More on the dissonance between the reality and international development research

I have blogged on several occasions about the disconnect between international development actors and the messy realities of development. In this post, I'll argue that some of the most important assumptions of development economics research and development funding not only have little basis but also distorts the debates. 

In a recent article Dani Rodrik alluded to the diversity problem in development economics research. 

Nearly 90% of authors in the top eight journals are based in the United States and Western Europe. Moreover, the situation seems similar with these publications’ editorial board membership... East Asia produces nearly one-third of global economic output, yet economists based in the region contribute less than 5% of the articles in major journals. Similarly, the shares of publications from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are minute, and significantly lower than these regions’ already small weight in the world economy.

This is the elephant in the room. From the perspective of practising insiders within governments in developing countries, despite their salience in international development conversations, it's stunning how little recent development research has contributed to improving actual development practice. In the spirit of provoking, I cannot recall any insight or instrument generated and popularised mainly by development research over the last three decades that would be of meaningful enough value to a practitioner in a developing country.  

For all practical purposes, the main contribution of international development research is to have built an eco-system which has built careers and reputations of well-intentioned but ill-informed foreigners. This stands no chance of any change without the geographic composition of researchers changing dramatically.

This post will try to clarify on some common misconceptions associated with the idea of evidence-based policy making, the latest fad in international development. 

The idea is that since much of public policy is made based on whims and fancies of politicians and bureaucrats, and therefore invariably falls short on outcomes, there is a strong case for using evidence of impact to design new policies. This narrative assumes that existing policy is free of evidence, most public policy fails to generate desired outcomes, and policies get made on fresh slates as altogether new interventions. As I have blogged earlier, while there is an element of truth in each, it's completely wrong to accept these assumptions as the default in development practice.  

These assumptions themselves emerge from the wrong belief that new interventions are a major part of the universe of development programs. Instead, the universe of interventions possible in any sector are mostly well-known, as also the implementation pathways and methods, and failings and deficiencies associated with implementation. Novelty and uncertainty, which demand innovation and rigorous evaluations, are relevant only at the margins. 

In other words, in its essentials, basic development in practice, in large measure, is about doing more of the same, albeit marginally better and quicker. Often technology can help. 

Contrary to the conventional wisdom which underpins these assumptions, instead of treading into unknown territory, most of basic economic, political, and social development is about treading the well-known path. The likes of innovation and efficacy evidence come at the margins. At the least, given the prevailing level of outcomes, the challenge is about getting from poor to average or at best satisfactory, and hardly about moving from good to great. And, this does not generally demand significant departures from standard practice. 

Consider the two most important sectors of education and health. The delivery of education requires the availability of schools, teachers, instructional materials and pedagogy techniques. Similarly, the delivery of health care requires focus on public sanitation and personal hygiene, and the availability of diagnostic facilities, hospitals, doctors and medical personnel for treatment. Realisation of outcomes in both health and education demands provider capacity, rigorous monitoring, and behaviour or attitude changes among all stakeholders. Again in the spirit of provoking, the likes of (most of what's peddled as) Edtech and (disproportionate focus on) health insurance, at least in the low income settings of developing countries, are costly distractions. 

Or take the examples of increasing property tax revenues and reducing electricity distribution losses. As I have blogged earlier, instead of focusing on the messy plumbing issues like physical audits and enforcement actions, opinion makers find comfort in the neatness of technology solutions like SCADA, GIS, and smart meters whose value is, at best, marginal. Evaluating these through rigorous research does not add much of relevance to the body of development practice. 

In this context, it's also worth drawing attention to the role of inputs. In many sectors, the focus on inputs have become a pejorative terms among development opinion makers. It's widely believed that somehow if you throw in innovation and align incentives through outcomes-based financing, magically everything will fall into place and outcomes will be delivered. I have blogged here, here, here, here and here about the failings with such thinking.

Just as adoption of Edtech depends on access to a tablet or computer, the delivery of education depends on schools with infrastructure and teachers. In either case, these are basic requirements and only take you to the starting line. In both cases, the realisation of outcomes depend on the quality of inputs and the manner of their use or implementation.

(If anyone is thinking of Edtech as an innovation to significantly improve the quality of public school education in realising student learning outcomes at scale, I disagree strongly. But that's for another post.)

Some other examples of this obsession with innovation and outcomes measurement include the questioning of prioritising public spending on roads and electricity, favouring the generation of electricity by kicking soccer balls instead of setting up thermal or hydro plants, prioritising subsistence entrepreneurship through micro-loans and income generation through the likes of chicken and cattle instead of wage employment creation, and advocating cash transfers instead of ensuring food security through public distribution of food grains.  

Even if researchers are not suggesting simple dichotomies, their research and its advocacy have had the effect of influencing the narrative of international development discourse for the worse by favouring such "kinky development" ideas as Lant Pritchett describes them.  

Despite this reality, there is a reason why this paradigm dominates international development discourses despite the dominant reality of doing more of the same. Instead of funding ongoing national programs, for a variety of reasons, multilateral and bilateral aid organisations and philanthropic funders generally prefer supporting something new. It's a different matter that there are very few meaningful enough "new" things, and most often the ostensibly "new" donor funded programs are mere repackaging of existing programs with cosmetic variations. 

In simple terms, the priorities of donors and imperatives of foreign funding coupled with the dominance of foreign researchers has distorted the discourse on international development.