An oft-repeated
complaint among bureaucrats is that legislators interfere too much in
operational issues like transfers of field functionaries and procurement of
goods and services. It is common knowledge that the MP or MLA have strong
vested interest in the postings of officials deputed to work in their
constituency and the contractors awarded local works or supply orders. Legislators
put pressure on officials to violate rules to accommodate these vested
interests. It forms a major source of patronage and a channel to keep their
loyal followers satisfied. But this interference in routine administrative
activities contributes to the politicization of grass-roots administration as
well as the erosion of state capability.
Why do law-makers end
up becoming rule-breakers? The simple answer is that of patronage, corruption,
and self-aggrandizement. A more sophisticated answer is that it is a reflection
of responsibilities and incentives within the system.
The unfortunate reality
is that legislators, or law-makers, spend very little time on their primary
responsibility of making laws. Though Parliament and Assemblies discuss and
legislate laws, much of that work is notional. The major part of the work of
preparing legislations is done by the concerned Ministry, at the instance of
the ruling coalition. The individual legislators have a very limited role in
this process. Apart from their occasional intervention, if any, in the discussions
that take place in the legislature when the bill is tabled, the legislator
could be nominated to a Parliamentary or Assembly Standing Committee that are sometimes constituted
to scrutinize the Bill. Their other statutory responsibility is participation
in the activities of the regular legislative committees. A legislator is
typically a member of one such committee and his time commitment for this is
minimal.
Here, the nature of
India’s parliamentary democracy differs from that in countries like the US. In
the US, legislations are brought forth as private member bills, where a handful
of legislators, often cutting across party lines, come together and formulate bills
which are then brought before the legislature. While the provision of private
members bills exists in India too, it is rarely used as parties front
legislations.
Accordingly,
legislators in US have large office establishment to facilitate the process of
preparing legislations. A typical Congressman has an official establishment
with 40-60 staff members, the MP in India has to rely on just 1-2 official
assistants. The situation is even more perilous with MLAs. In the absence of
any support staff, it is extremely difficult for even well-meaning and
committed legislators to contribute meaningfully to making laws or even plan
for the long-term development of their constituencies.
Deprived off any
substantial role in their primary role of law making, legislators expend their
energies on activities within their constituency. This generates two negative
externalities. One is the proclivity to interfere in administrative matters at
the district and constituency levels. The other involves competition and
conflict with their counterparts in the district, block, and village
panchayats. The latter becomes especially pronounced in cases where they belong
to different political parties. The turf battles in turn ends up exacerbating
the politicization of administration and weakening of public systems.
So how do we get Indian
legislators to become meaningful participants in the process of development?