Politicians and time frames

This is a little outlandish idea, though I have a feeling that the day is not far when this may become the norm! One of the most common complaints about politicians is that they suffer from very short time horizon biases. This results in decision making that is distorted by immediate and short-term considerations.

In an age when most human activities or occupations,especially those in the private sector, are measured for specific outcomes, the politician remains completely insulated from the trend. It is important that the incentives of our politicians be aligned with the demands and objectives of our society and economy. How can this be done?

I suggest that every serving politician be registered under the Election Commission (EC) and have an account. It should be made mandatory for all candidates to clearly outline their manifesto in terms of quantified outcomes, rather than mere normative statements. A general schedule of desirable economic or social parameters must clearly be specified by the EC or a Government agency like the Planning Commission, and made available to all the candidates. The outcomes should be constituency specific. By this, the candidate would perforce have to study the implications of all his promises in detail and give more specific outcome linked commitments. It will also significantly reduce the moral hazard inherent in "issueless elections".

In the event of the successful candidate failing to achieve his clearly outlined outcomes, he should be penalized certain points for each such deficiency. Also as an incentive, every fulfillment of outcome should be rewarded. A points matrix can be developed that would penalize or reward the candidate on each specified outcome, depending on the extent of achievement or deficiency. A certain band of achievement or deficiency can be provided as a buffer, so as to take into account the uncertainities inherent in such statistical estimations. A force majeure clause can also be included, which accounts for those sharp disruptions that are outside the control of the politician and which affected achievement of the specified outcomes.

During every election, the outcome achievement account of all candidates should be made public, so that voters make informed choices on each candidate. This will itself play an important role in influencing people's choices.

The candidate should have the points added to or deducted from his vote share in each election. The maximum deduction should not exceed 10 or 20% of the votes received by the candidate, so as to ensure that the sanctity of popular voting is not diluted significantly. Such deductions will be irrelevant in landslide verdicts, when the people have decisively voted in favor of the incumbent. It will however play a critical role in tight contests, where the mandate is not decisive. In such cases it makes some sense to bring in some objectivity to decide the outcome.

This will incentivize the candidate from the moral hazard of being short term in his outlook. There can be variation in the way in which the points are considered for each candidate during counting in the next election. Insteead of comparing the actual performance outcomes of each candidate with his manifesto commitment, we can compare that with the commitment of the second placed candidate in the previous election.

What are the advantages? It would make the elections more issue-based. By committing on specific outcomes, the candidates will also open themselves and their manifestoes up to more intense scrutiny. Any candidate claiming an unachievable level of outcomes will soon be found out in the ensuing debate. In any case, such candidates stand less chance of getting elected.

Is this difficult to administer? No, it is similar to the performance parameters judging many contractual agreements. The problem however, lies with defining the schedule of parameters and also the accuracy or otherwise of such quantified figures.

But despite all these formidable challenges, there is nothing wrong in making a start. The EC can commit election candidates to clearly specify their outcome proposals in their manifesto and can monitor the performance of each successful candidate in terms of achieving these outcomes. A record of their performance can be kept, and the system fine-tuned over one or two elections, and then may be experimentally tried out in a few constituencies.

To start with, I will suggest a template for Councillors in local bodies. The following outcome parameters can be suggested.
1. Length of roadways laid - internal and main roads (separately if needed)
2. Drain length laid - internal and major outfall drains
3. Number of new water connections
4. Number of new Sewerage connections
5. Number of new streetlights
6. Number of new Self Help Groups formed and linked
7. Any other parameter, which captures the local priorities

The candidates may be asked to disclose specific targets on each parameter, and an account of achievements maintained. An achievement of upto 50 or 75% can be given a fixed number of credits, and 1 credit awarded for every 5% surplus. Similarly, a penalty of two credits can be imposed for every 5% deficit. Upto 10% votes can be deducted (or normalized downwards) for over 50% shortfall in achievement, with 1% deduction for every 5% shortfall.