Europe's immediate challenge is to stave off the possibility of some members not being able to refinance their debts. The bond market yields on government debt of the peripheral economies have been rising swiftly. Markets now perceive the strong possibility of a Euro exit and are pricing in that possibility. And that's being reflected in these higher yields. In the absence of measures to mitigate this concern, a messy unravelling of the Eurozone is inevitable.
In many ways, this run on sovereign debt is surprising. The sovereign debt positions of these economies, except Greece and Italy, is better or no worse than that of many others outside the Eurozone with much lower bond yields. For example, Spain has among the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios among all the major economies. But it is now at the greatest risk of being denied market access for its debt. But United States and Britain with much higher public debt ratios are enjoying historic low cost of public borrowing. Even within Europe, many of the economies outside the Eurozone with higher public debt ratios have much lower yields.
In other words, solvency and economic fundamentals are not at the heart of the issue. All these economies appear to be facing a liquidity crisis. In fact, the financial crisis and economic recession threatens to precipitate a sovereign debt crisis. So clearly, there is something amiss. In his excellent new book, Paul Krugman has this explanation,
In fact, the importance of this is underlined by the manner in which the last round of such panic was redressed with the second round of Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) loans in March. These unlimited three-year loans by the ECB at low interest rates were quickly lapped up by the Eurozone banks and then used to buy sovereign bonds, which in turn experienced a sudden fall in yields. However, once its effects tapered off, market confidence has dipped and yields have been soaring.
Now, instead of this circuitous route, Eurozone needs ECB to explicitly emerge as a lender of last resort. Only this alone can allay market fears and stabilize the sovereign debt market.
Update 1 (9/6/2012)
Nouriel Roubini and Niall Ferguson advocate direct bank recapitalisation (by purchases of preferred non-voting shares of eurozone banks by the European Financial Stability Facility and its successor, the European Stability Mechanism), European deposit insurance (which has to be coupled with appropriate bank levies and a resolution mechanism in which unsecured creditors take the hit before taxpayers money is hit), and debt mutualisation (through some form of Eurobonds) as necessary for any resolution of Eurozone debt problems.
In many ways, this run on sovereign debt is surprising. The sovereign debt positions of these economies, except Greece and Italy, is better or no worse than that of many others outside the Eurozone with much lower bond yields. For example, Spain has among the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios among all the major economies. But it is now at the greatest risk of being denied market access for its debt. But United States and Britain with much higher public debt ratios are enjoying historic low cost of public borrowing. Even within Europe, many of the economies outside the Eurozone with higher public debt ratios have much lower yields.
In other words, solvency and economic fundamentals are not at the heart of the issue. All these economies appear to be facing a liquidity crisis. In fact, the financial crisis and economic recession threatens to precipitate a sovereign debt crisis. So clearly, there is something amiss. In his excellent new book, Paul Krugman has this explanation,
Just about every modern government has a fair bit of debt, and it's not all thirty-year bonds; there's a lot of very short-term debt with a maturity of only a few months, plus two-, three-, or five-year bonds, many of which come due in any given year. Governments depend on eing able to roll over most of this debt, in effect selling new bonds to pay off old ones. If for some reason investors should refuse to buy new bonds, even a basically solvent government could be forced into default...
This immediately creates the possibility of a self-fulfilling crisis, in which investors' efars of a default brought on by a cash squeeze lead them to shun a country's bonds, bringing on the very cash squeeze they fear. And even if such a crisis hasn't happened yet... ongoing nervousness about the possibility of such crises can lead investors to demand higher interest rates in order to hold debt of countries potentially subject to such self-fulfilling panic.The fundamental issue is that all the major economies are backed by their respective central banks which have unlimited cheque writing powers (atleast technically) and are virtual lenders and insurers of last resort. Markets have realized that with the ECB statutorily barred from lending directly to governments, the Eurozone members face no such backstop facility. If Spain or any other country faces a run on their banks, they cannot count on the ECB to step in with emergency cash assistance. Nor can the countries themselves print Euros. Eurozone members, therefore, face a Euro penalty which reflects in their sovereign debt premiums.
In fact, the importance of this is underlined by the manner in which the last round of such panic was redressed with the second round of Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) loans in March. These unlimited three-year loans by the ECB at low interest rates were quickly lapped up by the Eurozone banks and then used to buy sovereign bonds, which in turn experienced a sudden fall in yields. However, once its effects tapered off, market confidence has dipped and yields have been soaring.
Now, instead of this circuitous route, Eurozone needs ECB to explicitly emerge as a lender of last resort. Only this alone can allay market fears and stabilize the sovereign debt market.
Update 1 (9/6/2012)
Nouriel Roubini and Niall Ferguson advocate direct bank recapitalisation (by purchases of preferred non-voting shares of eurozone banks by the European Financial Stability Facility and its successor, the European Stability Mechanism), European deposit insurance (which has to be coupled with appropriate bank levies and a resolution mechanism in which unsecured creditors take the hit before taxpayers money is hit), and debt mutualisation (through some form of Eurobonds) as necessary for any resolution of Eurozone debt problems.
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