Substack

Tuesday, February 8, 2011

Econ 101 about India's food inflation

Monetary policy failings, hoarders, black marketers etc are all straw men in India's inflation story. A cursory reading of Econ 101 teaches us that there is nothing surprising about the high food prices in India. It is the inevitable result of an interaction of supply constraints and an inelastic demand profile.



The result of all this is obvious. For very small supply volatility, prices fluctuate sharply. As can be visualized from the graphic, small supply squeezes translate into disproportionately high price increases.

Further, there are other forces at work that may be amplifying problems at both supply and demand ends. At the supply-end, the growing importance of big retailers, without proportionate increase in production, is squeezing supply elsewhere. Since the big retailers keep enough supply channels open to hedge against any supply shocks, the impact of the resultant scarcity is felt with much greater intensity in the remaining market.

And worryingly, the demand curve, atleast for vegetables, fruits, meat, and pulses, is getting more vertical. Not only are people consuming more, they are also willing to pay even more to access these hitherto luxury foods. Or, as Paul Krugman has written, "it takes big price rises to induce people to consume less, yet collectively that’s what they must do given the shortfall in production". The increased demand for processed foods too is putting pressure on food. As people shift from consuming chicken to sausages, the amount of chicken required to generate the same meal multiplies.

So, why are producers not responding to these price signals? The simple answer is that they are not getting those signals. The hopelessly inefficient agriculture distribution chain ensures that producers get only a small portion of the increased prices. The major share is captured along the chain by various intermediaries and traders.

There are no simple solutions for this conundrum. We need to increase production. This requires incentivizing farmers to expand their acreage and improve productivity. This requires both investments in agriculture and ensuring that farmers get remunerative prices for their produce. And this lies at the heart of any lasting solution to India's food inflation problem.

Update 1 (12/2/2011)

An NYT report indicates that while demand for lentils and beans are growing at 6.5% a year, supply is increasing less than 1%. See also this report on agriculture supply constraints in India.

Update 2 (16/2/2011)

See this Room for Debate on global food price inflation. See this article that explains how diversion of land for biofuel production has increased the pressure on foodgrain prices. Wheat and soy prices increase when corn prices are high, since their acreage allotment is replaced by corn. In addition, wheat and soy get substituted for corn as animal feed. High corn prices cause higher meat, dairy, wheat and soy prices for consumers.

See this FAO monitor on global food prices.

Monday, February 7, 2011

The consequences of widening inequality

Inequality is fast emerging as one of the biggest challenges facing the global economy. Conservatives have long argued that inequality underpins the incentive system that drives economic growth. They claim that it is not inequality but poverty that should agitate policy makers.

The most famous proponent of the "inequality is bad for the economy" hypothesis is Raghuram Rajan. In his book, Fault Lines, he blames the political response induced by growing inequality for the sub-prime mortgage bubble and the Great Recession. He argues that governments, especially in the US, found in credit an easy route to propping up living standards of those at the bottom. The asset bubbles that followed generated an income effect that would paper over the widening real inequality.

The concentration of wealth is stunning. Credit Suisse estimates that there were 24.2 million people in mid-2010 across the world who had assets exceeding $1 million. This 0.5% of the global adult population control $69.2 trillion in assets, more than a third of the global total. The richest 1% of adults control 43% of the world’s assets; the wealthiest 10% have 83%. The bottom 50% have only 2%.

Consider this superb and cognitively striking illustration of inequality in the US by Jean Pen

"Imagine people’s height being proportional to their income, so that someone with an average income is of average height. Now imagine that the entire adult population of America is walking past you in a single hour, in ascending order of income.

The first passers-by, the owners of loss-making businesses, are invisible: their heads are below ground. Then come the jobless and the working poor, who are midgets. After half an hour the strollers are still only waist-high, since America’s median income is only half the mean. It takes nearly 45 minutes before normal-sized people appear. But then, in the final minutes, giants thunder by. With six minutes to go they are 12 feet tall. When the 400 highest earners walk by, right at the end, each is more than two miles tall."


The Economist had a recent survey on inequality that laid down the conservative defence (or atleast rationalization) of inequality. It documented the spectacular rise in income inequality across the world and draws several conclusions. However, the survey is shockingly disingenuous in both what it presents as its conclusions and what it ignores.

The omissions first. I can think of two concerns about rising inequality and resultant concentration of wealth that screams out to any reasonably perceptive observer. The series of articles in The Economist has conveniently overlooked both, without even a passing reference.

1. The first is a political economy issue. The extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of the richest 0.1% has naturally raised questions about its impact on the political balance of power. There is enough meat from sociology and political science that highlight the inevitability of gravitation of power into the hands of those who populate the top of the income and wealth ladder.

In addition, of relevance to our times, there is a growing body of literature that documents how this extremely narrow group of people are fast becoming the new "power-elite". The Economist article itself points to the work of David Rothkopf who shows how the world economy is disproportionately influenced by 6000 politicians, chief executives and other bigwigs (remember Government Sachs!).

However, it ignores the most obvious conclusion and rationalizes by arguing that democratic electoral politics takes care of such concerns. This, as again widely documented, is doubtful, since an electoral change only replaces one group of "power-elite" with another. This is all the more so since political parties across the spectrum owe their existence to moneyed interests.

All this is not to say that the "power-elite" have edged out all other shades of opinion. I would only claim that the extent of their influence on important political decisions (which have deep economic and social implications) grows as inequality widens and concentration of wealth increases. And no right-minded individual would dispute the harmful effects of this trend.

The recent example of the US Government's response to the sub-prime crisis is a case in point. No stone was left unturned to bail out the too-big-to-fail financial institutions and repair corporate balance sheets. However, nothing remotely similar in commitment and urgency was evident when it came to bailing out homeowners stuck with negative equity and repairing household balance sheets.

The era of financial deregulation that preceded the two decades leading to the sub-prime crisis is another example of the power of this new elite. A small clique of Wall Street bankers and lobbyists, supported by politicians and regulators who stood to benefit, led a movement that systematically dismantled all regulatory oversight on dubious ideological grounds.

2. The second issue is socio-economic. The rich beget the rich. The world economy is increasingly one where the superstars, be it any field, rule the roost. By their very nature, superstars have to be a small sliver of the working population. This path to super-stardom is ever so more determined by the capricity of an ovarian lottery.

It is increasingly true that there are considerable entry-barriers to accessing opportunities that enables people gain a seat at the top-most income table. The major share of opportunities in the knowledge-driven economy are linked with either wealth endowments or educational attainments.

The wealthy inherit the business or assets of their parents. Their achievements are built on this formidable foundation. It is almost like running a marathon where a privileged few join the race at the last lap!

Access to the best education, itself confined to a handful of top universities, is increasingly a function of privileged birth than merit. This is especially so since the number of such educational institutions remain the same, while competition increases exponentially. The super-rich with their deep pockets are many times more likely to pass this competition than the poor or even the mere-rich.

In this context, the argument about merit is positively misleading. We all know that getting a seat in the best university is not merely about studying hard and writing an examination. It is about access to a number of smaller opportunities that spans the entire student-life (especially early childhood and family background), all of which present their own particular entry-barriers, which prepares the ground for accessing and competing successfully in the best educational institutions.

Even accepting the odd brilliant individuals who get past the formidable array of entry-barriers and access such education, it cannot be denied that the probability of such people are small and fast declining. This is in stark comparison to the near certainty of those at the top of the income ladder accessing such education. The competition to even access the opportunities that determine future life outcomes could not have been more unfair.

For every visible example of a person with uncommon intelligence rising from the bottom of the income pile and succeeding, there are numerous untold stories of disappointments suffered by such people. Further, while there cannot be any example of people from the bottom pile with commonplace intelligence striking rich, there is more than an even chance that people with similar biological endowments will find a place at the top of the income table.

The best example of this trend is the growing evidence of the alarming decline in social mobility across the income ladder in the US.

Some of the arguments are factually incorrect or amazingly ignorant in its conclusions. It finds a silver-lining in the way people are becoming rich today. Consider this

"... to become rich in the first place, they typically have to do something extraordinary. Some inherit their money, of course, but most build a better mousetrap, finance someone else’s good idea or at least run a chain of hairdressers in a way that keeps customers coming back. And because they are mostly self-made, today’s rich are restless, dynamic and much keener on change than the aristocrats of old."


This is plain factually incorrect. There is enough evidence to suggest that the major share of the super-rich increasingly inherit their wealth, either directly (by direct inheritance of massive wealth) or indirectly (by accessing privileged education). The examples of Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg stand out precisely because they are exceptions than the norm.

The lengthy discourse in the header article on the stress and hormonal imbalances created by inequality is a classic case of diverting attention from important issues. This is all the more surprising given the complete avoidance of the almost commonplace political economy failings that inequality generates.

The arguments to debunk the work of Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (the authors of "The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone") - who attributes all manner of social ills to inequality - is plain specious. Consider this rebuttal by Peter Saunders of Policy Exchange,

"Factors other than inequality are often more strongly correlated with the problems described in the book. In American states, for example, race is a far more accurate predictor of murder, imprisonment and infant-mortality rates... He also chides the authors... for glossing over social problems, such as divorce and suicide, that are worse in more equal countries."


This argument overlooks the role of widening income inequality in exacerbating the pre-existing fault-lines. In simple terms, prevailing racial and other social inequalities are one more entry-barrier that those populations face in the race to access the opportunities that enable people to sit at the top of the income table. The already disadvantaged groups face even greater hurdles in this race today.

Reflexivity and economic forecasting?

Mark Thoma has this reason for avoiding making economic forecasts,

"There's a good reason why I try to avoid forecasts. In the past, whenever I've tried to predict the path the economy would take, I've found myself reading subsequent data releases in a way that supports the forecast. I think that once you make a forecast, it affects your objectivity, and I think that applies generally, not just to me."


I cannot but not agree with Mark. An undoubted element of reflexivity and self-fulfilling logic is inevitable with any forecasting exercise. It is natural that we will tend to read subsequent data in a way that supports previous forecasts.

Sunday, February 6, 2011

Hedging away stock option risks

One of the important strands of executive compensation reform in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis was to shift more compensation into long-maturity stock options. This was intended to align employees’ interests more closely with those of investors and discourage excessive risk-taking. It was hoped that this would expose them to the long-term risk of that investment, which would incentivize them to work towards the longer-term health of the firm.

It now emerges that executives have been getting around this issue by hedging their downside on their holdings using complex investment transactions. Hedges allow employees to limit losses, raise cash, or diversify their portfolios without selling the underlying holdings. And no surprises for guessing who is leading the way - executives from Goldman Sachs (sample the Collar hedge below which while capping the potential upside also limits losses)!



Though most public companies, including Wall Street firms, have policies that ban hedging, albeit only their most senior executives, the practice is widespread at the lower levels. However, such hedges often put the executives interest in direct conflict with those of their company.

It is clear that reforming executive compensation is far from easy. Financial market reform is at best a moving target. Regulators and policy-makers have to be quick to respond to emergent distortions, if not be one-step ahead of the market. In practical terms, this means that instead of one-time enactments, they need to have legislations and rules that are constantly evolving in response to emergent scenarios.

The amazing pace of mobile phone penetration

Two graphics that puts the pace at which mobile phone usage has expanded in perpective. First, mobile phones have been adopted more than five times as fast as fixed line telephone services, which took 100 years to reach 80% of country populations.



The speed of its adoption remains unprecedented.



(HT: William Jack and Tavneet Suri)

Saturday, February 5, 2011

Are inflation expectations firmly anchored in India?

There is very strong evidence to claim that supply constraints in foodgrains are driving inflation in India. However, the RBI has preferred to tighten the monetary policy on the grounds that uncontrolled headline inflation would unleash inflationary expectations that would spill-over into the economy.

In this context, Paul Krugman has an excellent post that compares the headline and core inflation in the US over a 40 year period. He finds that since the eighties, core inflation has remained more or less stable despite considerable volatility in headline inflation.



Krugman argues that the prices of food and fuel may rise or fall by double-digit amounts over the course of a year, then quickly reverse that rise or fall, whereas those of services (and most wages) and manufactured goods are set for periods of months or years. The latter are slow to develop inflation, but also slow to give it up, which is why policy should focus on whether those prices have started to rise too fast (or too slowly).

He also refers to the works of Edmund Phelps who thought that "wages were set mainly in reference to other wages, implying that swings in oil or wheat prices were largely irrelevant to the story". Krugman agrees with Pehlps - "if we think of wages as the ultimate core price, I don’t see any mechanism in today’s America whereby rising commodity prices translate into higher wage contracts."

However a comparison of similar sticky and flexible inflation in India yields different results. In fact, the wholesale price inflation (WPI) for manufactured products shows considerable volatility and mirrors the changes in WPI for primary articles, albeit at lower amplitude.



This does raise questions about whether we can conclude, in the Indian context, as Phelps and Krugman that the prices of manufactured goods are set largely in isolation from the changes in primary articles. There is a relationship between the volatility in primary articles and manufactured products which cannot be ignored. This also means that inflation expectations are not as firmly anchored in India, as in more developed economies like the US.

There is surely a greater role for monetary policy in such circumstances, though it is debatable as to what are its boundaries.

Friday, February 4, 2011

Off-loading construction risks in infrastructure

I have blogged earlier about the different models of infrastructure financing here, here, and here. Those posts also highlighted the importance of construction risks in developing countries and how such risks could be more effectively managed by governments. Post-construction, the assets could be contracted out (minus the construction risks) to private contractors.

The Bandra-Worli Sea Link (BWSL) was built at a cost of Rs 1800 Cr, several years behind schedule and at substantial cost over-runs. Once constructed, the Maharashtra Government (through the Mahrashtra State Road Development Corporation, MSRDC) have contracted out its maintenance and toll collection to Reliance Infrastructure for the next 40 years, starting from April 1, 2011.

In 32 months, starting from April 1, Reliance Infrastructure will construct the new 3.8 km sea-link between Worli and Haji Ali (WHSL), with connectors at Worli and Haji Ali. The contractor will recover the total cost of maintaining BWSL as well as construction and maintenance of WHSL for 40 years by charging toll from commuters.

Under the terms of the concession agreement, the contractor will make an upfront payment of Rs 1634 Cr and the toll rates will increase at the rate of 3% each year. The toll rates for BWSL, before and after completion of WHSL, have been fixed.

This model of contracting out the maintenance and toll-collection of BWSL in the immediate aftermath of its construction and recovering the public investment has important lessons for public policy in infrastructure. It aligns the incentives of all the stakeholders into a model that involves the most optimal distribution of risks.

It is all the more significant for countries like India where construction risks (delays and cost over-runs) are substantial and market forecasts are fraught with uncertainty. Shorn off these risks, these investments are likely to draw in capital at very attractive terms. The resultant lower cost of capital will have a substantial impact on the total cost and the financial viability of the project itself.

Further, it also addresses other concerns like traffic risk, a common challenge with road projects. Once the project (in this case, road) is commissioned and fully operational, it becomes possible for bidders to assess the traffic potential and its risks, and thereby make more informed bids. In case of the BWSL, the bidders can therefore bid with a much greater knowledge of the project's traffic outcome.

With construction risk off-loaded and traffic risk mitigated considerably, BWSL can attract financing capital at much lower cost. The MSRDC therefore would be able to capture much greater value from its concession agreement with the private operator.