

The graphic below, a composite measure of the ratings of all the three major rating agencies, shows that India moved up to investment grade rating in January 2007. However, unlike all its other partners, in a fairly accurate reflection of the political paralysis that has gripped the country, it has remained there for the past more than five years.
 

Tuesday, May 8, 2012

Why Able Abel has to be taxed?

Karl Smith points to this morality tale by Bryan Kaplan,
Suppose there are ten people on a desert island. One, named Able Abel, is extremely able.  With a hard day’s work, Able can produce enough to feed all ten people on the island.  Eight islanders are marginally able.  With a hard day’s work, each can produce enough to feed one person.  The last person, Hapless Harry, is extremely unable.  Harry can’t produce any food at all.
Questions:

1. Do the bottom nine have a right to tax Abel’s surplus to support Harry?
2. Suppose Abel only produces enough food to support himself, and relaxes the rest of the day.  Do the bottom nine have a right to force Abel to work more to support Harry?
3. Do the bottom nine have a right to tax Abel’s surplus to raise everyone‘s standard of living above subsistence?
4. Suppose Abel only produces enough food to support himself, and relaxes the rest of the day.  Do the bottom nine have a right to force Abel to work more to raise everyone‘s standard of living above subsistence?
How would most people answer these questions?  It’s hard to say.  It’s easy to feel sorry for the bottom nine.  But #1 and #3 arguably turn Abel into a slave.  And #2 and #4 clearly turn Abel into a slave.  I suspect that plenty of non-libertarians would share these libertarian moral intuitions.  At minimum, many would be conflicted.
The tale and the conclusions drawn lie at the heart of libertarian opposition to taxation and government intervention. But in the real world, the tale does not end as Kaplan envisions, but goes on. And here is a possible (among many) sequel.
Able Abel knows that he can produce more (of say, dates) and sell it to others and use the money realized to increase the quality of his leisure. He has heard of the neighbouring village island, Fishland, where he can pursue his dream hobby, fishing. So he strikes a deal with his other inhabitants. He offers to transfer a share of his extra production, if they help him with laying a road to transport his produce from the far-off fields to their village. 

Accordingly, the eight marginally able people sell one-fourth of their time to help Able Abel lay the road. However, taking pity on Harry, they also demand that he be provided subsistence feed by Able Abel, who readily agrees. Within three months the road is completed and simultaneously Able Abel has stored enough food for a week to cover his fishing expedition. 

He travels to Fishland and starts fishing. Now the people of Fishland find the dates which Abel eats irresistible and they offer him a deal. If Abel supplies them with ten bags of dates, they will in turn provide him accommodation for his fishing expeditions and also five buckets of fish, which he can take back and sell to his desert island villagers. Abel takes back fish samples to his village. As anticipated, his villagers like the fish and immediately agrees to buy it. 

But again the transportation problem crops up. Abel needs help to lay the road so as to transport dates and fish. Now it is a much longer road and needs help from the people of Fishland too. They all agree to contribute a share of their work in return for a share of Abel's earnings - dates for the people of Fishland and fishes for those from his village, including for Harry. And so the story goes on.
As can be seen, the fundamental issue here is not taxation or other transfers. Able Abel can pursue his economic activity only with help from his co-inhabitants. In the barter-world, this help comes in the form of work-sharing in return for a share of Abel's production. In the modern world, instead of the in-kind transfer, a share of his production or revenues is appropriated, in the form of taxation, to meet the cost of the infrastructure required to carry out that activity.

This help or support required to sustain an economic activity can be in many forms - maintenance of law and order to protect against thieves; mechanism to enforce contractual obligations; infrastructure to transport and store goods, and so on. It is unviable for individual economic agents to establish these support mechanisms. Someone has to co-ordinate the demands of all those needing these support systems and collect the cost required to establish and maintain them. The government steps in to provide them in return for a share in their incomes, in the form of taxation.

As I have blogged earlier, the abler, and consequently those more likely to be rich and well-off, generally benefit greater from these support systems. It is therefore only appropriate that they bear a greater share of the cost required to establish and maintain these systems.

Just as the eight villagers sympathized with Harry and demanded that Abel provide him with a share of Abel's produce in return for their labour to construct the road, there are certain underlying currents of morality in any society. Once social agreement on them break-down, Harry would not be able to rely on society to provide for him. Thankfully, societies today collectively agree on certain minimum moral principles, whose fulfillment they seek to achieve by setting apart a share of the proceeds from the taxation revenues. In simple terms, their willingness to contribute to the establishment of the support systems (which help people like Able Abel disproportionately) is conditional on the fulfillment of these moral obligations. 

To paraphrase Adam Smith, the villagers of the desert island and Harry get a share of Able Abel's produce not because of charity or some moral code or government expropriation, but because his own self-interest encourages Abel to strike the deal.