Wednesday, July 26, 2017

Is Uber the world's biggest Ponzi scheme?

The Economist digs out this from the financials of Uber, which was valued at $68 bn in its last funding round in 2016,
Underlying pre-tax losses were $3bn-3.5bn last year and about $800m in the most recent quarter. Some $1bn-2bn of last year’s red ink was because of subsidies that Uber paid to drivers and passengers to draw them to its platform. At least another $1bn went on overheads and on developing driverless cars; money is also being splashed on a new food-delivery venture and a plan to build flying cars. To put its 2016 loss in perspective, that number was larger than the cumulative loss made by Silicon Valley’s least profit-conscious big company—Amazon—in 1995-2002. Measured by sales, Uber is the world’s 1,158th-biggest firm. Judged by cash losses, it ranks in the top 20. It is now eight years old, but still probably years away from being stable enough to make an initial public offering of shares. In contrast, Amazon went public at the age of three, Alphabet at six and Facebook at eight... 

A discounted cashflow model gives a sense of the leap of faith that Uber’s valuation requires. After adjusting for its net cash of $5bn and for its stake in Didi, worth $6bn, you have to believe that its sales will increase tenfold by 2026. Operating margins would have to rise to 25%, from about -80% today. That is a huge stretch. Admittedly, Amazon and Alphabet, two of history’s most successful firms, both grew their sales at least that quickly in the decade after they reached Uber’s level, and Facebook is likely to as well. But over the same periods these firms’ operating margins show an total average rise of only one percentage point. Put simply, Uber finds it desperately hard to make money. It is not clear that it breaks even reliably across the group of cities where it has been active for longest.
Put simply, with these numbers, it is no stretch to argue that Uber may well turn out to be the world's biggest Ponzi scheme - you keep acquiring customers by bleeding money till you can take it no longer and the last ones wearing the hat takes the hit! 

As I have blogged earlier, the challenge is even greater in developing countries like India where the market is so price sensitive that any significant increase in price is most likely to see largescale customer exits, thereby snuffing out the only end-game of ride-sharing firms. Further, unlike Ponzi schemes where just the remaining investors take the hit, there is also the massive social damage likely to be caused by the immiseration of poor drivers who would have taken loans to buy cars to work for Uber. 

The potential social negative externality that results from Uber's business model cries out loud for regulation. Ride-sharing and room-sharing are probably the only two large economic activities that take place in unregulated environments, where the negative externalities, and they are very significant, are completely externalised.

Monday, July 24, 2017

Limits to progress, economic growth, and capitalism?

FT has more on the challenges facing retail in the US from the e-commerce market,
Credit Suisse estimates that as many as 8,640 stores with 147m square feet of retailing space could close down just this year — surpassing the level of closures after the financial crisis and dotcom bust. The downturn is hitting the largely healthy US labour market — the retail industry has lost an average of 9,000 jobs a month this year, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, compared with average monthly job gains of 17,000 last year.
The dramatic flurry of retail stores construction in the US has been a major contributor to this disruption,
PwC estimates that there is about 24 sq ft of retailing floorspace per person in the US, compared with 11 sq ft in Australia — the only other developed country that comes close to the US — and between 2 and 5 sq ft in Europe.
Amazon with less that 10% of US retail sales forms nearly 40% of US retailing valuations, 
The online giant’s shares are now worth $477bn, more than half as much as the rest of the listed US retailing world... Online-only purchases account for just over 10 per cent of all US retail sales, but the share is growing quickly.
And this is true not just of retail, but also in hotel and travel industry,
Priceline and Expedia are now valued at a combined $114bn, almost as much as all the hotels and hospitality groups in the S&P 500, or the airlines.
On labour intensity in retail, this is a stunning statistic,
Goldman Sachs estimates that ecommerce companies only require 0.9 employees per $1m of sales compared with 3.5 for a bricks-and-mortar store, and the sector is on course to lose about 100,000 jobs this year. This may be small compared with the overall retail economy — which employs almost 16m — but it is likely only the beginning of a broad, accelerating trend as even more shopping migrates online.
I have three observations.

1. One of the things that we tend to assume with development and economic growth is that it is always good and brings progress. In the long-run, or the general equilibrium, adjustments are made and losers compensated, it is assumed. However, there is little basis for this assumption. It is a faith-based argument. As Tyler Cowen has written recently, the pain and suffering associated with Industrial Revolution, was far from transient and tolerable. And unlike the 1700s, such adjustments are most likely to be even less acceptable. 

In general, there is nothing to suggest why automation should be accompanied by all the required labour market adjustments. In fact, what if in the future there are less human beings engaged in the work-force? There is no sound basis for the optimism of the techno-optimists. 

In the circumstances, being more cautious with the wholesale adoption of unqualified automation, even if it appears against progress, may not be that bad an idea. Public policy may need to more specifically explore the options to protect and keep meaningfully engaged those most vulnerable to labour market displacement from such trends. If we can exercise restraint on human cloning, we can as well be cautious on the adoption of driverless cars.

2. There is nothing to support the belief that economic growth of this generation and a couple earlier is the natural order of things. It is well-acknowledged that the growth spurt since the late nineteenth-century has not only been unprecedented but also outside the norm for centuries of human existence, and there is therefore nothing to suggest that it should continue. 

In fact, an empirical assessment points to a secular trend of stagnating incomes across the developed world. The Times points to an MGI analysis of 2016 that found 81% of the US, 97% of Italian, 70% of British, and 63% of French populations fall in an income bracket with flat or declining incomes over the last decade.

A world where economic growth is just enough to sustain living standards, while difficult to accept for our generation, should not signal doom. On a historic sweep, even if we are able to sustain the current living standards, with marginal and very gradual increases, it may be a big achievement. The far less desirable, but more likely eventuality (than another century of growth similar to the past century), is a decline in living standards.

3. Finally, this raises more questions about the sustainability of free-market capitalism. What if the inexorable dynamic of the market forces playing themselves out is a world without adequate work to support the billions and results in meaningless lives and pitiable suffering? On a 40-50 year horizon, I see no reason why this scenario is any less less plausible than the widely accepted argument that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" will eventually end up in an centralised and authoritarian system like in the Stalinist Soviet Union.

Update 1 (25.07.2017)

This - India won't allow driverless cars - is good public policy! 

Saturday, July 22, 2017

Is Reliance Jio the biggest product launch ever?

Reliance Jio, the telecommunications service offering of Reliance Industries, has courted controversy with its aggressive launch and pricing strategy. But that controversy aside, the scale of its launch has been truly spectacular. Consider this,
Reliance Jio launched its 4G service commercially on September 5, 2016 offering free data and voice services. It crossed 50 million subscribers in just a matter of 83 days, and 100 million in 170 days, having added an average 6 lakh subscribers per day.
Even when compared to anything the Chinese have done across sectors, this is something truly staggering. And to have done it without the technical and logistical glitches associated with product launches  and project roll-outs in such scale is a massive achievement. To have managed the logistics of customer acquisition and the challenge of the explosive load growth on technology systems is very impressive. 

And, it appears that there is more to come,
JioPhone, a 4G VoLTE feature phone called ‘India ka Smartphone’... is a feature phone, but with a larger screen, access to apps and of course 4G data and 4G VoLTE calls and will effectively cost the customer Rs 0 for the device and Rs 153 per month as monthly tariff... The target is to make 5 million phones available every week. The JioPhone will always have free voice calls. From August 15, the JioPhone will come with free unlimited data. A similar quantity of data on any other operator’s network would cost up to Rs 5000 a month... The phone has been created by Indian engineers for an Indian audience, Mukesh Ambani said, “made in India for Indian users”. The phone will offer an innovative cable link to television to help users view content on a big screen at home. Users will need to buy the Jio Dhan Dhana Dhan package of Rs 309 to get the extra data needed for this. The phone also responds to voice commands, which is unprecedented for a feature phone anywhere in the world.
It begs the question whether the Jio is the most accomplished launch of any technical product or solution by public or private sector across the world?

Thursday, July 20, 2017

The plumbing of third party audits

This study of third party audits of polluting industrial units in Gujarat is highly acclaimed. It claims to provide evidence that independent third-party audits are effective at reducing environmental pollution.

In brief, in response to a High Court directive, certain types of highly polluting industrial units in Gujarat had commissioned and had been filing thrice-a-year third party audit reports since 1996. Instead of being paid by the firms themselves, once the auditor payments were made from a central pool (money raised by researchers) and audits conducted randomly, there was a significant increase in reporting of pollution readings and reduction in actual pollution itself. In order to strengthen their theory of change, the J-PAL researchers also conducted explicitly announced random sample back-check super audits of each auditor and their payments were made contingent on the accuracy of the original audits (compared to the back-check super audits).

Similar third-party audits of polluting industries are being done by some states, either directly or through outsourced management of emission/effluent discharge sensors. In the circumstances, I struggle to understand the likely incremental benefits of an RCT evaluation of third party audits to monitor pollution. Of course, third party audits will reduce pollution. And perceptive environmental protection officials across states are aware of its utility. 

So, did the research provide anything that was valuable for real world life? In the real-world of weak state capacity, effective management of third-party audits itself is a massive task. The back-check super audits make the task even more onerous. Since the back-checks were conducted under the supervision of enthusiastic and committed research associates, were known to the industries, and auditor payments were made contingent on original audits tallying with the super audits, the original audits could not but not have become high stakes and thereby also high quality. The RCT established the efficacy of this particular double-audit design.

Unfortunately, such a two-level audit, which achieves both high stakes and high quality in this manner, while desirable, is too engagement intensive to stand a chance of effective scale up through weak public systems. If instead the research had proved the efficacy of one-level audits, that would have been of at least some practical value (maybe a technical rationale for an interested bureaucrat to push through the reform).

Like with this, I am puzzled by such research endeavours and the attention that it commands in the academic arena. Third party audits or certifications are today common place in monitoring everything from engineering works to the quality of goods procured and services delivered. In countries like India, over the last decade or so, third party quality audits, ostensibly of random samples and carried out unannounced, have come to be embraced for engineering works executed by all departments, big and small, urban and rural. It has undoubtedly contributed to improving the quality of these works, and where done well the benefits are very significant. 

If the authors were interested in showing that how the auditors are paid shape incentives, they need not have taken the trouble since there is a rich body of literature on the problems with ratings shopping by financial institutions. 

The researchers found at least two channels of incentive distortion with the earlier approach. One, an agency problem arising from the auditors being paid by the audited. Two, the auditors being paid significantly less than would have been required to conducted good audits. 

It is difficult to believe that the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (PCB) did not know what was going on. I can think of at least four first-order plumbing reasons why the PCB preferred to go along with the charade than adopt what were obvious (if atleast because they were being done in other sectors) reforms. One, these reports were being generated at the instance of the High Court and being reported to them. As long as the Court was happy, there was no reason nor inherent motivation for the PCB to change the system. Such pro-forma compliance with regulatory requirements is commonplace in bureaucracies. Two, if the government decided to do the audits, there was the question of who would pay for it, not to mention the “headache” of managing this additional administrative responsibility. Three, there are strong vested interests among the polluting industries that prefer the status quo. And regulatory capture, especially in such high stakes sectors (the difference between business as usual and pollution compliance for these firms is in many cases a matter of survival itself), is always imminent. Four, whether we like it or not, pollution control is a marginal concern for most state governments as they chase economic growth and job creation. To this extent, officials posted in such Departments are unlikely to be those with the greatest interest and enthusiasm to pursue painstaking reforms.

The issues of relevance for practitioners with third party audits are more in the plumbing. There at least a few that come to mind immediately. What should be the most cost-effective design of third party audits? What can be done to mitigate the risk of capture of such audits? How can the audits respond to dynamic expectations? And, how can the audits be financed?

In case of an engineering work, the most cost-effective design would focus on the least number of samples with the longest periodicity that would not compromise on deterrence. As regards addressing capture, inspections may not only have to be random but also done by personnel on rotation, and the agencies themselves may have to be shuffled periodically or multiple agencies employed. As to dynamic expectations, it may be necessary to periodically revisit the audit criteria and calibrate for the adaptations. On financing, it may be required for the PCBs to commission and finance the audits and, maybe, recover a part of the cost as a user-fee (or from the fines collected, though it could have perverse incentives) paid into a common pool. 

Ultimately what the practitioner needs is an administratively simple and workable third-party audit design. Or more specifically, he or she would want a tender document that captures these design specifications. The aforesaid research does not provide anything of relevance on this. 

Let me be clear that the purpose of this or an earlier post is not to downplay the importance of field experiments or economics research in such areas. They have undoubted value. Research, even without out a utilitarian dimension, is valuable. At the least, it provides some basis for a government official sitting on the fence to bite the bullet with independent and/or random sampled audits. 

Readers should note that there is nothing Gujarat or even India-specific to the plumbing issues. They are universal to any developing country with weak state capacity. So many of the plumbing features that could have been tested are generalisable. An opportunity has been missed, and more worryingly, we may not even be aware that these are the real challenges. 

These posts are motivated by my strong belief that field research rarely ever start with a felt-need or felt-problem for the primary stakeholder, most often government officials. While there are also practical difficulties, inadequate comprehension of the real plumbing challenges among researchers is the bigger obstacle to engaging directly with the problem. It does appear that, contrary to this, the best plumbers, outside of actual plumbers, are the practitioners themselves. Plumbing knowledge is a lived experience.

Monday, July 17, 2017

Thoughts on urban governance reforms

The issue of direct elections to the post of Mayor is a recurrent theme in Indian politics. A good status report is here

My preference is for directly elected and empowered executive Mayor, with a Council, and assisted by a Commissioner or Secretary, coupled with a few other reforms. 

But the case for a directly elected Mayor is complicated by the likelihood of political stalemate arising from a Mayor and Corporation being from different parties. Hence the argument for an indirectly elected Mayor. But this, in turn, has its flip side. 

The effectiveness of a Mayoral system comes from it throwing up ambitious and incentive aligned Mayors (who see the Mayoral system as a primary for bigger political offices). This is unlikely to emerge from an indirectly elected Mayoral system. As an example, just see this - Kolkata Mayor getting nominated from among the Councillors by the CM (which CM would nominate a powerful person?). In simple terms, an indirectly elected Mayor while addressing the political stalemate problem, weakens the fundamental premise of a Mayoral system - a powerful and incentive aligned Mayor! Only a directly elected Mayor can address that.

We also need to keep in mind that different combinations of Mayoral systems have been tried out in different cities, even in Mumbai. We need to learn from them and be clear as to what is different now that would increase the likelihood that this time will be different. I will suggest at least three things.  

One, a Mayoral-Council cannot by itself be effective without some complementary levers. At the least, assuming a level of delegation of functions under 74th amendment and powers from the State Government, most of the executive powers of the Commissioner should be transferred to the Mayor, and of the Standing Committee to the Council. This should complement further devolution of powers under the 74th amendment. 

Two, there is a need to address the likelihood of political stalemates. One way of partially achieving that, done elsewhere in the West, is to have smaller boroughs (executively administered or through political councils) that have all the daily administrative powers in functional areas like sanitation, management of utility services, tax assessments, building permissions etc. Those Mayors largely deal with broad functional areas like transportation, housing, and economic growth which require city-wide planning and co-ordination. 

Appropriate division of responsibilities between the Mayor/Council and Ward Committees can help mitigate some of the political stalemate risks. The Ward Committees would have all the responsibilities and power over basic municipal functions. Mayor and Council will have policy making and planning powers and control over sectors like housing, transportation, and growth. Financial sanctioning powers will have to be distributed among Corporation, Mayor-in-Council, Mayor, Commissioner/Secretary, and Ward Committee. The Ward Committee will be serviced by an Assistant Commissioner or some such level official and supported by a small Secretariat. The cutting-edge functionaries would be accountable to the Ward Committee. It may be worthwhile re-considering the sizes of current wards or consolidating 4-6 wards under a functional unit like borough (Kolkata has 16 boroughs and 144 wards). 

Three, try this out in a 4-5 second and third tier cities for a five year term and assess what changes need to be made, especially in terms of the functional responsibilities of each level (so as to increase functional efficiency and accountability) as well as capacity requirements for Ward Committees. There should be simultaneous movement towards ring-fencing and corporatisation of at least the utilities. 

To summarise
  1. Directly elected Mayor and nominated Mayor-in-Council (from among elected Councillors) for a term of five years
  2. Executive power with Mayor 
  3. Commissioner to be Secretary to the Corporation
  4. Delegation of all basic municipal functional responsibilities to Ward Committees - a Secretariat to administer basic functional activities
  5. Mayor and Council's responsibilities to be confined to transportation, housing, and economic growth, and planning and policy support on other functional areas. 
  6. Delegation of financial powers among different levels

Tuesday, July 11, 2017

Policing is hard - a bit of humility would be great!

I really cannot understand the purpose of this oped. Abhijit Banerjee points to the increased use of breathalysers (tools) and introduction of higher fines (laws) as essential in the fight against drunken driving. This, he says, has to be complemented with a strategy of vehicle checks at randomly decided locations using dedicated teams of police drawn from the reserves.  

But there is nothing new about this "strategy" that Banerjee claims to have figured out with an RCT. In fact, it is exactly this "strategy" that police superintendents and commissioners resort to for short periods when something (usually a high-profile accident or a court directive) precipitates greater vigilance on drunken driving. And some of the more enterprising police leaders with interest in traffic issues too adopt randomised checking locations strategy. The problem is that these things cannot go beyond short periods. Coincidentally, they are also exactly the same "strategies" than new entrants and popularity seeking police leaders embrace. 

Take the issue of random locations. While, from the outside, allocating random locations may appear an algorithmic exercise, it is far from that when operationalised in scale. A combination of closing ranks by powerful and entrenched interests and systems with very weak institutional capacity at field (read police station) levels mean that such strategies are easily sabotaged, unless there is a strong enough leader micro-managing the process. As an example, random third party quality checks of engineering works under construction, now passe, has become completely captured in many jurisdictions. As to reserves, their deputation beyond a few days, is by definition, impossible. In a heavily under-staffed police force overburdened with crowd and VIP events management responsibilities (bandobasth), reserves, are that only in name. 

In fact, the optimism with even with the first two may be misplaced. The challenge, as Esther Duflo pointed out in other contexts, is with the plumbing. We need to understand the evidentiary standard for a legal offence of drunken driving. For example, in order to limit discretionary excesses, the law (regulations issued on the central Act in different states) mandate that breathalyser tests have to be carried out in the presence of a police personnel above a certain rank. And over-burdened policy administrations have too few personnel of such rank to spare for any traffic responsibilities, much less for night-time drunken driving patrols. But delegating this responsibility raises its set of problems.

Actually, I can unpack several plumbing layers which can make the challenge even more daunting. But this is sufficient for our purpose. 

The article itself is drawn from this research paper which conducted RCTs covering 162 police stations in Rajasthan covering five management interventions - limitations of arbitrary transfers, rotation of duty assignments and days off, increased community involvement, on-duty training, and "decoy" visits by field officers posing as citizens. It found the first three "which would have reduced middle managers' autonomy, were poorly implemented and ineffective", while the last two had "robust impacts". Based on these findings, the researchers found "very large outcomes" from an intervention that linked "good performance" on sobriety tests without relying on middle managers to  the "promise of a transfer from the reserve barracks to a desirable police station posting".

The paper's headline finding is plain misleading, maybe even dangerously populist,
The experimental results in this paper show that it is possible to affect the behavior of the police in a relatively short period of time, using a simple and affordable set of interventions.
If only it were possible to easily replicate a sanitised pilot! So what do the authors conclude,
It is striking that two of the three most clearly successful interventions had never been advocated by the many police Reform Commissions or in the discussions we had with the police top brass despite the motivation for reform and support of the top administration. In contrast, the interventions that failed to work were all carefully selected by the police leadership, partly based on the recommendations of various Police Reform Commissions, who among them combine a huge amount of experience and expertise. These senior police officers also did not lack human capital, being selected through an extraordinarily competitive set of exams. Yet they had clearly substantially underappreciated the difficulty of implementing these interventions even with their full backing, suggesting that they did not fully realize the nature of the informal authority enjoyed by the station chiefs.
And this,
We see the relatively poor performance of police force interventions as evidence against the view that the managers know how to translate the general principles of management into solutions that are relevant for their organization. The managers in this case were the elite of the Indian police, with decades of experience and who were motivated enough, among other things, to engage with us to launch this reform program. They had a clear and articulated understanding of the principles that motivated the interventions and they were recognized as outstanding leaders. However, none of that could guarantee that they would automatically hone in on all the right interventions. And while they clearly shared the view that incentives, as a general principle, are important, they could not see a way to introduce them within the political and administrative constraints, until we intervened as pseudo-consultants. What do outsiders, with less institutional knowledge and experience, provide in these situations...
Really! This is staggering hubris, even if borne out of ignorance.

Let us examine the six (five plus one) "strategies" that the researchers have explored. "On-duty trainings" are a staple of any administrative system. The problem is just that the trainings do not get translated into meaningful enough learning or internalisation, even when done on the right set of issues and by outsider consultants. "Decoy" visits by field officers is more a figment of juvenile imaginations from stories of kings visiting their kingdom in disguise to obtain citizens' feedback than an institutional solution. In fact, if at all police leaders want better feedback, instead of hiring decoys, they should hire the services of third party agencies (and manage it well) or randomly solicit telephone feedback through call centres from people who have just interfaced with the police system.

Good police superintendents and commissioners (is actually true of managers at any level) do not require fancy "decoys" to quickly figure out more or less what is going wrong and who among their officers can be trusted. The practical difficulty of identifying and managing the activities of decoys is immense. Instead of trying to improve the effectiveness of their institutionalised intelligence wings, sending out "decoys" is exactly what populists and band-aiders would suggest. Finally, the researchers would not even be able to imagine the ways in which such "decoys" can end up creating an even bigger problem for the police force.

Take the case of the last intervention, linking transfers to good performance. Again plumbing is the challenge, which the researchers have unsurprisingly glossed over. 

For a start, drunken driving enforcement would hardly figure among the top-ten priorities of the mainstream police force, leave aside of the reserve force. And their (reservists) main bandobasth activities are not amenable to quantitative assessments of individual policemen. Second, how sustainable is a policy that explicitly seek to reward some policemen with transfers to "desirable" places (for whatever "good performance") and penalise some others (the natural corollary) by drafting them to reserves? 

Third the moment we start linking incentives to quantitative performance indicators in detecting drunken driving, it is only time before we get into targets and slip down an undesirable slope. Four what is the sustainability of an administrative process where there is no involvement of middle-managers? Ultimately managers at some level have to be managing this institutionally. Even assuming that level exists outside the "middle-managers", are we any less likely to have concerns with them? And is it even practical to think about such administrative stuff without the involvement of middle managers? Finally, it is far from true that "evaluation generated evidence and information is not typically available to the police leadership". "Evidence", of a far more sweeping breadth and with more than the requisite credibility and rigour, in large measure, is available, to police leaders who keep their eyes and ears open. No amount of careful evidence generation can get you beyond a few baby steps in your endeavour to effectively manage large systems. 

The authors of the Reform Commission reports, in contrast to academic researchers, are life-long plumbers, who, with varying degrees of success (or failures), have grappled with the plumbing challenges of policing in the real world. They were spot on with the three recommendations, which, however you look at police reforms, cannot but not be a part of any end-stage that Rajasthan Police would hope to achieve with police reforms. In fact, they are essential plumbing necessities in any administrative system, all of which can be very logically established (not being done here because of lack of space). In contrast, the three researchers' solutions, as discussed above, suffer from serious practical deficiencies. The Reform Commissions refrained from such band-aid recommendations because they were responsible and honest (apart from not being ignorant) to not do so.

Instead of suggesting solutions that help improve institutions and systems that are at the cutting-edge of policing activities, the researchers end up recommending piece-meal and unsustainable solutions. The objective, for example, should have been to improve policing outcomes by enhancing accountability of middle managers and enhancing the quality of intelligence from institutional channels, instead of hiring decoys and dispensing with middle managers.

This example is teachable in many respects. Abhijit Banerjee acknowledges the importance of  the so called inputs and regulations - breathalysers and prohibitive enough punishment as critical deterrents. But he also points to the role of complementary factors (strategy) to the success. 

It is in the same vein that we should see other input and regulation prescriptions in cases of education, health care, nutrition, state capacity and so on. Everywhere inputs and regulations are critical requirements to even get to the starting point. While they are necessary, they are not sufficient. Complementary levers of implementation as essential.

I have written about this many times earlier and let me repeat it. Performance incentives that involve large enough financial rewards or transfers are unlikely to work in scale in weak public systems like in India. After all where does it work in even developed systems? For a start, several plumbing challenges, mostly related to weak state capacity and the socio-political environment, increases the likelihood of an even more inefficient general equilibrium. Second, quantifying outcomes in a credible manner is deeply problematic, and collecting and managing it even more so, in most contexts. Third, financial incentives most likely end up becoming entitlements, thereby worsening the problem of already high lower level government salaries. Finally, transfers are among the highest stake administrative actions, and when done in environments where rank ordered "good performance" cannot be credibly and indisputably established is a recipe for controversies.

Let me state this and I would be happy to be refuted by practitioners from the police bureaucracy. There are no innovations, either great ideas or process re-engineering or even management theories, that can dramatically improve policing outcomes in conditions of acute systemic and leadership weaknesses. Wherever police systems work well, it is more likely a combination of functional administrative capacity and good leadership. The intensity of the latter can even temporarily mask deficiencies in the former. It is for this reason that we keep hearing stories of poorly run administrations suddenly becoming efficient with the arrival of a good Police Commissioner.

In economists' speak, the production function for good policing outcomes is largely these two. Innovations most often can work at the margins to improve administrative capacity and free up leadership energies for productive use elsewhere. But in really weak systems, as we have here, leadership is necessary to both generate short-term good outcomes and build long-term institutional capacity.

That this paper got through a peer-review is a reflection of how badly disconnected the real world of experimental economics is despite at least some economists' claims to being superior plumbers. These are thoughtful economists who swear by the general equilibrium. But that, in turn, requires deep plumbing knowledge. Not exactly their forte, despite claims to the contrary. 

Monday, July 10, 2017

India labour market graphic of the day

In the absence of reliable data, India's labour market assessments are mostly speculative exercises. In that context, a new MGI report tries to tease out some inferences. This assessment of the changes in the labour market for the 2011-15 period drawn from the annual survey of the Labour Bureau is instructive.
The report points to three broad areas of job creation - public investments in infrastructure; advances in automation and its impact on IT and BPO sectors; and independent work and micro-entrepreneurship driven by the new digital ecosystems.