Corporate India's wish-list is not India's reform wish-list

Times of India carries a wish-list of reforms for the next government to get "growth and development back on track" from some of the distinguished "thought leaders and captains of industry". I am not sure whether this is a wish-list for 'India' or for 'corporate India'.

It is staggering that improving regular governance and public service delivery, poor quality of school education, skills development, universal health care (aside from the Professor), universal social safety net, and so on do not get even a passing mention. In fact, none of the measures proposed have anything to do with rural development. This a testament to how detached corporate India has become from the vast majority of India. It also explains corporate India's attraction for economic growth, with little concern for its distributional consequences.  

I have no issues with corporate leaders championing their private business interests. But the problem starts when purely partisan lobbying masquerades as promotion of national development. What is in India's national interest goes much beyond what is good for corporate India. And evidently "captains of (Indian) industry" are not exactly the best proponents of "general national interest". 

Industrial Policy is not just about clusters and concessions

A Business Standard article writes,

At the aggregate level, SEZs appear to have made a significant contribution to investment and exports. They have received investment of over Rs 2.39 lakh crore. Exports from SEZs have seen a dramatic jump from Rs 22,840 crore in 2005-06 to Rs 4.76 lakh crore in 2012-13. But a disaggregated analysis is less favourable. Of the 589 formally approved and 389 notified SEZs, only 170 are operational. Further, only two SEZs accounted for nearly 42 per cent of the total SEZ exports in 2011: the Jamnagar refinery and DLF Infosys Mangalore. The share of FDI also remains abysmally small. Not only that, the proposed FDI in newly notified SEZs has been declining. It has declined from Rs 34,509 crore as on 31 December 2009 to Rs 30,964 crore in September 2010 and then further to Rs 26,984.4 crore as on March 31, 2012.

A major share of the growth also is a simple case of displacement of economic activity that would in any case have materialized but was attracted to the SEZs by the concessions provided.

It is lazy thinking to assume that we could easily solve our numerous structural problems - onerous labor market regulations, credit constraints, skilled human resource deficiency, infrastructure bottlenecks, excessive and costly business regulations, and weak contract enforcement - by establishing enclaves of industrial activity and providing concessions to encourage businesses. The New Manufacturing Policy (NMP) too makes the same mistake, little realizing that much the same has been happening since 1965, with limited success.

Most of the efforts of state and central governments at improving business environment has focused on providing fiscal and other concessions, overlooking the other more important challenge of removing structural and regulatory barriers to doing business in India. India's manufacturing will grow not because government will set up a few industrial zones or provide concessions. It will happen when we addresses the aforementioned structural problems and creates economy-wide (and not merely restricted to some clusters) conditions required for achieving global competitiveness. And that goes way beyond cosmetic solutions. 

Some thoughts on a second-best contracting in oil and gas

Kazakhstan's Kashagan oil field can easily lay claim to being the most expensive infrastructure project in the world. Discovered in 2000, the off-shore oil field in the North Caspian Sea is widely considered the largest oil discovery in the past 30 years. It is estimated to hold 35 billion barrels of reserves and 10 billion barrels of recoverable oil, and 1 trillion cubic meters of natural gas.

The field is being developed by North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC), a consortium of state oil firm Kaz Munai Gas, Italy's ENI, US Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and France's Total, each holding 16.81% share, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with 8.3% and Japan Inpex 7.56%. Though the field is estimated to produce a staggering 8 mbpd by 2014 and 12 mbpd by 2015, it has so far not produced anything despite 13 years of development and nearly $55 bn in investment. This has to be seen against the original investment estimate of $10 bn.

The Kashagan field is a good example of the challenges with off-shore oil and gas exploration. The standard PSCs have royalty payments or taxes predicated either on a return on investment or calibrated cost recovery. Exploration firms are wary of the geological and other technical risks, apart from the various expropriation and other political risks, that can potentially cripple them. Governments become too eager to lay their hands on the massive windfall from the newly discovered reserves.

The fundamental issue with any PSC is how the royalty payments should be structured so as to provide adequate comfort for investors without compromising on the interests of the government. Too liberal an arrangement, especially those that allow developers to scoop windfall gains when oil prices rise, increases expropriation risks. A conservative PSC, with back-loaded cost recovery, increases the risks for investors and thereby discourage exploration.

The exploration firms prefer front-loaded production sharing contracts (PSCs), where they try to recover their investments as quickly as possible. Governments prefer to go the other way, back-loading royalty outflows so that they can start getting their share as soon as production starts. The commercial attractiveness of participating in large fields coupled with incentive distortions within governments (say, corruption) means that incomplete PSCs are inevitable in such environments.

Incomplete PSCs have spawned a series of re-negotiations. International experience, not just in oil and gas, shows that these re-negotiations, done when the project has run into crisis, generally benefit the concessionaire. In the final analysis, the government ends up conceding more than what the concessionaire had demanded before the original contract was signed.

Apart from its strategic value, governments are attracted to oil and gas by the large profits from it. Since the marginal cost of production of oil is often $15-20, and the prevailing market prices are in excess of $100, the business is extremely profitable. Both governments and exploration firms eye this massive differential, or oil rents. Each tries to pursue contracts which protect their interests, mostly at the cost of the other.

It is therefore no surprise that there are not too many successful examples of "fair" sharing of oil rents across the world. The more successful example comes from Australia's resource tax, which tries to reconcile the interests of both government and the exploration firm. It allows firms to make a profit of 10% return on investment before royalty payments being. After this, a progressively increasing tax/royalty kicks-in, so as to capture the windfall that comes from higher oil prices. In fact, the royalty rate is smaller in the initial years and increases with time. Its success also depends on the country's credibility with the investors as well as its strong institutional capacity to monitor investments.

This also means that its replicability to developing country contexts is limited. Country risks, especially high in the oil sector, is not very readily mitigated, if at all. Reliably assessing capital investments, especially in off-shore fields, so as to monitor PSC's is most often beyond the competence of national regulators, especially of the smaller economies.

Experience from across the world shows that simple gross production royalty-based PSCs, as in the US, are not likely to be effective. The peculiar nature of natural resource ownership (in the US, land owners own the natural resources underneath their land) that has allowed private individuals (and who prefer the simpler signing bonus plus royalty arrangements) to allow prospecting on their lands coupled with the country's strong institutional systems have been critical to the success of this model in the US.

Such PSC's, which transfers to the government a share of the revenues or output, as soon as production starts and without waiting for the investors to recover their costs, are simple to monitor. But this regulatory simplicity comes with sub-optimal risk allocation. They extend the project cost recovery period, thereby amplifying the risks borne by investors.

Oil exporting countries have tended to view the sector from the perspective of revenue maximization whereas importers have sought to incentivize investments in exploration. India belongs to the later category and this should continue to form the basis of its petroleum policy. But, as a second-best alternative, a more sophisticated PSC may be the best bet for countries like India. It should include certain features.

1. The PSC should provide adequate flexibility for investors to recover their investments within a reasonable period of time. The investment recovery schedule should be carefully structured, with annual cash-flow being distributed in some proportion between recovering investments and profits from the first year itself. Here too, the share of "profit oil" can be structured to increase slowly with time. 

2. The contract should seek to cap the upside beyond a reasonable level. This is sound economics and prudent politics. It would discourage the developer from changing production in response to global price signals, and also minimize the prospects of popular backlash if world prices rise high enough to generate windfall gains. An Australia type progressively increasing tax regime enables the government to capture a large share of the upside.

3. Given the limited competition in oil exploration and refining, most governments have sought to keep their respective national oil companies involved in exploration projects, in even those with private developers. While their role has varied widely and government's motivations have been revenue maximization, it has served to keep the private firms honest besides enabling governments retain control over the project. It may therefore be prudent to keep the ONGC involved in these projects.

4. Regulatory regimes in complex markets like oil exploration should not be cast in stone. Regulators should constantly learn from ongoing contracts and refine provisions, prospectively, to optimize the contractual outcomes for both sides. This is especially so since the underlying price signals in markets like that for natural gas are heavily distorted and can change dramatically with policy changes by important governments - imagine the impact on JCC prices due to a liberalized LNG export regime in the US west coast.

The success of such PSCs depend critically on the regulator's capacity to reliably monitor investments. For a country like India, whose bigger concern is incentivizing investments and boosting local production, an arrangement that suitably takes into account the interests of investors may be a more prudent way forward. India, which is a large fuel importer, and is therefore primed to encouraging investments, should strongly consider the establishment of a small highly competent group to help regulators enforce PSCs. In this context, the Brazilian National Petroleum Agency, which has highly competent professionals, remunerated at higher than regular public sector wages, is an example worthy of emulation.

All this is no certainty for a successful oil and gas exploration policy. But, given the complex nature of the issue, it stands a greater chance of success. 

India's structural transformation challenge

There is now strong evidence that countries grow not by producing more of the same goods but by producing more goods of increasing complexity. Prof Ricardo Hausmann describes this in terms of a country's capabilities (or tacit productive knowledge), which are encapsulated in the products it makes. Countries grow when they acquire more capabilities, and upgrade, or move up the product ‘escalator’, from their current products to other, usually more sophisticated products. But this movement, commonly described as structural transformation, is easier between closely related products, or where there exists complementarities in the required capabilities. 

What has been India's performance with the process of structural transformation? Let me highlight the trends using data from World Bank's World Development Indicators and trade data from the CID's Atlas of Economic Complexity.

Among countries with similar percapita GDP, Indian economy has always had a very high level of complexity, as endowed in its export products. In fact, even as late as 2000, India's Economic Complexity Index (ECI) has been similar to that of China.

This has remained so till about 2005. But since then, the two countries have diverged sharply in their respective paths up the escalator, with China pulling away from India.

It's not just that China has pulled away with a dramatic structural transformation of its manufacturing economy, it has also been that India has stagnated, performing slightly worse than countries with similar per capita GDP.

This story is all the more surprising since India's product diversity provides it a very favorable location in the product space, better than any other country, including China. In other words, given its current product space, India is best positioned to jump into more complex products which leverage the existing production complementarities.

But, despite the initial advantages and vast opportunities, India has not been able to capitalize in moving up the manufacturing value chain (or industrial escalator). In fact, its opportunity value has increased in the 1998-2000 period, another pointer to the failure to realize the potential opportunities to move up the value chain. It is also a reflection of the relative stagnation in its manufacturing sector. As a corollary, the decline in China's opportunity value in the same field comes from the fact that it has realized much of the gains from moving up the escalator.

Clearly, the slow pace of structural transformation is a binding constraint on India's economic growth. This is also evident from various other measures of a stagnant manufacturing sector. Manufacturing's share of the GDP has been stagnant at 14-16% for more than three decades, a period which saw the rise of the East Asian economies.

Interestingly, as the graphic above shows, unlike the others, India has traditionally had a disproportionately small manufacturing base. So it is clear that there are deep structural constraints that prevent growth of the country's manufacturing sector, and they have been binding all along our recent history.  

Market competition and student learning outcomes

The latest PISA report is out. The big stories are the expected consolidation at the top by the East Asian countries and the surprising decline of the poster child of school education, Finland.

An equally interesting story is the even bigger decline of another traditional high performer, Sweden. In the 2006-12 period, it has fallen precipitously from 21st to 38th position in Math and 10th to 37th in Reading, both easily being the worst performances in the respective categories. What explains this trend?

Interestingly, over the past two decades, Sweden has undertaken certain fundamental reforms in its education system, most notably the increased involvement of private sector. Private, for-profit schools, Friskolas, were allowed, and parents were given tax-funded vouchers to pay for a school of their choice. The result is that almost a quarter of the country's secondary school students attend voucher-funded private schools, almost twice the global average. A recent report wrote,

Sweden replaced one of the world's most tightly regulated school systems with one of the most deregulated.. . The private schools brought in many practices once found exclusively in the corporate world, such as performance-based bonuses for staff and advertising in Stockholm's subway system, while competition has put teachers under pressure to award higher grades and market their schools.  

Many of the outcomes were completely predictable. Private participation and deregulation was accompanied by the inevitable problems of deteriorating quality. The Schools Inspectorate has found high-profile cases of private operators focusing merely on getting students to pass-grade instead of improving quality, stocking up on temporary teachers without required qualifications, and schools without adequate facilities. And the inexorable logic of choice,

As the best students flock to certain schools, standards suffer at the schools they leave behind. 

For the researchers and education "experts", who spend millions of dollars with sanitized micro-experiments of all kinds to assess the effectiveness of school-vouchers and private participation in education, the results from Sweden should be of much greater interest. In particular, Sweden's experience has much to enlighten about the debate about school vouchers. Furthermore, it is also a very good test case for the scaled version of the school voucher system, private participation, and deregulation. Since it has been on for nearly two decades, its general equilibrium effects are a more reliable barometer of such complex reforms.

Correlation is not causation. But neither is experimental research the gold-standard for determining causation. My only brief here is that we need to tread with extreme caution with such profound school reforms. Any aggressive push for private participation in schooling, especially in countries with weak state capability, is most certain to fall far short of expectations.

The PISA test assesses math, reading, and science competencies of more than half a million 15-16 year-olds in 65 countries/regions representing 28 million children of that age group. It is widely acknowledged as a touchstone for schooling excellence, including conceptual understanding, in all major countries of the world, except India!

Ireland's non-recovery?

Ireland, which received a $92.9 bn bailout in return for a very strong dose of austerity, apparently has become the first crisis-hit European country to regain market access. Its fiscal deficit has shrunk from 30% of GDP in 2010 to 7.5% for 2013. But the cost, as this NYT article highlights, may have been prohibitive, 

The government cut 30 billion euros in spending, or nearly 20% of gross domestic product, one of the largest austerity programs anywhere. New taxes were introduced. Salaries for public employees were cut by around 20%, and reductions in unemployment and welfare benefits followed. The bill to bail out Ireland’s banks has amounted to nearly €10,000 per Irish citizen... As the austerity measures have played out, the number of people in need has jumped. Homelessness is up nearly 20% since 2010. A study by Growing Up in Ireland tracking 11,000 families with young children found 67% could not afford basic necessities, and were behind on utility bills, rent and the mortgage.

Consumer spending has been flat. Through the end of the third quarter this year, 18.5% of homeowners had missed a mortgage payment and 12.5% were three months or more behind on their repayments, according to the central bank. Half of all loans to small- and medium-size business are also in arrears. More than 200,000 of Ireland’s population of 4.6 million have emigrated since 2008. Youth unemployment is 28%. Over 60% of job seekers have been out of work for a year or more. And 20% of children now live in households where neither parent works, the highest rate in the European Union.

Ireland's 10 year sovereign bond yields may have plummeted from 14.5% to 3.5%. But in the absence of any economic growth and the sharp cut in public spending, I am not sure how the country can recover fully without prolonged period of slow growth. Even as the economy has been contracting, public debt to GDP has ballooned to over 120%. It will rise further, unless growth picks up smartly in the near-term.

At the same time, unemployment rate has risen to 13% and labor force participation rate has fallen from 64% in 2009 to 60%.

One area where the savage austerity has been successful is in the country regaining its labor competitiveness vis-a-vis Germany. But ironically, the depressed wages are most likely to keep the aggregate demand muted for some time to come, thereby discouraging private investments and in turn further constraining growth.

Update 1 (1/10/2014)

Fintan O'Toole writes about the illusion of recovery from austerity policies, "an unreal image of slimmed-down perfection".

Two more graphs on QE

This striking graphic points to relative equity market performances of regular goods and luxury goods retailers. The sharp divergence in the aftermath of the inception of QE may constitute the largest wealth transfer in history.

Central banks have virtually taken over the bond market. At $1.6 trillion in 2013, central bank purchases account for more than half of all bond market transactions. It is no surprise that taper will have a large impact on the bond market.

Capital markets development in emerging economies

Deepening and broadening of capital markets, in particular debt markets, have been at the top of the agenda for developing countries for many years now. But global experience does not appear promising, a throwback to the original sin hypothesis.

As can be seen, non-financial businesses form a very small share of total national debt. More prominently, government debt takes up nearly half the share of debt in both India and Brazil, thereby lending credence to the crowding-out hypothesis. 
India's non-financial debt market has been growing in recent years, though government dominates the market.

The depth of global financial markets varies widely between developed and developing countries. It is in the range of 400-500% in developed economies, whereas it is in the range of 100-250% in emerging economies. However, in these emerging economies, the share of non-financial corporate debt and securitized loans is minuscule. For example in India, of the 42% of non-financial debt, just 4.8% (or 2% of GDP) is held as long-term bonds. It is no different in China, where while non-financial debt forms 96% of GDP, just 4.1% is held as long-term bonds. In fact, even in Latin America where most countries undertook big-bang capital market liberalizing reforms and put in place state of art regulation, non-financial bonds were just 2% of  GDP.

Globally, the rapid growth in financial stock since 2000 has been led by growth in equity markets, public debt securities, and financial institution bonds. The share of non-financial corporate bonds is relatively small and concentrated mostly in US and Europe.

Clearly, as the graphic shows, there is enormous potential for financial markets deepening across developing countries.

Indian corporates remain overwhelmingly dependent on banks and internal resources for capital mobilization. The share of corporate funding that came from internal resources remain elevated
at 30.8% in 2010-11, just down from 35.8% in 2000-01. In fact, new equity has fallen from 17.2% to 13.8% in the same period. More interestingly, the share of corporate bonds has hardly moved from 3.5% to 3.9%, a far lower than the 17% in China.

Despite the wave of financial market liberalization and the resultant surge in capital mobilization, domestic and foreign, private debt securities markets have remained relatively small. This is stark contrast to the rapid growth in equity markets and bank deposits.

In fact, globally too capital markets have remained elusive everywhere except the US. Globally, equity and bank loans have dwarfed long-term bonds as sources of infrastructure finance.

This trend is evident across Asia, Europe, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Only in US and Canada, do capital markets assume a significant share.

Does this mean that the quest for development of long-term bond markets is not a very realistic one? If so, where does the capital for financing infrastructure projects come from?

More on auditing infrastructure projects

Mint reports that India's Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has found the Government of India's Civil Aviation Ministry guilty of favoring the private concessionaire modernizing Mumbai airport with "undue benefits" amounting to atleast Rs 5887 Cr (~ $1 bn). The airport modernization project, initiated in 2006, is being executed by Mumbai International Airport Ltd (MIAL), a consortium led by GVK Power and Infrastructure Ltd (GVKPIL).

The latest cost of the project, originally estimated to be commissioned in 2010 at a cost of Rs 5826 Cr, is Rs 11647 Cr and the last completion deadline was for end-2013. The Government, through the Airport Authority of India (AAI) has 26% of equity in MIAL. A few observations from the report.

1. The report finds fault with the MIAL promoters' refusal to raise their equity investments despite the AAI offering their willingness to pare down debt and raise equity. It writes, "It appears that government of India, acting through AAI, was ready to infuse more equity ... the private party was not willing to take risk which is not acceptable." 

This is a surprising observation. Undoubtedly, raising equity would have lowered the cost of capital and the project riskiness, both of which would benefit the government. However, altering the original project capital structure would affect profitability of the original investments. Raising equity, as in this case, would lower the returns on equity investors. Why should MIAL or any other private investor agree to this, even if the government stakeholder is volunteering with more capital? 

2. Another observation by the CAG about the implications of the doubling of project cost on the capital structure is more pertinent. It writes, "It was also noticed that the debt of MIAL has not altered even as the project cost nearly doubled. This indicates that the finance risk for the project was not appropriately transferred to the concessionaire." Most of the increased project cost was passed on to the passengers in the form of higher Development Fees (DF). 

However, it may not be as simple as that. Though it is not clear as to how the upfront investment capital for the cost over-run was raised, it was most probably done through debt issued against the DF cash flow. If that is the case, and even if this debt did not reside with MIAL and is held by another SPV, then it may not be that bad. Then the question of how the cash-flow waterfall (which lays out the charge of various financiers on the net profits) is structured then assumes significance. 

3. The CAG report also finds fault with the Aviation Ministry for not imposing liquidated damages for the construction delays and allowing extension till 2013. Now, almost all big projects, done as PPP or otherwise, suffer delays. Most of these delays are due to context-specific factors that are beyond those of any one actor. Liquidated damages are imposed under exceptional circumstances when the cause of delay is obvious. It is of course possible that the poor governance within the Ministry, a very real possibility, contributed to mis-aligning the incentives of the developer.

While such omissions are not to be condoned, an indiscriminate application of this principle (that all delays should be penalized with liquidated damages), without regard for the extenuating project circumstances (and there are many of them), can be a death knell for many projects. Fear of being hauled up by the auditors is already causing project engineers to not take decisions on even genuine requests for time extension and cost escalation, thereby causing further delays. Policy paralysis is never far away.  

4. The CAG attributes a presumptive loss of Rs 5887 Cr for 11 acres of additional land, over and above that contractually agreed, transferred to MIAL. The basis of this is the estimation that the earning potential of 196.1 acres of land over a 60-year lease period is Rs 104,897.81 Cr. Such presumptive loss estimations are hazardous. In the instant case, as the AAI pointed out in its reply, such estimations may not be reliable in view of the fact that a significant share of the land is filled with encroachments, some including wholesale slums. 

5. The CAG also point out that the creation of eight subsidiaries by MIAL, without permission of AAI, and the outsourcing of its activities on revenue sharing arrangements would be detrimental to AAI's interest. This assumes great significance since MIAL has to share 38.7% of its revenues with AAI and the outsourcing of work will create conflict of interest concerns involving transfer pricing (paying higher prices to the subsidiary and thereby transferring profits) and profit dilution. 

German Manufacturing Lessons

Germany recently recorded the largest monthly trade surplus by any country ever, of €20 billion this September. NYT has two stories that nicely illustrate the reasons behind Germany's success with retaining and growing manufacturing jobs in the country, even as the rest of the developed world struggles with the same challenge. 

The first is a story about Faber Castell, the world's largest maker of pencils, pens, crayons, markers, and other drawing and writing supplies. It writes,

Faber-Castell illustrates how midsize companies — which account for about 60 percent of the country’s jobs — are able to stay competitive in the global marketplace. It has focused on design and engineering, developed a knack for turning everyday products into luxury goods, and stuck to a conviction that it still makes sense to keep some production in Germany.... In contrast to many American companies, like Apple, that have outsourced nearly all production to Asia, Faber-Castell and many other German companies make a point of keeping a critical mass of manufacturing in Germany. They see it as central to preserving the link between design, engineering and the factory floor...

While the basic design of a pencil has not changed much in 400 years, Faber-Castell has managed to find ways to be unique. For example, in the late 1990s, it developed a triangular pencil with raised dots that make it easier to hold. That proved popular. Innovations include the use of water-based coatings to make pencils more environmentally friendly, as well as nontoxic to compulsive pencil chewers...

Even boxes of the highest-quality Faber-Castell colored pencils and artists’ markers can easily cost hundreds of dollars. It is this focus on the premium end of the market that has enabled German companies to survive in markets flooded by low-cost Asian alternatives. Mercedes and Audi cars are good examples of this, but German companies have also achieved similar success with more mundane products like Rösle kitchen implements, Steiff stuffed animals and Falke socks. 

The other story is about the famous German apprentice system which has kept the supply of skilled manpower flowing to meet the demand from manufacturing firms, besides easing labor market problems that have bedeviled other developed economies. About Germany's 1.8 million apprentices, it writes,

In Germany, apprentices divide their time between classroom training in a public vocational school and practical training at a company or small firm. Some 330 types of apprenticeships are accredited by the government in Berlin, including such jobs as hairdresser, roofer and automobile electronics specialist. About 60 percent of German high school students go through some kind of apprenticeship program, which leads to a formal certificate in the chosen skill and often a permanent job at the company where the young person trained.

And about South Carolina's experiment with trying to embrace the apprenticeship system to alleviate shortage of skilled workers,

Still, the close cooperation between employers and the state educational system is unusual, and despite initial skepticism on both sides, apprenticeship opportunities are rapidly expanding both for high-school age students and for older workers. Apprenticeship Carolina started in 2007 with 777 students at 90 companies. It now has 4,500 students at more than 600 companies in the state, with the typical apprentice in his or her late 20s. Mr. Neese’s goal is to have 2,000 companies by 2020... it links the state’s technical college system with private companies to help create specialized programs. 

Replication of the German business culture outside the country may remain a distant possibility, though the adoption of the apprentice model may be a more realistic project. In fact, for countries like India, with ambitious manufacturing sector goals, such apprentice systems may be the only practical way to assure the supply of medium-skilled manpower required by manufacturing firms.