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Wednesday, July 8, 2026

AI for organisational and bureaucratic reforms

The debate rages about the extent of AI’s likely impact on the economy and human lives. So far, there has been an apparent lack of commercial value creation to justify the gigantic and exponentially increasing volume of AI investments. 

I blogged here on the distinction between horizontal and vertical use cases of AI, with success on the latter being limited, here cautioning about the likely impact of AI on development and in developing countries, and here on some possible high-impact use cases for AI in lower-income countries. 

The most common horizontal use of AI is in personal productivity improvements. Claude, ChatGPT, etc., are already having large effects on personal productivity. But its translation into vertical use products is muted. 

On this, John Burn-Murdoch points to the work of Mert Demirer, Leon Musolff and Liyuan Yang to make two important points. The first point is the “disconnect between reported increases in coders’ output and the apparent lack of a corresponding boom in product or value creation,” which creates a very steep funnel between inputs and outputs. 

The study by MIT’s Mert Demirer and co-authors tracked software developers’ work before and after they adopted AI tools. Importantly, they measured this at several different levels, from the amount of code written, to the number of discrete files edited, to the number of projects or features worked on, to actual releases of new software. They found an explosive impact at the top of this funnel — coders created or edited almost 300 per cent more files — but that boost was halved to 150 per cent by the time they got to the number of discrete pieces of work submitted for review, and that in turn shrunk fivefold to a roughly 30 per cent uplift in the number of full software releases.

The authors also found little evidence of AI-assisted increases in software development, leading to increased consumption of Apps. 

This brings us to the second point made by the authors about AI’s impact - it is likely to be fully realised only when new organisational structures, markets, and business models emerge.

But Demirer and his co-authors feel the more likely explanation is that current organisational structures and marketplaces are not set up to take advantage of real underlying gains. That view is supported by the evidence from past technological revolutions, where the real jumps in productivity and job displacement came from new companies and processes rather than incumbents grafting new technology on to existing workflows. In the case of electricity in the late 19th and early 20th century, productivity gains were modest where factories simply replaced giant steam engines with giant electric motors but left the rest of the machinery and layout unchanged. The boom arrived decades later when engineers fitted individual workstations with their own small motors.

In this backdrop, Jack Dorsey and Roelof Botha have an insightful article on organisational impact. Specifically, they claim that AI’s productivity-enhancing value can address the fundamental coordination problem in large organisations that manifests in the form of a trade-off between span-of-control limitations (which add organisational layers) and speed of information flows. They argue that AI sharply increase people’s span of control, thereby reducing organisational layers and hastening decision-making. 

The first organisational models emerged in the military to organise large numbers of soldiers into a coherent and effective fighting unit. It involves a hierarchical chain of command that allows for a span of control and a seamless flow of information and instructions. The model then entered the corporate world through the US railroads in the 1840s and 1850s, which borrowed West Point-trained engineers from the US Army. They trace the evolution of the modern organisational form,

In the mid-1850s, Daniel McCallum of the New York and Erie Railroad created the world’s first organizational chart to manage a system stretching over 500 miles with thousands of workers… McCallum’s chart formalized the same hierarchical logic the Romans had used: layers of authority, defined reporting lines, structured information flow. It became the blueprint for the modern corporation… Frederick Taylor (1856-1915), often called the “Father of Scientific Management,” optimized what happened within that hierarchy. Taylor broke work into specialized tasks, assigned them to trained experts, and managed through measurement rather than intuition. This produced the functional pyramid organization - a structure optimized for efficiency within the information routing system that the military had pioneered and the railroads had commercialized… 

In 1959, McKinsey’s Gilbert Clee and Alfred di Scipio published “Creating a World Enterprise” in the Harvard Business Review, providing an intellectual framework for a matrix organization that combined functional specialties with divisional units. Under the leadership of Marvin Bower, McKinsey helped companies like Shell and GE implement these principles, balancing central standards with local agility. This became the “professional” or “modern” corporation that propelled the postwar global economy… The McKinsey 7-S framework, developed in the late 1970s by Tom Peters and Robert Waterman, distinguished the “hard Ss” (Strategy, Structure, Systems) from the “soft Ss” (Shared Values, Skills, Staff, Style). The core idea was that structural elements alone were insufficient. Organizational effectiveness required alignment across cultural traits and the human factors that determine whether a strategy actually succeeds.

They suggest that AI makes it possible to solve the fundamental coordination problem within large organisations that necessitate hierarchical formations. 

For the first time, a system can maintain a continuously updated model of an entire business and use it to coordinate work in ways that previously required humans relaying information through layers of management… In a traditional company, a manager’s job is to know what’s happening across their team and relay that context up and down the chain. In a remote-first company where work is already machine-readable, AI can build and maintain that picture continuously. What’s being built, what’s blocked, where resources are allocated, what’s working and what isn’t. That’s the information the hierarchy used to carry. The company world model carries it instead… 

In a conventional company, the intelligence is spread throughout the people and the hierarchy routes it. In this model, the intelligence lives in the system. The people are on the edge… The edge is where the intelligence makes contact with reality… the edge doesn’t need layers of management to coordinate it. The world model gives every person at the edge the context they need to act without waiting for information to travel up and down a chain of command… Everything else the old hierarchy did, the system coordinates, and everyone is empowered, with a role that’s much closer to the work and the customer.

They identify three roles - Individual contributors (ICs) who are deep specialists and experts who build and operate system capabilities; Directly Responsible Individuals (DRI) who own specific cross-cutting problems or opportunities and customer outcomes; and player-coaches who replace the traditional manager whose primary job was information routing, who do both building and handling people. 

All this makes great sense and points to how corporate organisational models are likely to emerge as the application of AI progresses. There will be frontier firms in a few sectors that will lead the way for others to follow. 

AI applications are a promising opportunity to address inefficiencies and coordination failures in public bureaucracies, too, and improve the quality of public administration. 

For a start, it has the potential to restore internal capabilities, which have eroded steeply. Over the years, thanks to practices like outsourcing all analytical and documentation work to consulting firms and the hiring of individual consultants (most notably now, the system of Young Professionals, YPs, in governments), there has been a complementary erosion of in-house expertise. The capabilities to articulate proposals for internal deliberations and file circulation have atrophied. Given that bureaucracies run on deliberations and files, this trend is an underappreciated aspect of state capability weakness. 

AI provides an opportunity to reverse these trends and develop internal capabilities. The primary reason for the reliance on external expertise is the extent of analytical work and documentation required during the deliberative process (everything from a concept note on the proposal to reports for appraisals, and Cabinet Notes). The bureaucratic leaders who are burdened with a multiplicity of tasks, work under tight timelines, face increased fetters from oversight agencies and courts, and must rely on an increasingly enfeebled internal bureaucracy. In the circumstances, they prefer to outsource the thinking and documentation to outsiders. I have blogged earlier on the perils of this approach

AI tools like Claude are excellent at analytical work and the generation of these documents in response to clearly articulated prompts. It becomes a simpler proposition if bureaucrats can quickly and easily obtain a draft concept and supporting documents, and then scrutinise, validate, and refine it before circulation for approval. AI tools can then become a force multiplier for bureaucratic leaders, who are now constrained by their limited bandwidth and acute dependencies. 

This would also empower bureaucratic leaders, or at least some among them, and could enhance the quality of their engagement with the decision-making process. Besides, by minimising the drudgery of the bureaucratic process, it would also allow bureaucratic leaders to apply their minds and exercise judgment more effectively, thereby improving the quality of decisions and policy design and implementation. It would also lower decision-making delays.

It should therefore become a priority of the National Informatics Centre (NIC) (or an AI division within it) to develop or license AI application that is embedded in the e-office software and enables officials to sift through large documents and generate proposals/presentations, circulation notes and reports using prompts. This has transformative potential for productivity improvements, not only stopping the erosion of internal capabilities but also helping rebuild them. 

If this can be done, it opens up opportunities for far-reaching administrative reforms. The current bottom-heavy pyramid can be rationalised to make it fit-for-purpose.

A major inefficiency is the presence of multiple layers within the administrative system. It is a widespread practice across governments to have YPs, and those recruited as data entry operators originate the note file (a task earlier performed by the clerical staff). The note then gets circulated across several layers, often seven or eight till the approver. This can be radically pruned down to no more than three or four, including the approving authority. 

Such de-layering is especially relevant for technical ministries and departments whose activities are more amenable to AI-based support. Such ministries should have a separate administrative staffing plan, one that takes into account the role that AI can play in generating documentation and considerably reducing any drudgery associated with analytical work. 

As a general illustration, there are perhaps three kinds of activities in any department - shared services (HR, procurement, establishment issues, statutory matters, etc.), administration of departmental programs, and analytical and technical work. There are significant low-hanging likely process-efficiency improvements in all three, and substantive value-addition potential in the third activity. 

This would also necessitate a reassessment of public recruitments. The advent of AI applications means that, unlike in earlier times, apart from merely documenting the issues in a note file, the case worker (the ASO or SO) can now be expected to do some analysis and provide comments. This also means that a smaller base can serve the clerical roles (the entire paraphernalia of clerical cadres can be collapsed into just two functional levels - maker and checker), and their educational qualifications and skills must reflect the requirements for the revised scope of work. I’ll blog separately on this. 

The increased use of AI applications to analyse and document, and a compact and delayered deliberative process captured in the file circulation can also increase the quality of collective engagement and ownership of the bureaucracy in decision-making. It lets (and nudges or forces) everyone contribute meaningfully to the process instead of being passive pass-throughs of instructions and note files. It presents the opportunity to shed reliance on outsourced expertise and build back state capabilities.

This is deep work and, even in the best case, is likely to be adopted only by a few units in the first phase. The objective should be to create the conditions that encourage the emergence of these lighthouses and channel them to diffuse change more widely.

Monday, July 6, 2026

Some thoughts on the AI trade

The AI trade is clearly blowing into a bubble of utterly spectacular proportions. 

FT Alphaville points to the interesting reality that both equity valuations and earnings of the underlying companies are in bubble territory. They quote from the monthly market update by Joachim Klement and Francisca Reis of Panmure Liberum.

In 1929, the cyclically-adjusted P/E-ratio (CAPE) of the S&P 500 reached 32.6x according to Prof. Robert Shiller’s data. This was 1.8 standard deviations above trend at the time. In 2000, the CAPE reached 44.2x, or 3.3 standard deviations above trend – a clear sign of a bubble. However, as our chart below shows, earnings in both instances were within normal range, less than one standard deviation above trend. Today, the CAPE is at 41.0x, or 2.9 standard deviations above trend. Once again, we are clearly in bubble territory for stock market valuations. 

However, unlike in previous bubbles, we are having extremely high CAPE at a time when earnings themselves are 1.8 standard deviations above trend. In other words, we are in a valuation bubble at a time when earnings are in a bubble themselves. If we correct for the earnings bubble, the current CAPE would be 67.6x or 4.6 standard deviations above trend, a bubble that surpasses anything ever seen in US history by an extreme margin. If valuations followed a normal distribution (which they don’t, so don’t take this literally), this would happen in 0.00019% of months or once every 43,432 years.

See just the Shiller CAPE ratio.

That being the case, what makes any assessment of the AI trade problematic is its unique nature. 

It is the creation of a general-purpose technology that is most certain to transform several aspects of business models, work practices and trends, and life itself (and maybe even more). There are five stakeholders on the supply side of the AI story - semiconductor chips, cloud and data centre infrastructure, LLMs, financing, and support services. They encompass a vast spectrum of businesses - chip designers and makers, equipment makers, cloud infrastructure services, AI LLM developers, data centre developers, utilities, financial institutions, etc. On the demand side are all the different kinds of AI applications users, spanning every imaginable industry. 

While the LLMs and the cloud services are software, the rest are all hardware. At the vanguard are the top public limited companies of our times, all with formidable moats and strong balance sheets. Till the recent surge in private credit, the AI investments were being financed from their large cash surpluses. Further, all of them make massive and growing profits, even creating an earnings bubble. Finally, given the network effects generally associated with digital technologies, the AI landscape is more likely to create winner-takes-all markets. 

Also, so far, the AI trade has been running on the massive investments pouring into the development of AI LLMs and their applications. This investment binge is being driven by an intensely competitive race to outdo each other in improving the LLM algorithms and building up scale capabilities. The achievements to date on this have been truly spectacular. The applications development, though gathering pace, is lagging. No killer Apps or hardware have emerged on the landscape. 

The true reckoning for the AI trade will depend on whether the AI algorithms developed will find commercially valuable use cases. More specifically, whether these use cases, which will emerge in the years ahead, will justify the massive investments already made and being committed. 

Even more specifically, if the market smell tests of the AI promise endure, the bubble will continue to inflate. Such persistence of bubble inflation is, to a great extent, the perpetuation of stories. Elon Musk and SpaceX are the totemic illustrations. The two critical metrics of aggregate profits possible from the AI industry are the addressable market and margins. However, both are nearly maxed out in the valuation pricing on the upstream (supply) side. The best that can therefore be expected is that the downstream (demand) AI applications industry starts to create successful products. This would let the AI trade inflate more, at least for the immediate future.

On the contrary, if the market smell test points to the other way, at least in a few vanguard areas like autonomous driving or software development or healthcare and life sciences, then all bets are off and the wheels will start to come off. Another downward pathway is if the upstream supply-side margins start to get squeezed due to competition or disruption or rising costs. Given the asymmetric nature of such turns (bubble inflated gradually upwards, but the pop could be rapid), we could then see a rapid unravelling of the AI trade, with all its disruptive implications. The disruptions could be economy-wide, far deeper and broader than with the dotcom and other bubbles, given the wide sweep of markets that the AI industry has enveloped. 

Interestingly, even as the seven largest data centre operators are planning to spend $848 bn this year, five times what they spent in 2022, the stock prices of the applications-side hyperscalers are struggling. Microsoft is down nearly 20% this year, and Meta is down 11%. The AI trade is now running purely on the chipmakers. 

The critical place in the market to keep a close eye on may be the downstream side of AI applications and product development.

Saturday, July 4, 2026

Weekend reading links

1. Indian universities have come to dominate the global rankings for research paper retractions, following complaints of plagiarism, fake peer reviews, and other misdemeanours. According to the Retraction Watch database, India recorded 887 research paper retractions in 2025, form 21% of all retractions (second to China with 41%) despite contributing just 5% of all publications, and occupying six of the world's top 10 universities for retractions. 
2. Stunning statistic about the Algerian demographic dominance of the Les Blues, the French national soccer team.
Only two of France’s 26 players are of non-immigrant ancestry — 22 of them have African roots. Some, such as Mbappé, are deeply connected to their country of origin.

And this dynamic of reverse migration and migrant domination elsewhere.

Of England’s 26 players, eight have Caribbean forebears, 10 African, and 20 who were eligible to represent at least one other country because of their family heritage or birthplace. Belgium has players who trace their lineage to its former colonies — Congo, Burundi and Mali. The Portugal team has those of Cape Verdean, Angolan, and Guinean lineage. Those surplus to their requirements — players of African descent born and raised in Europe — in turn, populate most of the African teams. Ten of the 11 Senegalese players in the starting lineup against France in the opening game were born in France... Six of the players in the US national team are of Afro-Caribbean heritage... There are those from Nigeria, Ghana, and Jamaica. Three are from Hispanic backgrounds — Christian Roldan (Guatemala), Ricardo Pepi (Mexican-American) and Jesús Ferreira (Colombian-American). As many are from Europe, and three others have dual nationalities... For Australia's Socceroos, four players were born in refugee camps. The players represent 15 ethnic backgrounds and include a Malaysian with Sri Lankan roots. Eighteen other players have direct immigrant or refugee heritage. To contextualise, only one Black player (Sam Morris) and another of Caribbean descent (Andrew Symonds) have represented Australia in cricket.

This is a brilliant article by Sandip G about the magnificent quartet in the French team - Kylian Mbappe, Ousmane Dembele, Michael Olise and Desire Doue. 

3. The US military learns from Iran.

The US has, similarly, begun to build its production of drones. It used the Lucas, a one-way attack drone reverse-engineered by start-up SpektreWorks from an Iranian Shahed-136, for the first time in combat in February. The Pentagon is looking to begin mass-producing them, and has requested to triple its spending on drones and related technologies to over $74bn next year.

4. Shenzhen, with 400,000 taxi drivers licensed to provide services in 26 platforms, will permit robotaxis from July 1. The new rules will allow the Shenzhen government to promote the “orderly development” of robotaxi tests, demonstrations and commercial pilots either in select zones or citywide. 

5. Friedrich Merz's landmark pension reforms

Under proposals agreed by a bipartisan commission, a compulsory initial contribution of 0.5 per cent of employees’ pre-tax income, rising to 2 per cent by 2031, will go into a Swedish-style public pension fund managed centrally and invested in capital markets. Contributions are split 50/50 between employees and employers. The statutory minimum retirement age of 67 is set to rise in line with life expectancy; rights to early retirement for people with 45 years of contributions will be restricted.
Such measures have become vital to reduce the deficits of Germany’s unsustainable pay-as-you-go system. Some 16.5mn baby boomers will retire by 2036 with only 12.5mn new workers joining the workforce, according to some estimates. The government spent about a quarter of the total federal budget on plugging gaps in the system in 2024; economists say that could double to 50 per cent in two decades.
Linking the retirement age to life expectancy is projected to mean only a gradual increase — to 67.5 by 2041 and 70 by 2091. But economists say this is the only sound way to stabilise the system without spiralling payroll taxes or huge federal subsidies. Narrowing early retirement rights will address a drain of experienced workers amid acute skills shortages.

6. Important graphic that highlights the extent of renminbi depreciation since the beginning of 2022 and the surge in surplus.

7. China expands export restrictions on dual-use items against Japanese companies in the latest instance of weaponisation of its manufacturing dominance. 
The companies added to the export control list include subsidiaries of Mitsubishi Electric and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The restrictions will also apply to several Japanese government research organisations including the National Institute for Defense Studies. Chinese exporters are banned from selling to the entities on the restricted list, and foreign organisations or individuals are also prohibited from selling dual-use items that were built or originated in China. China last expanded the list to 40 companies in February. In parallel with the expanded export control list, China’s commerce ministry on Monday put 20 Japanese companies and organisations on its watchlist, meaning they will get closer scrutiny in any matters relating to potential dual-use technologies. The list includes subsidiaries of Fujitsu, Mitsui E&S, Hitachi, Komatsu and Terra Drone. Beijing’s targeting of Japanese companies is the latest example of China’s weaponisation of trade in recent years. The EU Chamber of Commerce in China in April has found that Beijing has nearly tripled its use of export controls in the past five years. While some instances have been in response to western measures, the researchers noted that Beijing’s controls have also frequently targeted trade chokepoints.

8. GST balance sheet.

Though average GST collections in absolute terms are almost 90 per cent higher than those in the pre-GST period, other parameters tell the real story. The average growth rate in tax collections and the tax-GDP ratio are lower under the GST regime compared to the pre-GST era. Collections were further marred by GST cuts starting September 22, 2025.
With high-skilled IT services under pressure, a financial sector with limited capacity to create low and medium skilled jobs and manufacturing struggling to gain traction, the one area where jobs are being created is low-end services. Delivery riders for Zepto, which has just filed its papers for an IPO, have gone up from 49,278 in 2024 to 2.21 lakh in 2026 — more than a four-fold increase. Zomato and Blinkit have almost doubled to 10 lakh riders in two years. Swiggy now has 6.1 lakh riders, while Uber, at 14 lakh active drivers, outstrips Indian Railways. The gig economy is emerging as an urban employment sink.
10. The Uniqlo-Toray partnership that underpins Fast Retailing's spectacular growth. 
In April 2000, Uniqlo founder Yanai paid a visit to the offices of Toray, a Tokyo-based chemicals and materials conglomerate he had read about in a magazine. It marked the start of a strategic collaboration that provided Uniqlo with arguably its most important advantage over rivals: access to high-tech, specialised fabrics. After testing 10,000 prototypes, Toray invented a material combining four types of synthetic yarn that absorbs moisture from the body and converts it to heat. Uniqlo branded it Heattech, and since 2003 has sold 1.5bn garments made from or containing it. Toray also helped develop the fabrics behind AIRism, used as a breathable base layer, and the Ultra Light Down ranges of packable jackets insulated with bird plumage... control over fibre shape and fineness, dubbed nanodesign, has helped to make highly water-repellent and durable $50 lightweight parkas, creating a far cheaper alternative to specialist outdoor brands such as Patagonia. The two sides are entering a fifth phase of collaboration that aims to combine synthetic fabrics with natural ones, such as introducing cashmere into Heattech products to make them softer. Okawa believes few other retailers have such deep relationships with their key suppliers.
11. Good FT long read about the Jamie Dimon succession struggle at JPMorgan. The things that stand out are the following: 

One, the appointment of someone to the top position in any organisation, public or private, is bound to be opaque and involve considerable discretion. The only disqualification would be the egregiously ineligible. For any others, there will always be ways to spin it as a fair process. This holds with greater effect as the stakes go up. 

Two, in the succession struggle, dominated as they are by a multiplicity of considerations, among those eligible or qualified, it is rare that the most professionally competent will emerge as the successor. 

Three strong leaders will always delay succession, and even when they choose to retire, will seek to retain enough levers to influence the decisions of their successors. Most often, it is about decisions involving the promotion of the interests of those in the organisation closest to them, their pet projects or initiatives, broader organisational strategic shifts, etc.

Friday, July 3, 2026

More on the limits to China's growth trajectory

The valuations of the US AI stocks and its public debt binge are not the only bubbles waiting to pop. An equally big bubble that could pop is China’s investment-driven and debt-fuelled growth model. Of the three bubbles, the last could well be the most consequential. 

I had blogged here explaining the hard limits to China’s current growth trajectory. This post highlights the unsustainability of the country’s credit-driven growth. 

The Economist has a very good read on China’s economic growth strategy, with its latest focus on high-technology sectors. 

This puts China’s infrastructure investments in perspective.

The old model of growth took shape on China’s coasts before spreading to the interior. Factories in the wealthy east employed poor migrant labourers from the hinterland. Those migrants in turn, unable to obtain residency in metropolises, often used their earnings to invest in property back home. Towering apartment blocks erected during the two-decade property boom have sprung up in the smallest towns, employing tens of millions of construction workers each year and hoovering up low-end manufactures. High-speed rail has penetrated the poorest counties.

All this investment was fuelled by local-government borrowing. One tally puts these debts at around 60trn yuan ($9trn), or 43% of GDP. The comparable figure in America is 12%. The poorest regions often relied the most on debt-fuelled construction of houses, roads and bridges. This has left some places, such as Guizhou province in the south-west, with dazzling infrastructure (including a bridge 626 metres high, the world’s tallest) along with insurmountable debts. Few of these costly public works have so far come close to generating the revenues needed to pay back creditors.

As the Cold War with the US and the West intensifies, President Xi has set the goal of global leadership in advanced technologies - EV, batteries, semiconductors, AI, robotics, fusion, etc. This has set the stage for a new round of competitive investments by governments across the country, with enabling credit supply measures. 

A national semiconductor fund has raised roughly 687bn yuan over the past 12 years. Government-backed fund managers watched their coffers swell to nearly 400bn yuan last year, an increase of 75% from 2024. In December the state launched a 100bn-yuan national venture fund with a mandate to invest in aerospace, semiconductors, brain-linked machines and quantum technology. Many local governments, including in small cities, are creating similar vehicles using tax revenues and capital from local state companies. They are setting up “high-tech zones” and “AI parks” to lure innovative companies with tax breaks and other perks. These new tech businesses are meant to generate tax revenue and help local governments grow out of their debts, says Jean Oi of Stanford University. While officials wait for their homespun DeepSeek, the AI lab that stunned the world last year with its powerful model, the central government relaxes the rules to give them more time to repay their debts.

The massive expansion of investments and intense competition have generated spectacular failures.

In 2021 the city government of Yichun invested 2.3bn yuan to help build an EV factory in a sprawling National High-tech Development Zone. But in contrast to successful EV clusters like those in Shenzhen and Hefei, the facility was isolated from suppliers and expertise required to build cars efficiently. It has since halted production. The rest of the industrial zone looks just as lifeless… A decade ago a fund with local- and central-government money poured around 150bn yuan into Guizhou, a mountainous province in central China, mostly into data storage and cloud-computing. But these ventures could not be integrated with local industry. The companies building the data centres are based on the coasts, the server parts are made elsewhere and local demand for the data capacity is scarce… The north-western industrial city of Lanzhou has invested in commercial space flight and a “drone economy” project even as it struggled to pay its bus drivers for several years (asking them to take out personal bank loans to tide them over)…

Mr Xi’s industrial policy promotes fierce competition in which companies and their host places, sometimes down to city districts, duke it out. This competitive pressure pushes down prices and elevates quality. The best businesses which emerge from this free-for-all, like BYD in carmaking, Huawei in electronics or Xiaomi in both, are formidable and ready to take on the world. They are also rare—and concentrated in established commercial centres, with deeper talent pools and pockets. Profits are even rarer. Investment returns accrue less to individual companies and more to integrated supply chains, which lower costs and speed up product cycles and innovation, says Chi Lo of BNP Paribas, a bank. 

The share of industrial firms generating losses has shot to a record high of around 32% in April, up from 10% in 2011 and above the previous peak during the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Corporate debt is also high and rising. Mark Williams of Capital Economics, a consultancy, notes that Chinese firms owe twice as much to domestic banks and bond investors today as they did in 2019. In that period, GDP has expanded by a third. Companies may move away from productive activities and instead chase subsidies that are available for centrally supported sectors, he says… a trio of IMF economists calculated last year, China’s “total factor productivity” (which captures how efficiently both capital and workers are used) was 1.2% lower than it would have been in the absence of industrial policy over the past decade or so. GDP was 2% lower, equivalent to forgoing around $400bn in value added each year. The more companies get caught up in the chase for subsidies and, by slashing their prices, for customers, the harder it will be for them to wring out profits.

China faces a confluence of headwinds - slowing economy; weakening aggregate demand and consumer sentiments (with persistent low domestic consumption); ten quarters of factory deflation (PPI −2.6%) (involution or neijuan); the property market still in crisis and recovery perhaps still a few years away; local governments deeply indebted; large excess capacity across industries; growing backlash among trade partners against surging Chinese exports; intense competition among domestic companies squeeze margins and are leaving companies running losses; and zombie firms kept alive by local and central government subsidies, cheap credit, and debt repayment rescheduling. 

Each panel below is a single number with its recent track. Red is contracting or dangerous; amber is stalling; green is the part still running hot, which is exactly where the next overcapacity is building.

In an environment where consumption is weak, any squeeze on investment and reduction of exports (due to rising backlash among trade partners) will only lead to job losses and social discontent. This has increased the reliance on investments to achieve the 4.5-5% GDP growth rates. 

And exports are critical to absorb the excess capacity that has been built up.

After infrastructure, real estate, and manufacturing in the first two decades, the current focus of the investment-driven growth model has been advanced technology sectors like EVs, batteries, semiconductors, robotics, AI, etc., where there is also a geopolitical imperative arising from the Cold War with the US. The macroeconomic policy mantra has been to “hold growth at ~5%, protect jobs, and roll the borrowing forward each time.”

All this points to the model of a giant economy-scale Ponzi scheme where investment is shifting from one sector to another in order to sustain a target GDP growth rate and prevent job losses, while also accumulating a growing pile of massive debts. 

A debt-funded model works only while each new yuan of credit produces enough output to service it. In China, that link has snapped: credit keeps compounding while nominal growth fades - the classic signature of a system paying old debts with new ones.

The cleanest unsustainability signal isn't the debt level per se but its productivity: total social financing has passed 309% of GDP, and in 2025 credit grew +8.9% while nominal GDP grew just +4.1% — more than twice as much debt as output. When each extra point of growth costs ever more borrowing, new credit is increasingly servicing yesterday's liabilities rather than funding tomorrow's, which is the arithmetic that ends the loop. And this is also reflected in the continuously rising fiscal deficit, especially in the off-balance sheet side. 

Worsening matters, these trends coincide with a period in which fiscal revenues have flatlined in nominal terms and declined relative to the economy since 2020.

As the RAND report writes, with the fiscal space disappearing, the government has relied on credit and mandates to keep the wheel spinning. 

Beijing can still mobilize large-scale borrowing for industrial policy. The central government and policy banks retain substantial capacity because Beijing can expand bond issuance, and national commercial or policy banks raise trillions of yuan annually in quasi-sovereign debt to finance strategic sectors. By contrast, local governments are squeezed; bond quotas are capped, land sale revenue has fallen, and off–balance sheet LGFV borrowing is under regulatory pressure. The most important immediate trigger was Beijing’s “three red lines” policy introduced in 2020, which sharply curtailed developer borrowing and land sales. Because land sales to developers had long been a major source of revenue for local governments, the resulting property downturn led directly to a collapse in land sale proceeds and fiscal capacity at the local level. A correction was likely inevitable because of the structural exhaustion of a land finance model that relied on perpetually rising property values to fund local growth. Therefore, localities are less able to cofinance subsidies or guidance funds. 

Policy is shifting as a result. Centrally directed (or funded) credit and investments remain important. Meanwhile, traditional cash subsidies and local incentives play a reduced role. Government procurement has fallen relative to GDP. Instead, Beijing is leaning on lower-cost directives and mandates (including procurement requirements, regulatory obligations, and selective credit guidance) that require less fiscal outlay but effectively spread the costs of industrial policy across firms and institutions required to comply. 

There are hard limits to how far this can go. 

Since around 1980, the political bargain between the Communist Party and the Chinese people was simple - rising prosperity in exchange for political acceptance. With consumption weak, any squeeze on investment, or a real loss of export markets to a rising trade backlash, flows straight into jobs. Youth unemployment is already near 18%. The flywheel is kept spinning not only for growth, but to keep that bargain intact. How long can the flywheel keep spinning?