Paul Krugman makes an interesting comparison between the relative paths adopted by Iceland and Ireland when faced with similar financial crises. He describes the relative success, till now, of Iceland and the disaster looming on Ireland, as the triumph of heterodoxy over orthodoxy in economic policy making.
In both cases, the crisis could be traced to irresponsible lending by banks and borrowing by real estate and other businesses. And businesses and borrowers in both ran up massive amounts of external debts. When faced with their respective decision-moments, the responses could not have been starker.
Nearly 18 months back, Iceland responded by making "foreign lenders to its runaway banks pay the price of their poor judgment, rather than putting its own taxpayers on the line to guarantee bad private debts". The result was a number of private sector bankruptcies, which also "led to a marked decline in external debt". It also introduced capital controls to prevent sudden capital flight by foreign and domestic investors. It refrained from destabilizing its Nordic social welfare model with the standard fiscal austerity measures like spending cuts.
In contrast, faced with the prospect of huge losses for banks and their irresponsible foreign lenders, the "Irish government stepped in to guarantee the banks’ debt, turning private losses into public obligations". The result is that the debts got transferred from the banks to the Irish Government's balance sheet. At the first signs of trouble, it imposed a series of "savage fiscal austerity" measures in order to restore "market confidence". And followed it with more doses of the austerity medicine.
The "confidence fairy" has responded in the most unexpected manner to the actions of both governments. If the supporters of the "confidence fairy" hypothesis were correct, Iceland should have been ravaged by the bond-vigilantes and Ireland should have been ovewhelmed by a rush in market confidence. The results have been exactly the opposite. The bond markets continue to savage Ireland, whose bond yields and CDS spreads continue to rise steeply despite nearly three years of austerity. However, Iceland has made a smart recovery, both its economy and the financial markets, winning praise from even the IMF.
Its CDS spreads have fallen from 800 to less than 300, whereas Ireland's cost of insuring debt has risen precipitously from less than 200 to over 500 points.
In fact, a testament of its success and the problems of the EU peripheral economies is the fact that Iceland's CDS spreads have fallen below that of even Spain.
And, unlike Ireland, being out of the single currency zone meant that Iceland could indulge in significant currency devaluation to increase the competitiveness of its exports.
In this context, Simon Johnson points to the odds stacked against Ireland being able to emerge out of its debts any time in the foreseeable future. He points to the fact the fact that atleast 20% of Irish GDP is from 'ghost corporations', attracted by Ireland's 12.5% corporate tax rate, that have little or no real activity in Ireland. This effectively means that the real debt burden of Ireland is more than 100% of the GNP and could rise to 150% of GNP in the next few years.
The steep fiscal contraction by way of spending cuts, especially at a time when the economy is set to contract for the third year in a row, will amplify the real debt burden. In the absence of a national currency, it cannot even devalue and increase the competitiveness of its exports. And given the extraordinary rise in asset valuations - property prices rose four times - any chances of asset prices rising to reduce the real debt burden is remote.
Further, this year, the government will run a deficit of 15% GNP, and with nominal GNP falling, it could well remain that high next year, even if the government cuts spending by the 2 to 3% of GNP currently envisaged. In other words, Irish economy would have to grow at close to its highest ever growth rates just to ensure that its debt share stays the same.
In the circumstances, it is certain that Ireland cannot resolve its debt crisis without some form of debt restructuring that forces lenders to take substantial haircuts. But coming in the way of this is the significant exposures of European banks to Irish debt.
It is estimated that the claims of foreign banks on Ireland are at over $500 billion. German banks are owed $139 billion, which is 4.2% of German GDP British banks are owed $131 billion, or about 5% of Great Britain’s GDP, French banks are owed $43.5 billion, which is approaching 2% of French GDP, and Belgian banks are owed $29 bn, or 5% of its GDP. None of these countries are likely to support measures that would effectively force their own banks to take losses on their Irish exposures.
Update 1 (29/11/2010)
Ireland becomes the second country after Greece within the Eurozone to accept a bailout. The 85 billion euro ($112 billion) bailout plan, at an average interest rate of 5.83% (compared Ireland's 10 year bond rate of close to 10%), includes a contribution of 17.5 billion euros by the Irish government itself through money it has already raised. Of the rest, 22.5 billion euros will come from the International Monetary Fund. The remaining 45 billion euros will come from bilateral loans from European nations and two European Union rescue funds set up in the spring.
Of this €10 billion will be used to immediately to recapitalise the banks to bring them up to a core tier 1 capital ratio of 12%, with a €25 billion contingency. The remaining €50 billion will be used to meet the budgetary requirements of the State. Under the Plan, Ireland will reduce its budget deficit to 3% of GDP by 2015.
Update 2 (3/12/2010)
Barry Eichengreen has the best article on the prospects for the Irish economy. It is in one word - brilliant!