Forward guidance and Kevin Warsh

The market reaction to Kevin Warsh’s second FOMC meeting decision to stay the course on interest rates despite rising inflation has triggered a debate on the Fed’s credibility in fighting inflation. 

This is how the $31 trillion US Treasury market reacted.

Long-term government borrowing costs shot higher as Mr. Warsh spoke, with the 30-year bond notching its largest one-day increase in more than a year. Trading around 5.22 percent, it is at the highest level since 2007. The 10-year Treasury yield, which serves as the benchmark for borrowing costs around the world, also rose alongside expectations about inflation over a longer time horizon.

Warsh has made it clear that he does not agree with the policy of forward guidance, and intends to discontinue it. He has argued that forward guidance distorts market incentives and comes in the way of market discipline. This blog is in agreement with it. 

The reversal of forward guidance comes abruptly, at a time when market expectations of the Kevin Warsh era are vitiated by the circumstances surrounding his appointment. Markets clearly think that Warsh may buckle down to pressure from the White House or prefer to please it and delay raising interest rates. 

In this context, I created the table below that evaluates forward guidance and central bank credibility. 

The high credibility and low forward guidance Volcker era is the golden quadrant. The central bank has earned trust through demonstrated willingness to act decisively, but it doesn’t tell you what it’s going to do next. Participants must do their own work to assess fundamentals, price risk properly, and build in uncertainty premia. Volcker’s Fed famously targeted money supply, not interest rates, and didn’t telegraph moves. The result was that markets had to think for themselves, and the discipline that emerged was real. Risk was priced because nobody could assume a backstop.

The Bernanke-Yellen era of high credibility coupled with a high degree of forward guidance ensured that the latter became the market’s mirror. When participants believe the central bank will do what it says, and the central bank tells them exactly what it will do, the rational strategy is to front-run the guidance rather than analyse fundamentals. The “dot plot” era, the “considerable period” language, the “whatever it takes” formulation created a world where the trade was to decode the Fed rather than decode the economy. The moral hazard is structural insofar as investors are rewarded for taking risk they don’t understand because the central bank has told them the floor exists.

The worst combination for policy effectiveness is that of low credibility and high forward guidance. The central bank issues guidance but nobody believes it. Participants pursue their own interests, and policy actions run counter to market expectations. This produces whipsaw where the central bank says one thing, markets price another, and when the policy actually arrives it dislocates rather than stabilises. One could argue the late-stage BOJ falls here (decades of forward guidance that markets progressively stopped believing).

Finally, the Warsh era tries to limit forward guidance but in a period of low central bank credibility, inducing a period of “greatest uncertainty”. Worse still, the transition itself amplifies the shock - moving from a regime of high credibility andhigh forward guidance (the post-2008 consensus) to one where both are removed simultaneously. The question to analyse is whether the Warsh Fed currently sits in the fourth quadrant.

There are four points to be noted.

First, the transition path matters enormously. Moving from the Bernanke-Yellen quadrant (high-high) to the Volcker quadrant (high-low) requires maintaining credibility while withdrawing guidance. This means the central bank must demonstrate through actions (not words) that it will do the right thing even when it doesn’t tell you what the right thing is. The Warsh challenge is that he has withdrawn guidance and may not yet have established credibility through a demonstrated willingness to act decisively against inflation. The risk is that he lands in the bottom-left quadrant (low-low) rather than the top-left (high credibility, low guidance).

Second, while I had blogged here listing forward guidance as an important channel in eroding market discipline, it must be noted that it’s not forward guidance per se that erodes discipline, but forward guidance combined with high credibility. Low-credibility forward guidance is merely useless. And high-credibility forward guidance is actively dangerous because it works too well, by substituting the central bank’s judgment for the market’s own.

Third, there’s a temporal asymmetry in credibility. Credibility is earned slowly (Volcker needed 2-3 years of painful rate hikes) but lost quickly (a single capitulation can destroy it). Warsh’s current position - rates unchanged while prices rise - coupled with the circumstances of his appointment (and the credibility problem it engenders) risks a credibility test analogous to Arthur Burns in 1972-73. If inflation accelerates and the Fed is seen as having waited too long, the move from “low guidance with emerging credibility” to “low guidance with low credibility” could be swift and self-reinforcing.

Fourth, this also highlights the less discussed aspect of policy making that involves shaping expectations. Once collective beliefs are formed and incentives aligned, it is very hard to reshape them. The Bernanke-Yellen response to the market tumult during and after the Global Financial Crisis, guided by the research works of Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford, and Paul Krugman, may well have been required in its immediate aftermath. The mistake was to continue and institutionalise it as part of the regular central bank policy toolkit. Bernanke or Yellen, with their credibility, ought to have exited forward guidance once normalcy was restored. But instead, they chose to please the markets with this new crutch. It is a bit like subsidies - once offered, there’s no sunset. 

Some thoughts on metro railway systems in India

This post will analyse metro railway projects in India, highlight their failings and make some suggestions.

There are three reasons why metro projects globally struggle to be sustainable, even on the Opex. One, the original traffic projections were on the higher side, making the revenue forecasts a non-starter. In other words, the metro should never have been built. Second, the ticket prices were kept too high, resulting in less demand. Third, there is limited induced ridership due to the lack of TOD, parking facilities, and modal integration. 

The first is a common factor associated with projects globally (optimistic forecasts to justify otherwise unviable projects). The second is a tricky problem insofar as lowering it further risks significantly worsening the financials of the metro. Besides, there is enough evidence that metro ticket prices are reasonable across cities. And the real problem is less the fare level than the generalised cost of the trip, or the fare plus the last-mile penalty (arising from the need to change modes, and the lack of any modal integration).

The last one is especially important since the metro is a large investment that is made to shape the city's growth, specifically by densifying the walkable vicinity of its stations and thereby inducing captive ridership. This is the biggest source of sustainable passenger ridership for the metro. Thin station catchments may well be the binding constraint to the operational viability of India’s metro systems. 

India's experience with TOD has been disappointing. None of its 900-odd metro stations is a TOD (densified residential and/or office spaces, which enable walkability from the station to house/workplace). This is unsurprising since the TOD policies generally suffer from poor design. There is also the reality that very few metro projects globally can recover even opex with the farebox collections and rely on real estate and other commercial revenue streams. More on it later. 

In addition to the three demand or revenue-side challenges, there is also a cost-side problem. They include the wrong mode selection - choosing an underground full metro when light rail or bus rapid transit system would have sufficed. The low-cost foreign loan is deceptive since a depreciating rupee inflates the cost (though the Yen, the major source of metro debt, has been depreciating or holding steady against the rupee). Further, the linear stunted network topology, as against a connected grid, limits ridership. Most Indian systems are linear stubs, so they sit permanently below the ridership threshold at which farebox economics turn. As an illustration, Chennai’s finances turned around dramatically once Phase 1 closed the loop, with ridership surging from 13% of projection at CAG FY20 to now ~60%. 

I asked Claude to generate certain parameters for the leading Indian metros. First, the difference between the DPR ridership projection and the actual realised ridership points to strategic misrepresentation with inflated estimates to secure project approval. As can be seen, apart from Delhi, the shortfall is very high, with the majority not even able to generate a third of the estimated ridership. This points to clear strategic misrepresentation to get the project sanctioned by exaggerating the ridership estimates. 

Delhi is now above its old 2019-20 target after Phase-III/IV and post-COVID recovery. This points to the fact that maturation and network completion, and not fare tweaks, are likely to move the needle.

In terms of the percentage of just the opex covered by farebox revenues (or ticketing), it is very low in many metros. However, when combined with the other revenues, five metros are able to cover the opex.

But if we include debt-service, the picture becomes extremely bleak. Most Indian metros are deeply in the red. 

This has important fiscal implications. I took six major states, and assumed their current ridership trajectory and fare growth to calculate the gap between their total revenues (farebox and non-farebox) and total opex and debt service. This assumption overlooks that ridership trajectory may improve over time. In any case, this analysis points to an undiscounted 25-year total gap of ₹1,06,569 cr, or NPV of ₹64,423 cr when discounted at 7%. The state share is around 60% or ₹38,582 cr, and the central share is ₹25,840 cr, amounting to a total annual budget requirement of ₹6,900 cr for FY26 to ₹6,256 Cr for FY30. 

A global comparison yields interesting results. Apart from Northeast Asia, generally, metro railway systems struggle to cover even Opex through farebox collections. 

In all western cities, their governments funded the infrastructure (versement mobilité in Paris, LTA asset ownership in Singapore, TfL/Treasury grant in London, MTA authority-level bonds backed by dedicated taxes in New York). The operator, therefore, never sees the debt service, which has been socialised as a public subsidy up front. Only Hong Kong MTR and Tokyo make the operator carry capital and still clear cost, and they do it through property and ancillary income, not fares.

India is a structural outlier in loading the capital debt onto the SPV's own balance sheet. The Indian farebox is being judged against a burden every comparable peer either socialises to the budget or funds from property. The sustainable systems didn't find a magic farebox - they either kept capital off the operator (the European/American subsidy model) or monetised the land (the Hong Kong/Tokyo model). India did neither.

So what can be done?

A systemic reform requirement is to orient the design and implementation of metro railway systems away from being primarily a railway construction project to an urban planning initiative. This would entail tight integration of the planning of metro rail projects by the municipal authorities. 

The TOD influence zone (TIZ) around each station should be seen as a genuine opportunity for redevelopment and densification. The planning regulations applicable to the TIZ should make it significantly more attractive to build insidecompared to outside - 3-4 times higher FAR, remove parking minimum, TDR-driven land assembly, TDRs brought in with higher multiples, etc. Equally important, the regulations should make it attractive to redevelop the built-up areas (and not be like this). Instead of being prescriptive on land use, it should be left to market forces to determine the appropriate shares of different types of uses in each zone. It would also allow the markets to crowd in the right kinds of commercial amenities, such as groceries, retail, restaurants and cafes, and services, into the zone, depending on its broader land-use mix. 

An important reason for the failure of TOD is the lack of attention given to its public realm elements, specifically the street configuration for connectivity and walkability, and public amenities. This is a bad omission given that walkability (from/to commute and for amenities) is the primary objective of TOD zones. An area without these elements contradicts TOD. Unfortunately, in built-up areas (which form the major part of TIZ), these elements don’t emerge overnight. They require master plans that are configured to enable walkable street connectivity, higher density, and mixed-use developments. Once the master plan is in place, its implementation should be facilitated proactively through the development control regulations and building bye-laws that allow for TIZ preferences and incentives, and instruments like the Town Planning Schemes. These are 10- to 15-year agendas.

The TIZ preferences should be complemented with feeder buses, multi-modal fare integration, and e-rickshaw access so as to extend the catchment beyond the TIZ. Further, as the Chennai example shows, metro lines should complete the loop or connect the grid, and not remain as linear stubs. 

For financial sustainability, the TIZ should deploy appropriate value capture finance instruments. I blogged about it here. They would include betterment levies (brownfield areas) and impact fees (greenfield areas), station-area commercial development, air-rights leasing, and purchaseable FAR. However, care should be taken to ensure that these levies do not detract from the commercial attractiveness of building inside the TIZ. These revenues should be assigned to the SPV balance sheet. This is how HK MTR earned 65% of its 2024 profit from property, not fares. 

These urban planning and other policy requirements should be tightly incorporated into the approvals given for these projects. Every new metro DPR must include statutory master plan amendments, FAR densification for station catchments, mixed-use zoning, land assembly strategy, and the land-value-capture financing plan. They should be preconditions, not annexures. The rail alignment should be a subset of the urban plan. 

There should be no sanction without station-area FAR increases, TDR-driven consolidation, betterment-levy design, and air-rights leasing, all routed to the SPV. TDR can pre-fund land assembly before construction starts. These should become an approval veto. Further, any ongoing support from the Government of India must be made contingent on compliance in letter and spirit with these requirements to pre-empt backsliding and subversion by the states. 

The planning elements discussed above would have to go against the conventional wisdom on urban planning held close to heart by town planners across India and the vested interests of builders and others. It would therefore require strong resolve at the highest political and bureaucratic levels to overrule objections and enforce them. 

For new projects, central funding should become conditional on a corridor-density threshold, independently audited ridership models, and ex-post accountability. There should be an end to the practice of a self-certified 14% IRR. Anything below the threshold should qualify only for a MetroLite / MetroNeo / BRT.

In conclusion, the urban metro should be used as an opportunity to redraw the metro as an urban plan by densifying station catchments, capturing the value, and servicing the construction capital.

The demand side constraint of the Indian economy

I blogged here, arguing that Indian businesses face a structural cost constraint similar to that of developed economies that erode their global competitiveness. This cost constraint on the supply side must be seen alongside a constraint of a consumption class that is far smaller and shallower than imagined. In other words, a developed country's cost structure in a low-income country's market size. 

This point has been a consistent argument of this blog and was documented in great detail in Can India Grow? in 2016, much before it became more widely recognised.

India’s demand-side problem is twofold. For a start, it already has a low per capita income, the lowest among its emerging market peers. Second, this itself conceals a low base of the consumption class that is also not widening proportionately with economic growth. The nature of economic growth is such that it is not only not broad-based enough but is also widening inequality. 

The recently released PRICE - Tata Sons Many Urban Indias report is a confirmation of the demand-side constraint. It finds that the top 100 cities, with just under a fifth of the population, capture almost half of all household surplus, the closest measure to genuine discretionary spending capacity. What sits outside, the other 81% of India, holds only about 53% of surplus combined, and most of that is in the top slices of tier-2/3 towns and the productive rural belt. The surplus-generating layer of the economy is essentially urban and already fully contained. There is no large pool of "middle India" outside urban India waiting to broaden the base.

PRICE's top-100 city-tier framework (Big Six, Boomtowns, Breakout, Frontier) is the empirical proof that "urban India" is not a homogeneous consuming class. The gap in savings between the top and bottom tiers is nearly 3.5×, and one in six Frontier-city households is already financially overstretched. This is what “narrow” looks like at the city level. 

The top 15 cities have two-thirds of all top-100 consumption, and the Delhi NCR alone has 15% of all urban consumption. The consuming class is a stratum within the Big Six, not the Big Six themselves. Even within the six megacities, PRICE reports that 24% of households are low-income. The consuming class is not "urban India" (~500M) or even "top-100 city India" (282M), but a stratum of prosperous households scattered across the Big Six and the top of the Boomtown tier. 

The Blume Ventures categorisation of India’s consumption class finds three groups, with the first comparable in size to the population of Mexico at 30 million households (the Blume Rule of 30, or 10% of Indian households). A worrying finding is that the consuming class that anchors private demand is small and getting deeper, not significantly wider. A vast base has almost no discretionary spending power at all. This is the inverse of the broad, upwardly mobile middle that sustains private investment.

The PRICE report's optimistic headline (~715M "middle income" people by 2031) conflates a household that shares a scooter with one that services a car EMI. Once you apply a real surplus filter - savings above ₹4 lakh a year, which is roughly what it takes to run a car, insure a family, and take one flight - the number lands where Blume said it did. In simple terms, PRICE's 715M by 2031 measures how many Indians will earn enough not to be poor, a significant achievement. Blume's 140M measures how many can act as a consuming class today - the market a brand can actually sell a car, an AC, a holiday abroad or a health-insurance policy to. 

The numbers are further validated by other sources. An income assessment by Rama Bijapurkar points to a more differentiated group, but a similar narrow base of the consumption class. She estimates that 93% of households have annual consumption of less than $5,700. 

The data on penetration of discretionary goods and behaviours corroborates the Blume survey data. Almost every independent marker lands near the same Blume Rule of 30. Whether you measure cars, ACs, credit cards, foreign travel, or who actually pays income tax, the consuming class converges on the same narrow apex. If anything, the Blume data itself looks too optimistic. 

Whichever marker you pick - cars (8%), ACs (13%), passports (~10%), income-tax payers (1.5–3%), credit cards (4.6%), foreign trips (2%) - the consuming class lands at ~10% of households or fewer. That is also exactly where the bottom-up Blume spending model, income surveys of Bijapurkar, and asset penetration estimates of NFHS/Bain lands.

India's "middle class" has been estimated at 29 million people one way and 600 million another, a multiple spread of 20 that reflects what one is choosing to count. 

India has a consuming class of ~140M, an aspirant class of ~300M moving toward it, and a base of ~1bn for whom the "middle class" debate is moot. That picture is consistent with every methodology once you ask which question each one answers - how many can afford a car (~10%), how many are above poverty by global standards (~30%), how many participate in the digital economy (~65%). Conflating them is the single most common error in India market-sizing. This is a very nice summary of why nobody gets the elephant in full.

In this context, it is also useful to draw a nuance on India’s high consumption rate of 61% of GDP, which is far higher than China’s ~38% of GDP. India’s problem is that while it is already a consumption-led economy, the problem is the quality of that demand. It is too thin per person, skewed to the top decile, and increasingly financed by debt as households run down savings. In other words, the demand side constraint is not the consumption share of GDP, but that there are too few middle-income earners to generate broad, income-financed volume. That points policy at jobs, wages and investment, not at “stimulating consumption.”

Fundamentally, all the above is a reflection of two important factors - the low per-capita income and the widening inequality in sharing the benefits of aggregate growth. 

India's per-capita output (PPP) trails Vietnam and Indonesia and is under half of China's. Its Mexico-like consuming tier is real, but at best, only ~10% of the country.

India imposes rich-country costs on poor-country incomes in capital, fuel and land - and because those costs are policy-made, they are the actionable half of the problem. The demand blade can only be widened the slow way: through jobs, wages and productivity.

Unfortunately, corporate surpluses are being captured, not recycled into the wages that would create the next tier of consumers. Profits race ahead while sales, jobs and pay lag far behind.

It also does not help that Indian businesses across sectors are averse to spending on R&D and innovation. 

R&D is a fixed cost that only pays off over a large, contestable market. A thin domestic market depresses the return to it, which is why the economies that lead on R&D expenditures are either big-and-rich at home (the US) or export-driven (Korea, Germany, Taiwan). India is neither, and sits alone in the low-R&D corner.

This is an instructive comparison of India with China and South Korea.

The main takeaway is that India’s existing consumption class, confined to just 10% of the households, is too narrow to sustain high growth rates for long periods. It requires considerable broadening. But broad basing economic growth requires access to good jobs, a daunting task given that the gig economy is the biggest source of job creation and elsewhere it is mainly contractual jobs. Worsening matters is the reluctance of the private sector to invest or innovate.