A short recent history of Ukraine

While we are all focused on the trends in the war and the politics surrounding it, it may be useful to step back and examine Ukraine's recent history. Making my work simple, this FT article nicely captures a short post-2000 history of Ukraine,

Ukraine’s birth in 1991 was bloodless to the point of anticlimax: with the Soviet Union beginning to fray, parliament adopted a declaration of independence in August 1991 which was then endorsed by about 90 per cent of voters in a referendum. It was followed by years of dysfunction that unfolded in parallel with the post-Soviet transformation of Russia... Ukraine was also hobbled by a deep rift between the east of the country — largely Moscow-leaning, with a complex network of ethnic and cultural ties to Russia — and the more nationalistic, Ukrainian-speaking, pro-European west. In the post-independence era this split began to deepen, with fateful consequences for the whole country...

Then in 2004 the east-west cleavage triggered a massive political crisis that culminated in an event Ukrainians still call the Orange revolution. In that year’s presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych, a politician from the Russian-speaking east who was backed by Putin, defeated Viktor Yushchenko, a centrist supported by the centre and west of Ukraine. But mass protests over vote-rigging prompted a rerun of the ballot, which was this time won by Yushchenko. Yanukovych came to power anyway, in the 2010 elections. But the east-west tensions intensified and with them the debate about Ukraine’s future direction: should it aspire to be part of Europe or cling ever tighter to Russia? That unresolved question came to the fore in 2013 when Yanukovych unexpectedly pulled Ukraine out of a long-negotiated pact with the EU, triggering months of protests. He ended up fleeing Kyiv as Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity swept the old order from power... in the chaos that ensued, Russia annexed Crimea and fomented a revolt in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, where pro-Kremlin separatists declared two breakaway statelets.

It's worth examining the country's post-independence economic history. Adam Tooze points to this stunning fact in very illuminating blog,

Ukraine’s performance between 1990 and 2017 was not just worse than its European neighbors. It was the fifth worst in the entire world. Between 1990 and 2017 there were all told only 18 countries with negative cumulative growth and even in that select group, Ukraine’s performance puts it in the bottom third. Amongst the four countries that delivered less growth for their citizens than Ukraine were the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Yemen... A self-determining country with Ukraine’s great human and natural resources, whose polity is fraught but not failed, has experienced a generational stagnation, not at the high level of income enjoyed by Italy, for instance, but at 20 percent below its late-Soviet level.

The IMF article blames it on a combination of low investment and declining population. 

Clearly, the country has been ravaged by civil wars and political instability since its independence. But things did not improve even under its pro-western leaders.  In fact, as the FT article shows, despite his current rightly deserved popularity, public trust personally in President Volodymyr Zelensky and in Ukrainian public institutions has been very low. In fact, as recently as July 2021, nearly 55% of population did not trust him, and less than 20% had any trust in him! Trust in critical public institutions is minimal or negligible. 

In light of these, it's hard not to feel that Ukraine has been Europe's failed state. This makes it all the more easier for the likes of Putin to meddle in the country's affairs. And this also means that, if a compromise happens and Russians pull back, one should be cautious about putting too much faith in President Zelensky's ability to create a new Ukraine. Zelensky's track record does not offer any confidence. Any western strategy towards Ukraine should keep this in mind - don't put all eggs in the Zelensky basket. 

As the FT writes, the invasion appears to have forged a remarkable unity across the country and boosted Ukrainian nationalism. The Russians clearly miscalculated the depth of Ukrainian nationalism, as opposition and anger at Russians have become all too evident even in Russian speaking cities like Kharkiv. Perhaps things may have been different if Ukraine had fallen quickly. But now with the prolonged nature, the horrific pictures of indiscriminate bombings, and the brave resistance by President Zelensky, any hopes Russia may have had of putting in place a stable pro-Russian regime has completely disappeared, not only for now but perhaps for at least a generation. Even if Kyiv falls, occupation will 

In fact, given where we are, it can be argued that it's perhaps in Russia's interest to ensure that Kyiv does not fall. The best scenario for Russia now would be to have President Zelensky continue in power with some compromise agreement which amends the Ukrainian constitution (which enshrines the country's aspiration to join NATO) and foreswears any formal military entanglement with the west. For if Kyiv falls and Russia has to install a regime to run the country, the occupation will have to be in the face of deep resistance and limited acquiescence, and will cost Russia an unaffordable cost. It can ruin Russia and put it back decades, both its economy and society.