Some thoughts on the Hyderabad model of urban growth

This is a long read, triggered by a recent article in The Economist lauding Hyderabad’s vertical growth-enabling policy. 

It is an opportunity to think more broadly about the drivers behind Hyderabad’s spectacular urban growth over the last three decades, one with few precedents in India. Also, to avoid drawing the wrong lessons from the city’s success in economic growth and real estate development, this post will provide some qualifications. It will point to the role of the government, the political economy and the role of large developers, and the consequences of deficient urban planning. Finally, it will offer some comparison between the Hyderabad model and those of Gurgaon and Shenzhen.

The Economist article lauds Hyderabad’s vertical growth and the enabling policy of the government. 

Hyderabad, unique among India’s cities, abolished fsi in 2006. And then, miraculously, life went on. NIMBYs foretell all sorts of doom the moment anyone talks about building anything. They warn of Gothamesque ghettos with gridlocked streets, dry taps and overflowing sewers. Nonsense. Today tall residential blocks line the highways in Hyderabad’s western suburbs and traffic still flows faster than in most major Indian cities. Dozens more towers, including the Trump ones, are sprouting in a neighbourhood called Kokapet that was not long ago full of custard-apple orchards and is now a forest of construction cranes. 

There are two reasons Hyderabad has not descended into dystopia. One is its 160 km-long orbital motorway, the first bit of which opened in 2008 and is now an arterial road in the new skyscraper belt. The other is that abolishing the arbitrary cap on FSI did not mean the abandonment of all rules. Regulations covering minimum street widths and required setbacks still apply. Aviation authorities impose restrictions around air-traffic funnels. The effect is that developers can build high only if they have a large enough plot next to a wide enough street somewhere far enough from an airport. Markets decide the rest. The cost of construction rises with height, so a builder’s decision about how much to pay for land and how tall to go rests on whether potential buyers of flats will cough up enough to make the project profitable. That has prevented a housing bubble.

For a start, Hyderabad’s spectacular urbanised growth over the last three decades owes primarily to government actions. Four, in particular, stand out. 

1. The spurt of IT services industries locating to Hyderabad provided the economic anchor to sustain the spectacular property development that followed. Its emergence owes all to government policies. From having nothing apart from a small software cluster at Mythrivanam, the spectacular boom in the IT industry was catalysed by the conscious efforts of the then government of Andhra Pradesh in the mid to late nineties. It established the 158-acre HITEC City at Madhapur through a PPP between APIIC and L&T, with Cyber Towers being the iconic building. The then Chief Minister, Mr Chandrababu Naidu, toured the US and Singapore extensively, wooing software firms, and his efforts culminated in Bill Gates's visit in 2001 and the announcement of Microsoft’s largest R&D centre outside Redmond. It was followed by GE and ICICI and a flood thereafter and continues to this date, expanding to all kinds of sectors and innovations. The Cyberabad brand took off. 

Starting with a few hundred in the early nineties, Telangana state’s IT employment has moved from 0.4 million in FY14 to about a million in FY25, and 85–90% of that sits in the western Hyderabad corridor. 

2. The state’s IT services push was supported by the Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Investment Corporation (APIIC)’s model of acquiring land, developing trunk infrastructure (transport and utilities), and leasing/selling with clear titles through a single window at concessional rates to incoming firms. This too, like with the ORR, had its set of controversies and scandals.

Apart from the L&T HITEC City, APIIC developed the initial 100-acre Financial District at Nanakramguda, and several others. HMDA has been the price-discovery mechanism for the entire premium belt through its periodic auctions that have unlocked vast extents of government lands. The high premium commanded by these auctions is also because the state layout provides serviced plots with clear title. This is closer to a Chinese SEZ-style state land-lease model than to Gurgaon's private-land-assembly model.

3. The Outer Ring Road (ORR) has been transformational to the urban growth in the western part of the city. Notwithstanding all the controversies on the alignment finalisation, land acquisition, contracts, and tolling, the Hyderabad ORR should count as a totemic example of high growth-catalysing infrastructure investment in India’s history. It unlocked value by enabling the vast hinterland of barren and rocky lands to become productive centres. It was a truly visionary project when conceived in the early 2000s and even when its execution started in 2005. 

The ORR enabled orbital and radial access to the city, thereby resetting the commute dynamics and unlocking vast barren lands, reducing times by multiples. It is no surprise that every land price in the corridor is capitalised against ORR access time. HMDA’s designation of a 1-km high-density buffer on either side of the ORR effectively unlocked about 316 sq km of premium-development-eligible land, the value created from which dwarfs the ₹6,700 cr cost of the road itself.

The ORR did the work of several economic growth crowding-in instruments, and produced the pattern of intense capitalisation of access to it, and (on the flip-side) the neglect of everything it does not touch.

4. The last enabler, the subject of The Economist article, is the deregulated development control regulations, specifically the unlimited FAR adjoining wide roads brought in by the GO Ms No 86 of 2006. In fact, even among the DCR, the GO’s success was only in its deregulation of the FAR. The high FAR manifests in the most salient aspect of Hyderabad’s real estate growth, the skyline of massive high-rises. 

Even with all the above, it also critically required the enterprise, vision, and risk appetite of a handful of local real estate developers (My Home, Rajapushpa, Aparna, etc.) who hoarded large land banks in anticipation of the developments since the late nineties and early 2000s in the run-up to the boom. Only large real estate developers could afford to take the risks that lock up huge upfront capital and endure the vagaries of business cycles. 

However, it has managed to escape the market concentration that characterises markets like Gurgaon. The nature, scale and pace of development have also ensured that while a dozen developers account for the bulk of Grade-A supply, and the top three alone control about 64 million sq ft of upcoming pipeline, there is a long tail of over 30 mid-tier local names.

Such entrepreneurship could also flourish only in a political economy and social milieu which condoned the often questionable overlapping of public and private interest, and deep-rooted corruption. Governments changed, but the underlying model and ongoing work continued unhindered. It is a very good example of Mancur Olson’s stationary bandit at work. 

The combination of the 158-km Outer Ring Road, an unlimited-FSI building regime, a hospitable IT policy, and a handful of developers with 2000s-era land banks has added roughly a mid-sized city's worth of office, housing and vehicles to a 200-square-kilometre arc of west Hyderabad in about a decade-and-a-half. The public sector supplied the foundation. The private sector built on it. What emerged are pockets of car-dependent, single-use, higher-income, gated communities, with limited mass transit or affordable housing. 

This brings us to the issue of urban planning. 

Here, apart from the single instrument of unlimited FAR in the development control regulations, it is notable that the state fell short on the critical aspects of urban planning - master-planned mixed-use, walkable street grids, timely metro and mass transit access, transit-oriented density transfer, affordable housing, and vibrant public spaces and community life (apart from those in the gated communities). Even the unlimited FAR has its set of problems. 

However, it can also be argued that more than state failure, these outcomes were the result of private incentives and the political economy overwhelming urban planning imperatives. The reality of developers with large land banks near the ORR and their close relationships with both politicians and bureaucrats trumped all other factors. 

In any case, they have had several undesirable long-term consequences. Here are a few.

1. Residential real estate development has almost completely taken the form of high-rise gated communities and villas, all serving the upper middle-class and above. Affordability has been the casualty. 

The sub-1000 sqft supply is a mere 2–4% of the west corridor’s pipeline, versus 13% for Hyderabad city and 18% at the all-India top-7-city level. Apart from public housing under various government schemes, it will be a big surprise if there is even one development of housing in the 600 sqft range and below, catering to the lower-income class. The corridor’s default product is a 1,500–2,200 sqft 3 BHK, forming half of everything built, and easily catering to the upper-income class. 

This is a resounding nod to the reality that even in the most deregulated contexts and rapidly growing economic regions, affordable housing and lower-income housing will remain heavily under-supplied. It must be acknowledged as an area of market failure, requiring policy action. 

A ₹10 lakh household income supports roughly a ₹65–80 lakh home, which puts everything from Kokapet, Financial District, Gachibowli, Madhapur, and Raidurg out of reach for a typical mid-career IT professional. Even a ₹25–30 lakh household income (senior IT / GCC AVP) is stretched at ₹2 Cr pricing in Financial District. What this means is that the corridor is now selling primarily to senior tech and finance executives, NRI, and dual-earner-tech/finance households. Junior and mid-level tech workers are being pushed to Tellapur/Kollur/Miyapur. Even in these peripheral areas, sub-1000 sqft housing reaches only about 8%. 

2. The revenue bias of the state government may have compounded the problems. The massive premiums commanded in the land auctions, coupled with the restrictive DCR (on setbacks and open space requirements), have distorted the real estate market and skewed it significantly upwards. For illustration, at ₹150 cr/acre for Neopolis land, the input land cost alone works out to ₹8,000–10,000 per saleable sqft (assuming 2.5–3.5 FSI usable given the large setback and open-space rules). Add construction (₹3,500–5,000/sqft for a premium tower), financing costs (typically 12–18% of project cost), developer margin (20–30%), and GST and other statutory levies/fees, and the total cost comes to ₹13,500–17,000/sqft. This land economics forces ₹4 Cr and above units. In contrast, in Velimela, where land is still ₹5–10 lakh/acre (not for long, one would imagine), 2 BHKs can come at ₹40 lakh. 

In fact, it can be safely said that the entire land-use regime consisting of the ₹150 cr/acre Neopolis land price, the setback rules that make sense only for large plates, the developer economics that require more than ₹80 lakh units to sustain the ORR-belt cost stack, has displaced sub-1000 sqft out of the ORR corridor. The real affordable-format supply in Hyderabad now exists outside the ORR corridor’s western arc, in Miyapur, Bachupally, Nizampet, Kompally (north-west), Kukatpally (central), Uppal, Nagole, LB Nagar, Ghatkesar (east), and Rajendranagar, Shamshabad, Adibatla (south). These are outside the ORR corridor’s western arc. Anarock’s Q3 2025 Hyderabad realty breakdown indicates that 87% of the new supply added was in the premium, luxury, and ultra-luxury segments, priced upward of ₹80 lakh, a figure which rises to more than 95% in the ORR corridor. These are figures that point to a serious housing crisis. 

3. This has been despite the HMDA having a 5% of developable area mandate for each of the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) and Lower Income Group (LIG). Builders have the flexibility to construct it on alternative land within a 5 km radius. However, there is not even a single instance of any developer having built physical units using this option. Instead, they have preferred to use the cash-out loophole of paying a shelter fee, which was carved by amending the Special Development Regulations for the ORR Growth Corridor. It allows developers to pay a capitalisation fee equivalent to 1.5 times the basic land value to HMDA. The low basic land value means this becomes a cheap option, one immediately capitalised into the cost of construction. 

This must count as one of the biggest missed opportunities of Hyderabad’s ORR-based growth, and adds to the list of planning and policy failures. More importantly, the amendments to the EWS/LIG mandate underline the dominance of real estate developer interests. 

4. Also, given the lack of any public transport connectivity linking them, these gated communities are car communities. The very large enclosed boundaries of these communities mean that they are not walkable localities, thereby further isolating the communities and increasing the reliance on cars.

The Phase 1 Blue Line of the metro terminates at Raidurg, on the eastern edge of HITEC City, whereas the next 5–6 km, as in the schematic, contains the highest concentration of new office and residential capex in the corridor, and it has no rail transit at all (though they are included in the Phase 2 corridor of 11.6 km whose work has just started). They are also served sparsely by a fragmented bus network. Even when completed, the configuration and the nature of the development in the area make it sub-optimally useful. 

The metro gap is perhaps the single most consequential planning failure of the western corridor. Hyderabad, like others in India, are seeking to fit the metro into a built-form, instead of shaping the built-form around a built or planned metro. 

5. Furthermore, they are also not mixed-use developments (the institutions/offices, residences, and commercial areas are distinct), thereby forcing households to commute to buy their groceries and vegetables. To some extent, the basic requirements are met by having small shops inside each gated community selling groceries and vegetables/fruits. But outside of this, all commutes are long and car-based. It is unsurprising, therefore, that, like elsewhere in India, there is not one example of Transit Oriented Development (TOD) among the current stations. 

6. The absence of lower-income housing, coupled with the redevelopment and gentrification of even the erstwhile villages, has meant that West Hyderabad must rely on distant areas for various household services. Housemaids, drivers, and other help must travel long distances using autos and bikes to come and work in these communities. Apart from the costs on their lives, this creates their own set of problems (like getting a housemaid early morning or having a driver stay back late, or even their reliability). 

7. The “unlimited” FAR also meant that the government has foregone large revenues in the form of sale of purchasable FAR permitted over a base FAR (which comes with the property right). It can, however, be said that its absence has lowered the cost of construction and boosted supply. For now, the foregone revenues have been recovered many times over in various forms of economic activities, thanks to all the complementary actions that confluenced in the region’s development. 

All this means that West Hyderabad has made its choice of a pattern of living that revolves around secluded gated residential communities and is car-based, instead of the walkable, mixed-use, mass-transit and outdoor public-spaces-based living that characterises many western cities. There are benefits and costs with each model. But once the choice is made, it is almost cast in stone. 

It is also pertinent that while West Hyderabad has developed at this pace, the same planning and development control regulations (DCRs) have had no impact on the rest of the city. Economic growth over the last two decades has largely bypassed the existing twin cities of Hyderabad-Secunderabad and facilitated western suburban expansion. It is hard to think of even one example of meaningful-sized urban regeneration or redevelopment in the remaining parts of the city. It can even be argued that the development of the western ORR corridor has come at the cost of the rest of the city. 

This also reflects the restrictive nature of the existing DCRs, despite the unlimited FSI. Very few, or hardly any, plots in the built-up city can avail this unlimited FSI, thereby pushing development outside to the suburbs and benefiting builders. This is one more illustration of the fact I blogged here that reforms to DCRs across Indian states have largely bypassed the built-up city and benefit only the greenfield suburban developments. 

How does Hyderabad’s development compare with two similar examples of rapid growth to scale - Gurgaon and Shenzhen? 

Unlike Gurgaon, which emerged primarily on the back of private land assembly enabled by the licensing regime of Haryana’s Development & Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) and even private infrastructure development (e.g., CyberHub metro), the government had a big role to play in the development of the other two. In Hyderabad, as aforesaid, the government aggregated lands, allocated and auctioned them, while also developing the trunk infrastructure. 

Shenzhen is the extreme case of transformation of farmlands, with population rising from a mere 30,000 to 17.6 million in 40 years, and is instructive for its sequencing. It built the metro alongside, not decades behind, the office and housing pattern. Shanghai Pudong transformed farmland east of the Huangpu into finance-and-office from 1990 onward, but again with subway preceding the office boom. Songdo (Incheon) in South Korea is a smaller-scale but similarly planned-from-blank comparison.

Among the three cities, only Shenzhen retained state agency over the density and transit pattern of what it was building. West Hyderabad and Gurgaon both handed the pattern to developers who, rationally, given their incentives, built gated single-use tracts at the highest FAR they could get. The transit, water and sewer bill is what the state pays afterwards.

The best comparison for west Hyderabad is not Shenzhen (which had state agency), nor Gurgaon (which lacked any state trunk infrastructure). It is a distinct third pattern, created by strong state trunk infrastructure, state land assembly and allocation, weak state land-use and transportation planning, strong private densification, and remarkable entrepreneurship and risk-taking, all riding on a booming IT services industry. This third pattern deserves its own space in the Indian urban development literature.

Weekend reading links

1. Good long read in the Indian Express about the ridership deficit facing metro railway systems in India. This is a good website for network maps.

Radhika Shenoy, 28, a working professional in Hyderabad’s Secunderabad, points out that last-mile connectivity is a major challenge when she uses the Metro. “Neither my house nor my office is close to a Metro station. So, taking public transport becomes more expensive than using my own scooter or hiring a cab or auto,” she says... Manvika Shivhare, a 29-year-old lawyer based in Lucknow, says most people she knows never use the 23-km-long city Metro to get round the city, preferring to travel in an auto or two-wheeler instead. “The Metro is useful for going to the Airport, for which it would cost Rs 70, while the auto would take Rs 400. But none of us uses it for our daily commutes, since Lucknow is such a small city.” Shivhare says this won’t change even with the upcoming 11-km-long Line-2, connecting Charbagh Railway Station and Vasant Kunj in Lucknow.

2. India's crude oil imports from Russia rise to more than 2.6 million barrels per day in June and July.

3. The big semiconductor chip companies distort South Korean education priorities and the labour market.

For decades, South Korea’s brightest students gravitated towards medicine, and private tutors focused on helping students gain admission to elite universities. Now, some semiconductor departments sponsored by Samsung and SK Hynix — which guarantee employment after graduation — are attracting growing interest, and cram schools are catering to job seekers pursuing lucrative chipmaking careers. In the 2026 admissions cycle, SK Hynix-linked semiconductor programmes at several leading universities recorded higher application rates than medical schools, whose applicant numbers fell by nearly a third to a five-year low. 

Kwon Seok-joon, an engineering professor at Sungkyunkwan University, said generous chipmaker bonuses had altered how students viewed the trade. “For 20 years, medicine was the only path that guaranteed both wealth and prestige in Korea,” he said. “The Hynix bonus broke that monopoly. For the first time, chip engineers are in the same league as doctors when families discuss a safer future.”... In May, Samsung reached a landmark profit-sharing agreement with its 78,000 semiconductor employees, with average payouts expected to approach $400,000 in the memory chip division. Rival SK Hynix agreed last year to distribute 10 per cent of operating profits to workers over the next decade, implying average bonuses of about $500,000 this year based on projected earnings.

4. More evidence of lagging salary growth amidst rising sales growth.

Growth in net sales of 3,057 non-finance companies in the June quarter was 22.18 per cent year-on-year, according to a Business Standard analysis of the numbers from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy... Salaries in the June quarter went up at less than half the pace at which sales have grown — at less than 9 per cent... The starkest contrast was in the mining sector, where sales grew 40.83 per cent and salaries and wages 1.04 per cent. Lower growth in wages has likely he­lped operational profits, where margins had come under pressure because of higher costs of raw materials.

5. Labour market expectations from the PLFS 2023 survey data.

Our job seekers expect up to 40 per cent higher salary than actual earnings reported in the PLFS for the same occupation. Male job seekers, in particular, show greater over-optimism in salary expectations relative to women, expecting almost Rs 8,000 more per month than the actual average earnings for these jobs and Rs 8,500 more per month for salaried jobs. Altogether, salary expectations diverge from reality by more than 30 per cent. When we assess the job aspirations and expectations of job seekers who are below 25 years of age in our sample, we find that expectations are even more skewed – again, more so for young men than young women... 

So we set out to inform and expose a random subset of our 3,000 job seekers to the real world and re-surveyed both the informed and the non-informed a year later. Twelve months after receiving information, we find that providing accurate information about job opportunities significantly dampened job seekers’ labour-market expectations of landing their ideal job relative to those who were not informed. Men, in particular, were less likely to report that they were on their ideal career path. This disillusionment is accompanied by a decline in men’s job-search intensity. Thus, as preferred job offers fail to materialise, job seekers adjust their expectations downwards and either remain in the same jobs or drop out of the labour market and enrol at educational institutions.

6. Is fusion energy, the process that energises stars and sun, about to become a reality?

Privately held fusion companies raised $4.5bn over the past year alone, according to the Fusion Industry 2026 report. There are now more than 50 such companies. Last month, General Fusion, a Canadian outfit backed by Jeff Bezos, became the first publicly listed fusion company. These signals hint at an important shift: fusion energy is gradually being perceived less as a scientific challenge and more as an economic one.

7. Made in Switzerland.

Switzerland, where manufacturing still accounts for almost 19 per cent of GDP, twice the contribution from its celebrated financial services industry. The white cross on a red background, emblazoned on products from Heule precision tools to Caran D’Ache pencils, is both a guarantee of quality that is understood worldwide, and a valuable marketing device for Swiss manufacturers... Switzerland has the highest proportion of high-tech manufacturing of any of the OECD’s 38 member countries...

A landlocked country of 9mn people, with few natural resources and some of the world’s highest wages, is not an obvious starting point for a manufacturing success story. But the Swiss made it work. Companies responded to high wages and an appreciating currency by becoming more productive, more specialised, more sophisticated and more expensive, while focusing on global markets rather than their small pool of domestic consumers. “Swiss Made” became shorthand for the result: watches, machinery and precision tools good enough that customers around the world would pay extra for them. One of the results is an economy unusually rich in relatively small companies that dominate particular niches. A study published this summer identified 100 such Swiss businesses, together generating more than SFr40bn in annual revenues. They range from VAT, a maker of vacuum valves used in semiconductor production, to Burckhardt Compression and specialist manufacturers such as Rondo, whose machines shape dough into pastries in bakeries around the world...

That strength is underpinned by an unusually deep apprenticeship system. About two-thirds of young Swiss pursue vocational education and training, most learning partly inside companies — supplying manufacturers with generations of machinists, technicians and other skilled workers. Bern pushed its commitment to open markets still further in January 2024 when it unilaterally abolished all tariffs on imports of industrial goods. The government argued that such protection had become counter-productive: cheaper imported components would reduce costs for Swiss factories embedded in global supply chains... at least 60 per cent of manufacturing costs must generally be incurred in Switzerland and an essential manufacturing step must take place there for the product to qualify as “Swiss Made”.  

But protectionism and the appreciating franc are denting the country's competitiveness and manufacturing base. 

8. The changing face of economics research. First, the dominant fields of research are changing.

Second, it is reaching out to other disciplines.

A research paper by Tom Harris, an economics PhD student at the London School of Economics, bears this out. Aggregating the literature published in 24 leading economic journals between 2000 and 2025 and NBER working papers between 2021 and 2025, he found the share of papers written by teams spanning different fields had jumped 16 points to 35 per cent between 2000 and 2025, while solo-authored papers fell as a proportion of the literature from 34 per cent to 15 per cent.

Third, economics research is becoming more empirical.

Research from Prashant Garg, a postdoctoral researcher at Bocconi University, and Thiemo Fetzer, economics professor at Warwick University, finds causal claims in economics have jumped. In 1990, 7.7 per cent of claims made in the literature were causal. In 2023, that hit 32.6 per cent. Additionally, papers with more causal claims are more likely to receive citations and wind up in top five journals, the research suggests.

And this turn to empiricism has had not so good consequences.

Results derived from real-world data and experiments are hard to replicate under the same conditions and methodology, with research suggesting that up to 70 per cent of recently examined economics papers contain some results that cannot be reproduced. Sometimes this is simply because the data is broken or otherwise unavailable to other researchers, although other theories abound: pressure to publish, data manipulation, patterns of funding and structural incentives in the academy, for instance. There are also cynical explanations, such as questionable research practices or fabricated data sets.

9. Israel's economic squeeze on Palestine is less reported but adds one more dimension to the genocide.

Israel quickly canceled permits for tens of thousands of Palestinian laborers to reach their workplaces in Israel... Since the start of the Gaza war, unemployment in the West Bank has skyrocketed to 28 percent, more than double the rate before the conflict... Then, in May 2025, Israel started confiscating hundreds of millions of dollars per month in import taxes that it collects on the Palestinian Authority’s behalf. This revenue stream accounts for about two-thirds of the West Bank government’s budget for 2026 of about $6 billion, according to Palestinian officials. That deficit has forced the Palestinian Authority to lower the salaries of 140,000 civil servants and security officers, shorten school weeks to three days and accumulate billions of dollars in debt... 

Israel has also erected new roadblocks across the West Bank, stifling the movement of goods within the territory... Israel has also limited the amount of shekels that Palestinian banks are allowed to send to Israeli banks, a crucial process that helps enable Palestinian merchants to buy goods from Israel and the rest of the world. The Netanyahu government permits quarterly transfers of about $1.5 billion from Palestinian to Israeli banks — far less than previous administrations allowed. The restrictions have resulted in about $5.7 billion languishing in bank vaults in the West Bank, according to Palestinian government and banking officials.

10. The public sector dependency in the UK

In Britain 50-60 per cent of the electorate works in the public sector or gets benefits or a state pension, suggesting a tipping point has been hit.

11. India's labour market facts of the week.

A new NITI Aayog report notes that about 87 million people aged 15-29 are outside education, employment or training, while only 8.25 per cent of graduates are employed in jobs aligned with their qualifications.

12. The Economist has an excellent article that points to research about the impact of AI on students. David Stromberg of Stockholm University and Victor Lei and Wu Yanhui of the University of Hong Kong tracked 27,000 pupils aged 12-18 in China, where AI adoption has been fast. Around 80% reported using models such as Doubao and DeepSeek, and the other 20% formed the control group.  

After six months, pupils using AI saw their average homework score rise by 18% across all subjects. The time they took to complete each assignment fell from an average of 64 minutes to 45. But come exam time, the same students scored 20% below their classmates who had not called on AI’s help. Homework scores once predicted exam performance; now those who score highest are, perversely, more likely to do worse in exams.

The drop in exam scores was concentrated among students who rushed their homework. Those who used AI but spent as long on assignments as non-users paid little penalty. What matters, then, is how pupils use the technology. Those whose exam results remained strong were not simply copying and pasting answers to save time. More likely they used the chatbots as a personal tutor, perhaps to explain difficult concepts or help solve specific problems.

John Burn-Murdoch says this finding underlines the importance of conscientiousness (or self-discipline) in this modern digital age with all its distractions and access to shortcuts. 

Derisking the financing of infrastructure sector segments

A striking feature of urban infrastructure financing in India is the negligible role played by debt, especially bank loans. It should be a policy priority to significantly increase the mobilisation of debt prudently and sustainably for urban infrastructure projects. 

In this context, I have blogged here with a proposal to leverage the viability gap funding (VGF) scheme of the Department of Economic Affairs, Government of India, to mobilise bank loans and other debt. The idea is to use VGF to transform the project economics to make it commercially viable for banks to lend to municipalities without a sovereign guarantee and against project revenues. This would be an incentive-compatible form of desirable debt, and also provide a pathway to boost the uptake of the struggling VGF window. 

The newly announced Urban Challenge Fund (UCF) of the Government of India is a step in this direction. The ₹1 lakh crore scheme seeks to transition cities toward market-based financing by providing central assistance up to 25% of the total project cost for projects that are able to mobilise at least 50% of the project cost from market sources like commercial bank loans or municipal bonds. The remaining 25% is to come from state and municipal governments. 

The UCF should avoid the kind of incentive-misaligned recourse debt mobilised against the municipal general funds and/or with state government guarantees. Instead, it should try to ensure that the debt is non-recourse, mobilised against project revenues and without any sovereign guarantee. This kind of debt ensures fiscal discipline and a sustainable pathway to financing urban infrastructure. The UCF guidelines are silent on this important distinction. In fact, there is a case for a substantial incentive within the scheme itself to nudge cities in this direction.

However, initiatives like the UCF and VGF are unlikely to generate adequate uptake if they are implemented as a regular government scheme, and directly between the central and state governments. For one, the rigid and bureaucratic nature of project appraisals, approvals, program administration, and payment tranche releases is unsuited to finance projects involving private capital. Further, the operationalisation of such financing will require getting a few things right on both the demand and supply sides, which requires a market-making role. 

On the demand side, it requires the creation of a shelf of projects that can be structured to access project finance. Developing a good quality pipeline of ready-to-finance projects entails a non-trivial cost and requires a project development fund. The category of projects, like those in water and sewerage, solid waste management, bus transit, electricity distribution, etc., are best placed to benefit. 

On the supply side, it requires derisking and increasing banks' appetite, in particular, to finance such projects. Nothing is more effective than a few successful demonstrations of project finance for municipal projects. Today’s commercially attractive infrastructure sectors like national highways, thermal and renewable power generation, parking, etc., got derisked over time through a handful of successes.

This facilitation of the demand-side and easing of supply-side concerns requires active market-making. The infrastructure development finance institutions (DFIs) like National Infrastructure and Investment Fund (NIIF) and National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development (NaBFID) are well placed to act as infrastructure investment banks to make this happen by providing technical assistance to develop the project and structure project financing (without recourse to general municipal funds or state government guarantees), mobilising lenders to help achieve financial closure, and contributing the derisking financing layer. 

Accordingly, at least a part of the grant allocation for schemes like VGF and UCF could be made available for these DFIs to build a pipeline of projects and finance them. A proportionate share of the Project Preparation and Capacity Building Fund (PPCBF) under the UCF should also be transferred to them. This should be part of an explicit mandate for these DFIs to derisk projects clearly specified sectors for bank and bond finance. 

If successful, it would be a powerful example of market catalysis of the kind that is central to the mandate of DFIs.

Weekend reading links

1. Germany used to be the unquestioned global leader in chemicals, machinery, and automobiles. Now, thanks to the onslaught from China, it has fallen on bad times. Sample this on automobiles.

When German companies expand or build factories, it is often in places like Hungary, China or Mexico. The number of cars produced in Germany has fallen 28 percent since 2016, according to the VDA, the German automakers’ association, putting the country well behind China, the United States, Japan and India. Germany could soon also be overtaken by South Korea and Mexico... The German carmakers face an assault on two fronts. In China — the world’s largest car market — sales of foreign car brands are plummeting. And Chinese automakers are making big strides in Europe. In June, Chinese carmakers outsold Japanese carmakers in Western Europe for the first time, according to figures compiled by Schmidt Automotive Research.

China was once a lucrative market for the Germans, accounting for 37 percent of Volkswagen sales in 2019. But after Chinese automakers learned how to manufacture cars through joint ventures with foreign carmakers, the tables turned. BAIC Group, an automaker owned by the Chinese government, has become Mercedes’s largest shareholder, with a stake of almost 10 percent. Chinese companies like BYD and Geely Auto were quicker to develop electric vehicles that were heavily promoted by the Chinese government and are selling briskly in Europe. The Germans took too long to offer appealing electric vehicles. Volkswagen sold 26 percent fewer cars in China in the first six months of the year compared with a year earlier, while Mercedes reported a 28 percent decline and BMW a 20 percent slump.

2. The latest on AI's limitations on vertical use cases, explained with three illustrative use cases.

While A.I. can excel regularly at complex tasks, it can be unreliable when put in charge of an entire job. It can certainly add value to certain areas of the work force, but for now, A.I. still needs a human boss... In our experiment, we deployed A.I. “agents” to act as office workers and found that they were capable of performing some of the tasks we assigned, but not all of them. The agents, which can act autonomously and make decisions based on detailed instructions, excelled at problems they could solve by writing computer programs. But they struggled with understanding the nuances of human language and at navigating user interfaces like the Chrome web browser.

3. Important point about how wealth inequality has come to dominate income inequality as the reason for social discontent.

While wealth inequality has not changed much, the relative importance of wealth compared to income has. The median household’s disposable net worth (net property and financial wealth excluding pensions) in the UK, US, Germany and France has roughly doubled in real terms since the mid-1990s; incomes have grown by only around 30 per cent. The result is that where a generation ago it would have taken about 20 years of savings from the average salary to earn your way from the bottom quarter of the UK’s wealth distribution to the top quarter, it now takes 40. There are similar or even larger upward extensions to society’s economic ladder elsewhere.

This is all the more pernicious since the growing role of passive wealth gains (whether gifted by an asset price boom or one’s parents) relative to income in determining someone’s economic status is mirrored by their growing importance for wellbeing. In the 1990s income rank mattered more than wealth rank for life satisfaction or avoiding distress. Since then wealth has become steadily more influential and is now the larger driver. 

4. Ukraine has run out of Patriot air defence systems to shoot down incoming Russian ballistic missiles. 

5. Chrystia Freedland on Baumol's disease and public services.

Baumol’s assignment was to determine why in-person classical music performances seemed harder to fund. He found that the snag wasn’t that the musicians were getting worse — it was that the rest of the economy was getting better. It took four musicians one hour of work to perform a Schubert string quartet, exactly the same as it always had done. But four hours of human labour would produce roughly a hundred times as much wheat as it did in the pre-industrial era. For manufactured goods, the multiple is even greater. The same insight applies to taking a two-year-old on a walk in the park, or supporting a mother as she gives birth. As such, Baumol’s disease poses a knotty challenge for the state in liberal democracies because so much of what governments do is more like playing the violin than manufacturing a car.

6. Two points from John Burn-Murdoch's latest on the crisis of social isolation among youth. First, the share of those without any in-person contact during a typical day rose sharply during the pandemic and has not returned back to normalcy.

The least socially connected are increasing their disconnectedness. 

7. Rent controls are back as housing prices rise.

Rent controls, where a government sets price limits on rents or annual rent increases for certain types of housing, tend to be effective in their primary objective. A 2024 review of dozens of studies on the policy published globally between 1967 and 2023 found controls were effective in capping rents. The quid pro quo, say their critics, is that they increase rents on unregulated properties and reduce the overall supply and quality of housing in the long term... Of the 38 members of the OECD club of mostly richer nations, 23 already have some form of rent control. Ireland and Austria widened the scope of existing rules this year... In practice, rent regulation can encompass a wide range of measures. Outright freezes, such as in New York, tend to be temporary. More enduring limits can apply to existing or new tenancies, or both, and may apply nationwide or be focused on areas of high rental demand. There are often exemptions, such as for newly built properties, and a variety of yardsticks are used to determine the size of permitted increases... 

New Yorkers are the most burdened tenants in the US. Despite decades of regulation, new renters in the city spend an average of 40 per cent of their income on rent. Rent stabilisation — where annual increases are set by a city board based on its assessment of the market, inflation and other variables — is the main mechanism, applying to almost a million units. Households living in rent-stabilised apartments tend to have median incomes lower than overall renter households... In Berlin about 700,000 households, or a third of the total, spend more than 45 per cent of their income on rent, according to the Berlin Tenants’ Association. Like several hundred other high-demand areas in Germany, Berlin is subject to the Mietpreisbremse, or rental brake, a 2015 law that applies to new leases, and the Kappungsgrenze, introduced two years earlier, which limits rises on certain types of existing tenancies. Despite these guardrails, rents have risen almost 70 per cent over the past decade. 

Scotland has come up with new rent controls which have evoked interest globally.

The new controls are more precisely calibrated than before; they will apply only to specific areas, last for a maximum term of five years, and limit rent increases for both new and existing tenancies to consumer price inflation plus 1 per cent, up to a 6 per cent maximum. There are some exemptions, for instance properties that are coming to the rental market for the first time.

8. China's investment slump deepens in July.

Industrial output expanded 4.5 per cent in July on a year earlier, official statistics showed on Monday, short of the 4.8 per cent forecast by a Reuters analyst survey and growth of 5.3 per cent in June. Retail sales rose just 0.6 per cent last month, compared with analyst forecasts of 1.5 per cent growth and 1 per cent in June, as the waning effects of consumer goods trade-in subsidies weighed on household spending. Fixed asset investment declined 6.7 per cent for the first seven months of the year on the same period in 2025, deepening from a 5.7 per cent drop in the year to June. 

9. On RBI's exchange rate interventions.

Over the last 10 years, across spot and forward markets, the RBI’s net annual currency intervention has averaged about $60 billion, or 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). During FY21 and FY22, when India’s balance of payments generated surpluses, the RBI net purchased $157 billion. That effectively put a floor on the exchange rate. In contrast, the RBI sold a significant $118 billion in FY25, helping restrict the rise in USD/INR from 83.50 to 85.50. Between April 2025 and February 2026, the RBI sold another $37 billion, even as USD/INR moved up to 91. Following the outbreak of the Iran war, the RBI sold a further $37 billion in March 2026 alone, with USD/INR eventually ending the month around 93.50... Such interventions were not necessarily incorrect. But when sustained at this scale and over such timeframes, it inevitably influences currency levels, not just volatility...

The RBI also intervenes in bond markets and modulates banking liquidity to facilitate monetary-policy transmission. During FY26, India’s net government debt across central and state government bonds and Treasury bills grew by ₹17.8 trillion. About ₹10.6 trillion was net purchased by banks, insurers, and pension and provident funds, which have regulatory obligations to buy such bonds. The RBI’s own holdings net increased by the remaining ₹7.2 trillion, thus accounting for a substantial 40 per cent of the incremental government debt... The RBI’s large bond purchases and liquidity operations helped keep rupee-denominated interest rates below levels that might otherwise have been required to attract discretionary savings.

10. Israeli national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, a hardline settler previously convicted of incitement to racism, advocates killing Gazans each night. 

“I think we should be doing 30 to 40 targeted assassinations per night,” Ben-Gvir said. “Not just those who pose an immediate threat. There are people there who don’t deserve to live . . . They are not even people.” Ben-Gvir also called for the re-establishment of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territory, saying he envisaged “all Gaza” belonging to Israel and reiterating his previous calls for Palestinians to “emigrate”. “I imagine settlements not just in Gush Katif but throughout Gaza, and encouraging emigration, the more the better,” he said, referring to settlements that were dismantled by Israel in 2005. “And for the terrorists, there should be no emigration. We should just kill them one by one.”

11. Fear of AI is uniting American politics.

Almost three quarters of Americans do not trust businesses to use AI responsibly, according to Gallup. More than 70 per cent oppose having data centres built in their area because of fears about water and electricity inflation. Eighty per cent or more distrust AI for driving, medical advice and corporate hiring decisions. As The New York Times recently put it, fear of AI is the “most bipartisan issue since beer”. That feeling is as strong in the centre as it is on the Maga right and the democratic socialist left. That such fears are often conspiratorial should be no surprise. Paranoia is a natural response to the unknown. Maga’s Steve Bannon calls data centres “weapons labs”. Marjorie Taylor Greene, the former pro-Trump lawmaker, refers to Big Tech as “Skynet” after the self-aware computer system that triggers nuclear holocaust in the Terminator movies. Progressives talk of AI killing US democracy and ushering in a Blade Runner-style dystopia.

12. The big economics story of the recent months is the return of interest rates.

13. For long the World Bank and IFC have tried to get African countries to capture value by investing in the processing of their natural resources. Nigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote is doing exactly that by constructing the world's second-largest petroleum refinery, which has allowed Nigeria to export refined oil to Europe and elsewhere, while also ensuring that Africa's largest crude producer does not need to import refined oil. 

His new $20 billion oil refinery in Lagos, which has seen a spike in demand for petroleum products — both in Africa and elsewhere — since the war began in February. Despite having abundant crude oil, Africa still relies heavily on imported fuel... Jet fuel shipments from the Dangote Refinery reached the U.S. market for the first time ever this year, according to the company. The Dangote Refinery was “the world’s single largest exporter of jet fuel” in April and May, said Daniel Evans, a vice president of S&P Global Energy, a market-research firm. Last month, the refinery was Europe’s largest supplier of jet fuel and diesel, according to Devakumar Edwin, a vice president of Dangote Industries. On Tuesday, Dangote Refinery said it had secured $1 billion in financial backing from a Dubai-based investment group to go public on the Nigerian stock exchange. If the listing goes through, it will be Africa’s largest-ever public offering.

14. The rise and rise of America's public debt.

The US’s national debt has hit a record $40tn as borrowing rises at a historic pace... It has grown by $3tn over the past year, its fastest ever pace outside the pandemic era... America’s national debt has surged over the past two decades, rising from less than $6tn (about $12tn in 2026 dollar terms) at the turn of the century as vast public spending during the financial crisis and Covid pandemic exacerbated yawning budget deficits. In the past 10 years alone, the overall debt burden has doubled. Debt held by the public — a key metric monitored by markets that excludes intragovernmental holdings — now exceeds $32tn, roughly equal to the size of the US economy. The Congressional Budget Office, a non-partisan watchdog, expects the debt held by the public to exceed the high of 106 per cent of GDP reached in the aftermath of the Second World War by the end of the decade and hit 120 per cent by 2036.

15. The moderation of Meloni...

As prime minister, Meloni’s cautious pragmatism has dismayed hardline Maga purists such as Bannon, who told Italian media she was “a total globalist” who had betrayed her “fundamental beliefs”. Meloni has paired tough measures to curb irregular migration with higher quotas for legal migrants, helping Italian businesses cope with labour shortages. She has also softened her anti-EU rhetoric and forged effective working relations in Brussels.

... and fall out with Trump.

After Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, Meloni — the only EU leader to attend his inauguration — sought to cast herself as Europe’s bridge to Washington, hoping it would strengthen her hand in Brussels and at home. Instead, Meloni has been tarnished in the eyes of many Italian voters by her close association with an unpopular US president. Trump has imposed high tariffs on EU imports, pressed Nato allies to sharply increase defence spending and attacked Iran — policies deeply damaging to Italian interests. “Her proximity to Trump has failed to give her any appreciable results,” said Riccardo Alcaro, research director at Rome’s Institute of International Affairs, calling her erstwhile friendship an “electoral albatross” as Meloni gears up for a bruising re-election campaign... analysts say Meloni’s difficulties with the White House reflect not only Trump’s personality but a Maga world view that appears to expect near-total subservience from its allies... Maga’s deep-rooted antagonism towards the EU as a political project also made it hard for any leader with a pan-European outlook “to cosy up” to the administration for long.

16. One of the biggest innovations of the 20th century, container shipping.

Seventy years ago it would take at least 10 days for a ship at London Docklands to be emptied and reloaded by around 50 dockers. Pilfering was rife, accidents were commonplace and port business was vulnerable to labour strikes. Then came the shipping container, an 8ft x 20ft steel box that needed increasingly vast vessels to carry an ever-expanding volume of goods... it takes cranes roughly 40 hours to empty and reload a large container ship — around 20,000 steel boxes lifted by 146-metre-high computerised cranes that move two containers every three to four minutes. That efficiency and scale is testament to the unglamorous steel container, an invention that has driven down shipping costs to such a low fraction of total manufacturing value that it has enabled the rapid expansion of global trade over the past 70 years... The box’s dimensions were standardised from 1968 — a step that is “frequently overlooked”, says Brian Slack, a professor in geography and planning at Concordia University, Montreal. Without it, “containerisation would not have been as revolutionary as it turned out to be”...

More than 280mn journeys were made by containers between world markets last year. They bear around two-thirds of global seaborne cargo — about 60 per cent of total world trade, according to UN Trade and Development. More than 7,000 container ships are currently operating. The largest can carry cargo equivalent to a 44-mile-long freight train with, for example, around 120,000 bananas or 10,000 pairs of jeans per box. The average size of the ships has more than doubled since 2000, according to the WSC... To service the demand for goods, shipping lines have ordered larger and larger ships. The current record size for a container ship is the so-called ultra-large container vessel MSC Irina, which has a carrying capacity of 24,346 twenty-foot equivalent containers, or TEUs. The number of new container ships on order is equivalent to around 40 per cent of the current sailing fleet — a record high.

17. Circular trading in China's humanoid robots industry.

China’s humanoid robot makers are generating much of their revenue from selling machines to government-backed training centres — which then collect and sell training data back to the robot makers, raising concerns about actual demand in an industry Beijing is keen to promote.

18. Data centre job creation facts.

At the peak of construction, according to a November 2025 study by the University of Southern California, a data centre in the US needs between 0.7 and 2 workers per megawatt. To build India’s targeted capacity of 10 GW by 2030, that works out to a peak construction workforce of 26,000... In direct employment, a 100 MW data centre supports 120–150 jobs. Take the generous end of that range and India’s 10 GW target yields 15,000 full-time, sustainable jobs. And these aren’t, for the most part, gold-collar jobs. A handful of C-suite roles rake in Rs 1 crore a year. Design and engineering workers make Rs 30–40 lakh. The staff who actually keep the lights on—on-site security and hands-on hardware engineers—earn around Rs 10 lakh. A recent study from the US—the world leader in data centres with an installed capacity of 55 GW—examined the employment records of 770 server farms going back two decades and concluded that the industry overstated their job impact by a factor of three at least. Apply the cut to India’s job-creation estimate and the promise wilts before a single server is switched on.

And who will use it.

Of the 10 GW capacity India intends to build by 2030, only a sliver is meant for the country. The industry estimates that 90–95% will be leased by foreign firms such as AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle, and Meta. Even now, of the roughly 2 GW already installed, barely 30% is used by Indian players.