"Second-best" solutions to resolving civil wars

In a world of "best practice" models, it has long been the acknowledged wisdom that civil conflicts in developing countries, especially in Africa, can be solved only by encouraging democratic exercise of power and eliminating despotic warlords who have seized power. This poses problems in finding solutions to many of the sub-national strifes in Africa, where local warlords carve out their exclusive jurisdictions and exploit the area and its people, plundering their rich natural resource base.

The international community has consistently refused to recognize the reality of these strong local centers of power, represented by the victorious warlords, and have responded by imposing economic sanctions. This stalemate in turn benefits and most often ends up strengthening the warlord's position (they manage to focus local discontent on the hardship caused by the sanctions), while causing severe hardship and deprivation for the poor residents of the area.

Now Chris Blattman makes a bold suggestion that the relationship between a local warlord and his exploited local residents be formalized through a legal arrangement, wherein the illegitimate enterprise be converted into a legitimate economic activity. The economic activity would then be regulated and subjected to all the regular checks and controls and taxes. Such a "second-best" arrangement acknowledges the reality of the warlord's de-facto authority, but tries to incentivize him to exercise internationally accepted norms of ruler-ruled relationship.

The warlord benefits by way of international (and formal domestic) recognition for his authority over the area, in return for adhering to responsible norms of governance and repsect for democratic rights. The local residents therefore escape exploitation by their rulers. The warlord trades his exploitative policies for domestic and international legitimacy.

As the example of Uganda shows, over time the remaining traces of exploitative practices recede and the residents gain enough power to even remove their rulers, mostly through democratic process. This sets the platform for the development of more organic and accountable governance structures.

There is atleast one precedent in history for this arrangement. This is something similar to the dilution of the Mughal empire by the jagirdari system (the local Mughal generals were granted revenue collection jurisdiction over their areas, as jagirs) in India of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which may have played a significant role in expediting the transition from monarchy to democracy in the country.

An extension of this logic would be to recognize victorious warlords, but only under certain conditions, wherein they agree to abide by international conventions on civilized behaviour and adherence to basic human rights. It is surely an experiment worth attempting.