In an NBER working paper, David Laibson and Johanna Mollerstrom (and here) show that global savings rates did not show a robust upward trend during the period (1996-2006) (in fact it actually declined) nor was there an investment boom in the countries that imported capital.
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They argue that these capital flows from emerging economies coincided with asset bubbles (in equity markets and then real estate markets) in developed economies (they do not examine the reasons why the asset bubbles got inflated in the first place) and contributed to amplifying them. The asset bubbles in turn created a wealth effect and triggered off a consumption boom, which in turn boosted imports and widended trade deficits. In other words, the capital imports were consumed and not invested.
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They find that the asset bubble framework quantitatively explains the large current account defcit of the US (peaking at 6%) and the modest increase in investment during the same period (less than 2% of GDP). In their sample of 18 OECD countries and China, they find that movements in home prices alone explain half of the variation in trade deficits.
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