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Monday, June 30, 2014

Three development tensions of India

I have an op-ed in Indian Express with Lant Pritchett on three challenges of India's development experience - managing equitable growth, revitalizing a 'flailing' state, and unlocking the potential of states. A longer version is below.

In the euphoria surrounding the election results, it is tempting to avoid facing up to the harsh realities of making development happen. Even for those who characterize the election as “the dawn after the dusk before” in the new light of day India’s development challenges remain essentially the same. These challenges were not overcome by an election, nor can be overcome by doing more of the same, even if effectively, but by doing things differently.

There are, and have been for some time, three central tensions of India’s development experience. The first tension is to sustain a development model which generates rapid economic growth but also creates jobs and produces equitably shared benefits.  The second tension is to deliver effective governance with a “flailing state”. The third tension is to manage national cohesion in a vast and diverse country - where there are as many India’s as there are Indians. None of these three existential tensions of modern India have changed with the electoral results. Let’s examine each.

India needs a dynamic growth strategy, one that goes beyond unproductive dichotomies that pits growth against redistribution, rural against urban, and small against big. The ongoing growth versus redistribution debate, reflected in the recent acrimonious battle between two distinguished pairs of economists, obscures more than it illuminates. This dualism, which pitches one world-view against another ostensibly opposing one, is a gross simplification.

India is far from alone in having gone through this debate. In its initial World Development Reports (WDRs), the World Bank proposed a “two-and-half legged stool” strategy for economic growth – policies for creation of productive labor demand supported by those for development of human capital, and underpinned by a system of “half-a-leg” of a basic safety net. However, with time, the WDRs and global discourse have gravitated towards a single-leg strategy of redistribution, revolving around social transfers, best exemplified by the Latin American Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs.

India, especially over the past decade, has been an enthusiastic adopter of this single-legged stool strategy. The employment guarantee program and food security legislation are totemic illustrations. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that even in Latin America, as in East Asia, the vast majority of people emerged out of poverty not through transfers but through earned incomes from productive jobs created. 
We therefore argue in favor of a development strategy that combines economic growth with productivity. This requires the replacement of the prevailing model of static redistribution of products that revolves around handing out dole with redistribution of productivity that creates the conditions for increased economic growth. This redistribution would equip all Indians, especially the poor, with skills that enhance their productive potential. In other words, India’s development agenda should be framed around economic growth which is underpinned by re-distribution of productivity.

Such redistribution of productivity requires public policies that can enable access to a basic set of essential goods and services for all Indians, irrespective of their economic station. A recent McKinsey report indicates that nearly 650 million Indians are income deprived and need support to access these essential goods and services. This would enable them to develop certain core human resource competencies that are necessary to access opportunities in the modern economy. It will also ensure the ultimate objective of a dignified life for all Indians.

Needless to say, this productivity agenda has to be complemented with the more widely discussed reforms to release infrastructure constraints, deregulation to improve the ease of doing business, removing labor market rigidities, deepening and broadening of the financial markets, and so on. Pro-market and pro-poor need not be contradictory.

Second, the achievement of all development objectives is closely dependent on a state which is effective in the implementation of its core functions. The weak state capability is an obstacle to the achievement of all the ambitions of an “aspirational” India. This weakness is reflected in issues as wide-ranging as the abysmal student learning levels in public schools to the intermittent and poor quality of electricity and water supply and their persistently high distribution losses. It contributes as much to perpetuating the pervasive harassment of citizens approaching the government for statutory services, as to fuelling the large-scale corruption that arises from failure to design and manage contracts with private parties that protect public interest.
 
This has in recent years resulted in a steady erosion of the commitment of the middle-class to public provision of services. The perception of a weak state and the resultant feeling that governments cannot get the basics done has spawned three trends. One, the belief that government institutions cannot deliver good quality services – education, health care etc – has led people to vote with their feet to private service providers. Two, the belief that public services are so irretrievably damaged have led to the belief that cash or benefits transfers is more effective. Finally, the deep disengagement of those entrusted with the responsibility of delivering these services, not only in their role as providers but also as users, has depleted any incentive to improve performance.     

Restoration of state capability is not easy, given its close interaction with political and civil society dynamics. The commonest causes for degeneration in state capability include politicization of bureaucratic processes, administrative indiscipline, erosion of accountability in the discharge of official responsibilities, weakened supervision and monitoring, and ubiquitous corruption. Any meaningful effort at restoration has to address these failures. The role of state governments is central to success in improving capability of the Indian state.

Finally, on social cohesion, its religious and linguistic dimensions have, rightly so, received much attention. However, a more functionally important dimension revolves around the role of Indian states in its federal structure.

It is now well acknowledged that most of the dynamism of the Indian economy over the past decade has come from its states. Even as New Delhi slowed down, many progressive states aggressively pushed reforms, invested in infrastructure, and courted private investments. These state economies, many as large as medium-sized countries, did not go through anything like the weakness experienced by the national economy. Astute observers and investors no longer see a “one India”, but prefer to look at the country as “many Indias”. A new government with an ambitious growth target would want the engines of its growth at full throttle.

Indeed the Prime Minister has recently acknowledged that “India’s progress lies in the progress if states”, and affirmed that issues raised by the states will be considered on “priority”. This calls for the central government to step back from dictating to states and let them chart their varying natural growth trajectories. The most sustainable strategy to promote national economic growth is for the central government to facilitate, not micro-manage, state’s unlock their development potential.

The most egregious example of such shepherding is in the role of the Planning Commission. The one-size-fits-all norms and components of all national programs impose stifling and highly inefficient restrictions on states. The annual state plans for each program is made in a routine manner without consideration for the widely varying requirements of states. The result is lack of state ownership and routine, at best, efforts at implementation.

It is time to move beyond this and embrace an approach that allows states enough design and operational flexibility in these programs. The central government should clearly outline the objectives and broad implementation guidelines and leave it to the state governments to prepare detailed plans that meet their requirements. The state Chief Ministers should be encouraged to lead its design and implementation as his or her government’s program. When state governments have the resources and the freedom to address their development problems, it is most likely to generate accountability and effectiveness, both missing from the current paradigm.

Sunday, June 29, 2014

India's banking mess graphic for the day

This graphic below captures the shocking deterioration of bank balance sheets in the past three years. The share of stressed assets has more than doubled alarmingly.
Recapitalizing banks, thereby creating the space for further lending, should be the first priority of the new government. The revival of private investment, especially infrastructure spending, depends critically on this. It is therefore imperative that the forthcoming Union Budget provides the required allocation for recapitalization.  

Friday, June 27, 2014

Japan's Corporate Governance Reforms

Shinzo Abe promises to unleash the third arrow of his Abenomics agenda - structural reforms to enhance competition and innovation. One of the major prongs of this is expected to be corporate governance reforms that would seek to break to distortionary cross-holding relationships between different companies.
The government is also preparing what advisers say will be a world-class corporate governance code that requires multiple independent outside directors, formal protection of whistle-blowers, and other measures that proponents say would have been unthinkable before Mr. Abe came to power a year and a half ago. These corporate governance reforms also seek to put an end to a decades-old tradition: the practice of holding shares in one another to create a web of relationships meant to keep unwanted interference to a minimum. It is not easily visible on the surface, but Japan’s biggest corporations are linked together in a sprawling web of mutual shareholdings that shield company executives from the pressures of the stock market. Coddled in a comfortable old boys’ club, Japanese executives have long gone unpenalized for failed investments, refusing to withdraw from money-losing businesses, hoarding cash and bringing shareholders perennially low returns. Mr. Abe’s government sees the cozy arrangements as out of place these days, especially as the country seeks to win over foreign investors. Mr. Abe’s latest round of measures calls for a reduction in cross-shareholdings to “as low a level as possible.”
In simple terms, Mr Abe is proposing to introduce best-practice corporate governance reforms into a system steeped in deeply traditional Japanese culture. Now this promises to be a defining moment in the country's economic history. The objective of breaking the cozy relationships arising from the web of cross-holdings is to improve corporate governance standards. But it is difficult to say that the reforms would achieve their objective.

The prevailing corporate governance arrangement, for all its distortions, has to be seen in the light of the very deeply traditional cultural norms that steeps Japanese life. Arguably, in any modern society, which is not permeated with the deep sense of respect, deference, and loyalty that underpin personal relationships in Japanese society, such relationships are most certain to engender cronyism and corruption.

But in case of Japan, how are we to say with any degree of certainty that the modern best practice, with its own chequered history of cronyism and corruption, will be more incentive compatible that the current cozy relationships? How are we to say that the reforms would not result in an equilibrium that is more distortionary and sub-optimal? Are there not better ways to hold corporate boards accountable?

Thursday, June 26, 2014

A turn away from PPPs in road sector

This sums up the sad state of India's infrastructure sector woes,
In 2012-13, of the 7,464-km build-operate-transfer (BOT) target, only 1,115.75 km were actually awarded. Similarly, in 2013-14, of the targeted 5,000 km through the public-private partnership(PPP) mode, only 287 km were awarded through three projects, as the bids did not find takers among private-sector players. Another 2,500 km of projects were awarded under the EPC modeFor the 2014-15 financial year, the target was to award 3,000-3,500 km of road projects through the BOT route and another 5,000 km through the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) route... At present, completion of road projects worth Rs 83,000 Cr are pending. Since 2009, only three projects have been completed, adding only 315 km to the country's existing highway network. This is despite a record 147 projects (a combined value of Rs 1.47 lakh Cr) being awarded under the public-private-partnership (PPP) mode.
Now, in order to kick-start new projects, the new government proposes to set up a transport corporation with a corpus of Rs 1 lakh Cr, with 26% stake of Japanese investors at an assured return of 9%, to finance road projects on an EPC mode. The government in turn proposes to raise its share of the corpus by securitizing its annual toll revenues of Rs 5000 Cr.

This constitutes an important shift in policy by the government. It is an acknowledgement of the difficulties associated with bidding out such road projects on PPP and a resultant shift to public procurement on an EPC mode. Once the construction is completed, the roads would then be entrusted to private partners as long-term O&M concessions.

In other words, the government would bear a major share of the construction risk, and rightly so. These risks are considerable given the land acquisition and environmental clearances associated with such works. Once the road is commissioned, the initial traffic estimates would give a much better idea of the possible toll revenues. It makes possible for potential bidders to give their quotes with much greater certainty, thereby attracting more optimally priced bids and minimizing the likelihood of re-negotiations.

This course of action is exactly what this blog has been consistently advocating, for this and other reasons. While the theoretical case for an DBO/DBFO/BOT PPP contract looks very strong, the risks associated with them are too large to be captured in even the most complete contract. This course-correction is a step in the right direction, though it comes after a series of failures which could have been easily avoided.      

Wednesday, June 25, 2014

India's power sector in ten graphs

The World Bank last week released one of the most well researched reports on India's power sector that I have come across. Here are ten graphics from the richly illustrated report.

1. The graphic below clearly spotlights the Achilles heel of the sector - distribution. Its losses have been mounting alarmingly.

2. The distribution side debt grew the fastest, at a CAGR of 23% in real terms in the 2003-11 period. It also grew from 9% of total electricity sector debt in 2003 to 36% in 2011. Transmission and generation debts grew at a CAGR of 10% and 9% respectively.
3. The cost-revenue gap has almost doubled in 2003-11. In the same period, the average cost rose 7% annually (70% in real terms totally) whereas the average revenues rose 6% (66% in real terms).
4. The main driver of cost has been power purchase costs, which have risen from 56% in 2003 to 74% in 2011. The rise in fuel costs due to imported coal and inefficient power procurement planning (which forces utilities into short-term power purchases) have been behind the rise in power purchase cost.
5. The decomposition of utility losses reveals interesting insights. The losses are decomposed into three buckets - distribution losses beyond an international benchmark of 10%, under-collection of bills, below cost-recovery pricing. In 2003, utilities were charging an average tariff well over cost-recovery and the losses were driven by distribution losses. In 2011, states were in aggregate charging an average billed tariff below cost-recovery. Distribution losses had come down whereas under-pricing losses shot up.
6. Distribution losses dominate in MP, Haryana, Bihar, Jharkhand, Assam, and Tripura. Under-pricing losses dominate for TN, Rajasthan, AP, HP, Punjab, Mizoram. For UP, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Uttarakhand collection losses matter too.
7. Fortunately, tariffs have been increasing in recent years. In 2012-13, 26 states issued orders raising tariffs. On average states increased tariffs once in two years between 2007-08 and 2012-13.
8. Across the world industrial electricity tariffs are the lowest. However, in most Indian states, industrial tariffs are much higher than both commercial and residential prices.
9. No discussion in Indian power sector is complete without agriculture. While consumption been stable at about 25% since 1991, it formed only 7% of revenues realized in 2011.
10. Apart from agriculture, the other major target of subsidy are domestic consumers, who consume almost a quarter of the electricity sold. A staggering 87% of all electricity consumed by domestic users are subsidized, clearly indicating a very high level of leakage. And this subsidy is large - the tariff subsidy for the 87% is on average Rs 1.5 per kWhr. The cross-subsidy from the remaining 13% is only Rs 0.62 per kWhr. In 2010, 87% of the subsidies were delivered to households above the poverty line. Households below the poverty line either do not have access to supply or consume disproportionately less.

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

Stress Tests in a graphic

One of the differences between the way the US and European authorities responded to the financial crisis was in the rigor of their respective stress tests. The American stress tests credibly signaled the health of financial institutions and thereby stemmed the spread of the panic, whereas that in Europe did little to allay market suspicions and fears.

This graphic nicely captures how these tests restored normalcy to the credit markets.
Once the test results were announced, the TED spread (indicates the perceived risks in lending to banks), CP spread (a similar indicator for business), and the Baa spread (indicating perceptions of corporate risk) all fell precipitously. 

Monday, June 23, 2014

The head start from the "accident of birth"

An excellent video and infographic captures how inequality gets baked into your life  from the accident of birth through massive 6000-hour early childhood learning gap,
By the time they reach 6th grade, middle class kids have likely spent 6,000 more hours learning than kids born into poverty. Learning time is a resource that is unequally distributed, and disadvantaged students suffer the consequences. While middle class children learn to read, create, persist, and problem-solve at home and through after-school and summer experiences, parents stressed by poverty are far less likely to be able to ensure those opportunities for their children.  
Update 1 (13/9/2014)

Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn have this nice essay on the benefits of early childhood interventions and good parenting on long-term life outcomes of children.